

deposits of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. The consolidation of the situation in the Crimea and on the left-bank Ukraine was recognized as a precondition for a large summer offensive. This decision of the OKH command foreshadowed a difficult for both sides introductory "game" near Kerch and near Kharkov.

Further, it was supposed to completely master the Donbass and go to Rostov-on-Don. From that moment on, German operational thought was bifurcated. Army Group "B"¹ was to advance to the east, push back Soviet troops across the Don and Volga rivers and capture the cities of Voronezh and Stalingrad. Astrakhan. Group "A" turned sharply to the south and since the spring

¹ of 1942, Army Group "South" was organizationally divided into Army Groups "A" and "B", although it was issued only in July. 261

turned the movement to the Caucasus. The decisive stage of the summer campaign, therefore, was the creation of a strong strategic position in the south, passing along the Caucasus Range, the coast of the Caspian Sea, the lower Volga, the Don River.

From this position, it was supposed to continue the offensive in a southerly direction, overcome the Caucasus, capture the oil fields of Baku and enter Iran through Armenia. According to the OKB, the troops of E. Rommel, who, so far, were on the border of Egypt and Libya, were to advance there, towards Army Group A, according to the OKB. It was assumed that the tank army "Africa" would defeat the British troops in Egypt, force the Nile and the Suez Canal, enter Palestine and, in the future, take possession of the entire Middle East in cooperation with the troops advancing from Russia. It is clear that no one discussed the issue of "powering" this grandiose offensive with tanks, aircraft, people, ammunition and, most importantly, fuel. These transcontinental "pincers" are not all! Having united and regrouped, the German troops were to move from the regions of Transcaucasia and the Middle East to British India and through the western spurs of the Himalayas to reach the Indus Valley, where they would meet with Japanese troops advancing from the Burma region. The British historian B. Liddell-Gart evaluates this plan quite highly: "the Germans were closer to

success than it seems after a complete and catastrophic failure." But it seems to me that the idea of the OKW does not deserve a plan of consideration at all. It is thought out worse than even the deployment of Barbarossa and only confirms the crisis of the operational component of German military art. Among the reasons that make it impossible to attack India through the Himalayan passes, I will point out only one, not the most important one: insufficient "altitude" of tank engines. Even if we consider that part of the operation that lay within the physical capabilities of the German soldiers - I'm talking about the first stage of the general offensive in the south -

the inadequacy of the German plan both in terms of available forces and in general principles of strategy looms. The Nazis advanced on the strategic flank, leaving the center unsecured. Moscow with its communication network

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was at the disposal of the Soviet command, and as the Wehrmacht moved south and east, the importance of this factor should only increase. Ultimately, it turned out that the Germans, with their best (of the remaining) divisions, were drawn into the gap between the Volga and the Black Sea, hoping in the ideal case to obtain a mutually blockaded position, completely unsuitable for the development of the offensive. In the event that the Russian troops retained significant bridgeheads beyond the Volga and Don, the position turned out to be unilaterally blocked for the Germans¹.

The problem of supplying the advancing groupings in the Don steppes is not

was decided and not even put at the planning stage. The same applies to the problem of the engine life of German tanks with their narrow tracks.

In addition, to cover the ever-stretching flanks of Army Group B, A. Hitler decided to enlist the troops of the allies: Romanians, Hungarians and Italians. By political pressure on the satellites, he achieved his goal, but now the judge

¹ A position is called "mutually blocked" if the offensive is unprofitable for either side. If one side can advance and the other cannot, the latter is said to be blockaded. The simplest example of a mutually blocked position is a large river. To force it, you need to expend strength, form a bridgehead, build bridges ... for a long time, until the bridgehead is fully consolidated with the main position, it is very vulnerable. Therefore, "ceteris paribus", forcing a large river, you need to have an advantage in strength. If the Germans really threw back the Soviet troops behind the Caucasus Range, behind the Volga and (in the Voronezh region) behind the Don, the position took on the appearance of a mutually blocked one. The Germans could not advance to the east and, with great difficulty, to the south, but the Russian troops also had to have a great superiority of forces in order to decide to upset the balance. Let us assume, however, that the Soviet troops managed to retain significant footholds north of the Caucasus and west of the lower Volga (as they did in 1942). Then the German army finds itself in a very difficult situation: an offensive is extremely dangerous for it and probably impossible. Russian troops, on the other hand, can accumulate troops on bridgeheads, waiting for the right moment to strike. It is possible, of course, to withdraw troops beyond the Don, but such a withdrawal would mean complete bankruptcy of the offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht. Indeed, what is the point of climbing into the Volga steppes if it is still impossible to keep this territory within the framework of the positional "game"? 263



Strategic plans of the parties for 1942

ba of the advancing divisions of the Wehrmacht was made directly dependent on the stamina of the involved military contingents¹. In the middle of

¹ 1942, there were 14 Finnish divisions and 8 brigades on the Eastern Front, 7 Romanian divisions and 7 brigades, 3 Hungarian divisions and 2 brigades, 3 Italian, 2 Slovak and 1 Spanish divisions ("blue"). The combat effectiveness of these formations was very low, which was convincingly demonstrated by the battle near Odessa in the summer of 1941. In addition, the war with the USSR did not arouse any enthusiasm among either the Hungarians, or the Slovaks, or the Italians, or even the Romanians (the latter had at least a reason - the annexation of Bessarabia in 1940). From a technical point of view, the Allied contingents were a long turned page in military history and were completely dependent on German technical and organizational assistance. During the summer-autumn of 1942, the number of allied contingents on the Eastern Front increased. 264

In connection with the new strategic initiatives of the OKW, the importance of Crimea has changed dramatically. In 1941, we qualified the operations of the 11th German Army on the peninsula as a serious mistake. While von Bock was preparing an offensive against Moscow, and Army Group South was deploying the first operations on the left-bank Ukraine and in the Sea of Azov, the task of capturing the Crimea should not even have been set. One army corps consisting of two or three divisions was absolutely enough to hold Perekop and cover the directions to Kherson, Kakhovka and Melitopol. If the forces stationed in the Crimea would go on a serious offensive and overturn this barrier (which would take a lot of time and effort), Army Group South would only be glad to cut them off from the peninsula with a counterattack under the base of the ledge and defeat them in an "open field". In other words, such an offensive, improbable in itself, would create problems only for those who led it. Having launched an offensive in the

Crimea, the German command achieved an impressive victory and, of course, neutralized in advance the possible actions of the Primorsky Army against the rear of Army Group South. But the price of this - distraction from the main tasks of the whole army, led by the best commander of the Reich - was excessive. The 11th Army could have resolved the crisis near Rostov in favor of von Runstedt. It would have been even more rational to transfer it to the north, creating a strong grouping between Orel and Kursk, consisting of the 2nd tank, 2nd field and 11th field armies. Such a grouping could provide a chronically weak junction of army groups and contribute to the rapid advance of G. Guderian to Tula-Ryazan. Since E. Manstein launched an offensive on Perekop in the 20th of September, just at the time when parts of the 2nd Panzer Group were completing the Kiev strategic operation, the Germans had enough time to "castle" the 11th Army. After heavy and lengthy battles with the superior forces of the Red Army,

which, moreover, occupy positions fortified by nature itself, E. Manstein won a decisive victory, broke through the front, and on October 29 began to quickly move south. Geographic features of Crimea

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you, that it is very easy to hold two "entrances" to the peninsula - Perekop - Sivash in the north and Ak-Monai positions separating the Kerch Peninsula from Crimea proper in the east. But as soon as the enemy breaks through any of these positions, it is already impossible to stop him: to the very coast there is a plain, like a table, a plain without any natural obstacles. The army of E. Manstein advanced on Sevastopol (through Dzhankoy-Simferopol and through Dzhankoy-Alushta) and Kerch, destroying the retreating Soviet troops along the way. But the remnants of the Primorsky Army (on October 16, it was evacuated from Odessa, which it had successfully defended for more than two months, and was sent to strengthen the defense of the Crimea; due to the indiscretion of the Soviet command on the peninsula, the army did not have time to turn around on the Ishun positions, suffered heavy losses in attempts to counterattack troops of E. Manstein), retreating in divergent directions, part of the forces broke through the Crimean mountains to the coast and then to Sevastopol. The main base of the Black Sea Fleet was well supplied from land (up to batteries of 305-mm guns), and the troops of the Primorsky Army, having rich combat experience, became the backbone of the fortress's defense. On November 11, E. Manstein began the assault on Sevastopol, but on the 21st it ran out of steam. It became clear that

a siege was coming. Now the 11th Army was quickly pinned down by battles in the Crimea. This is the essence of the mistake made by the German command: leaving the Crimea in the hands of the Red Army, it could control the Soviet 10-12 divisions in the Crimea with three divisions. Now, 4 "counting" divisions of the Primorsky Army (about

people, together with the rear units that retreated to Sevastopol in the first place, the local garrison, sailors, naval base personnel - up to 55 thousand) chained the entire 11th Army to themselves - along with the Romanian brigades and reinforcement units of over 8 divisions. The result, achieved at such a high price, amounted to some limitation of the Black Sea Fleet's capabilities and a reduction in the range of Soviet strategic aviation, which at that time was physically absent. From the point of view of the "OKH war", the game was not worth the candle. But the "task of the OKW", that is, the offensive in the Caucasus, demanded

the unconditional mastery of the Crimea. After all, now the former Army Group "South", divided into groups "A" and "B", ear

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dila to the east - beyond the Don, and to the south - beyond the Kuban. Under these conditions, the Crimea became a springboard leading the Soviet troops to the deep rear of the German advancing groups.

On the other hand, the Crimea was for the Germans the shortest road to the Taman Peninsula and further to the Caucasus. In any case, possession of it made it possible to create a second line of operations to feed the operations of Army Group A, which otherwise "hung" on the only railway line leading from Rostov to the south. Both sides understood this,

so the capture of the Crimea was recognized by the German command as the most important prerequisite for the implementation of the Blau plan, while the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command considered the offensive in the Crimea the primary task of the spring-summer campaign of 1942

of the year.

Such a clash of plans led to a counter Crimean strategic operation, which lasted more than six months.

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At first, the Soviet troops achieved major success. In the last days of December 1941, they carried out one of the most unusual and successful landing operations at sea - the Kerch-Feodosia. The Black Sea Fleet, indisputably dominating the theater of operations, showed itself very poorly in the war, but this landing, carried out in winter, in freezing conditions, with the predominance of enemy aircraft in the air, went down in history forever. A poorly organized landing from small ships in the Kerch region diverted the attention and reserves of the German command. The main forces were sent directly to the enemy-controlled port of Feodosia and landed under enemy fire from cruisers and destroyers. Following the warships, transports entered the captured port¹.

¹ About the Kerch-Feodosiya operation, which in itself constitutes a separate story, see Art. V. Goncharov "Crimea and the coastal flank of the Soviet-German front in 1941-1944" and the bibliography for this article (one of the appendices to E. Manstein of the 1998 edition).

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Immediately there was a real threat of encirclement of the 42nd Army Corps of E. Manstein's army. Although it was not possible to realize this opportunity, there could no longer be any question of any new German offensive against Sevastopol. A very real threat of complete defeat loomed over the 11th Army.

Fortunately for her, the build-up of the Red Army on the Feodosia bridgehead was slow, and the command of the troops was in the hands of a person who was completely unsuitable for this role. Even on January 12, General D. Kozlov was still "not ready" for the offensive. E. Manstein, to whom the slowness of the operational maneuver so successfully launched by the Soviet troops, provided some freedom, transferred almost all available forces from Sevastopol and on January 15 struck

strike at the junction of the 44th and 51st armies. On January 18, he again took Feodosia, and the Soviet units retreated to Ak-Monai positions in the narrowest part of the Kerch Peninsula. The loss of Feodosia meant that only one port remained at the disposal of the landing troops to feed the operation. In addition, it was difficult to build up forces on the Turkish Wall, and the new landing operations carried out in Evpatoria and Sudak ended in complete failure, due to the lack of any interaction between the paratroopers and the troops of D. Kozlov. From February to April 1942, the Crimean Front, consisting of the 44th, 47th and 51st armies,¹ tried

to attack three times. In conditions of incredible slush, the tanks sank up to their gun turrets. In March, a difficult battle for both sides unfolded near the coast of the Sea of Azov, after which the attention of the front commander finally broke away from the swamps of Sivash and switched to Feodosia. Here the April offensive of the Crimean Front was launched, also unsuccessful. By the beginning of May, the main forces of seventeen divisions of the Crimean Front (total

numbering 300,000 people) aka

¹ Based on the current situation and in order to improve command and control, on January 28, the Headquarters divided the Caucasian Front into D. Kozlov's Crimean Front and the Transcaucasian Military District. (For a number of reasons, the armies of 1942 were much smaller than the "classic" military formations of 1941. Simplifying somewhat, we can say that the Soviet army corresponded to the German corps, and the front corresponded to the German army). 268

were placed in a narrow ledge in the north, formed as a result of the February offensive. The 44th Army continued to occupy its old positions north of the Black Sea. An incredible number of soldiers by the standards of World War II crowded together on a narrow twenty-kilometer isthmus. The troops were preparing for the offensive, therefore, although the divisions deployed in two echelons (on the Ak-Monai Isthmus it was impossible to place units in one echelon purely physically - there was simply not enough space for this), the second echelon did not prepare a fortified position and, in fact, remained in an open field, and within the reach of enemy artillery fire.

For the commander of the 11th German Army, E. Manstein, who deservedly enjoyed the reputation of the best strategist of the Third Reich, the Crimean Front was a mortal threat. E. Manstein had to fight in two areas - at the Ak-Monai positions and around the Sevastopol fortress. The operational lines of these directions intersected at right angles: that is, during the assault on Sevastopol, the 11th Army substituted a flank for D. Kozlov. The Soviet fleet dominated the sea. There was not a single defensive position on the entire territory of Crimea to the west of the Kerch Peninsula. As soon as the Russians broke through the front and entered the Crimean steppes, the encirclement and destruction of the 11th Army would only be a matter of time. On the other hand, E. Manstein could not concentrate all the troops against the Crimean

Front, having lifted the blockade from Sevastopol. It would take the Black Sea Fleet a single night to deliver the Primorsky Army (renamed the troops of the Sevastopol Defensive Region) reinforcements and the resources necessary for the offensive. Then - another version of the catastrophe of the 11th Army - with a breakthrough of the Russian Sevastopol grouping to the north and its exit to Dzhankoy. E. Manstein gathered 7 infantry and 1 tank divisions against D. Kozlov¹

cavalry brigade. 150,000 people, half of the available forces of the Crimean Front.

Understanding the complexity of the situation of the 11th Army, OKH in the spring "threw" E. Manstein 22nd Panzer and 28th Light Infantry Divisions.

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At dawn on May 8, E. Manstein struck along the Black Sea coast, creating superiority in forces in a narrow area. In the rear of the Soviet troops, an assault force was landed from landing boats (with the absolute dominance of the Black Sea Fleet at sea!), Which confused the defense of the 44th Army. German dive bombers dominated the air

Soviet aviation did not appear.

By evening, E. Manstein advanced eight kilometers and, unexpectedly for himself, entered the operational space. He immediately throws the 22nd Panzer Division into the gap. With the complete inaction of the command of the Crimean Front and the leadership of the Black Sea Fleet (commander Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky), the operation "Hunting for bustards" enters a phase of growth. E. Manstein turns north, and already on May 9, the 47th and 51st armies are surrounded. On the 14th, Kerch was taken, and the catastrophe became all-encompassing. The loss of Soviet troops as prisoners amounted to 150,000 people, 1,113 guns, 255 tanks, 323 aircraft (according to K. Tippelskirch). For completeness, I will cite well-known, but

indicative documents containing an assessment of the Kerch battle by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command : *Lieutenant Chernyak, and the commander of the 47th Army, Major General*

Kolganov, revealed a complete misunderstanding of the nature of modern warfare. Stalin. "You are demanding that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you must know that we do not have Hindenburgs in reserve. Your affairs in the Crimea are not difficult, and you could handle them yourself. If you used attack aircraft not for side affairs, but against enemy tanks and manpower, the enemy

would not break through the front, and the tanks would not pass. You don't have to be a Hindenburg to understand this simple thing while sitting on the Crimean Front for two months." Stalin. Having got rid of the unbearable flank threat, E. Manstein deployed

assault on Sevastopol. The city fell to the top

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May 19, 1942

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July 1 . Crimea was completely lost. The main of the conditions set by the OKH for the transition of the Wehrmacht to a general offensive in the Stalingrad and Caucasus directions was fulfilled.

-5- Compared to the Crimean strategic operation, the battle near Kharkov was more complex, maneuverable, and both sides had chances of success. On May 12, at 6:30 a.m., Soviet troops went on the offensive, bypassing the capital of eastern Ukraine - from the Volchansky and Barvenkovsky bridgeheads. The offensive was a success, and the position of the German 6th Army immediately became critical. The northern grouping advanced 18-25 kilometers, the southern one even 50. Almost "Guderian" pace of the operation!

In this difficult situation, the Nazi command was at the height of the situation. Ignoring the pleas of the field commanders for help, German strategists concentrated superior forces against the foundation of the Barvenkovsky salient. The offensive began on May 17 at 5:30 am, by 8:00 a.m. the tank group of P. Kleist broke through the defenses of the 9th Army and went to the rear of the advancing armies of the Southwestern Front. S. Timoshenko ignored the danger and continued the attack on Kharkov, bringing into battle the "echelon of success development" - tank corps. For his part, von Bock also expanded the operation: he struck at Izyum from the north - towards Kleist's tanks.

We must also pay tribute to S. Timoshenko and the command of the Southwestern Front. Yielding to the enemy in mobility, finding themselves in a difficult operational situation, they tried to wrest victory from the enemy in the "tempo game": move by move. On May 19, an order is given to turn the attacking grouping 180 degrees and defeat Kleist, hiding in the information space with the fact that the Kharkov Opera

¹ The total losses of Soviet troops in the Sevastopol operation amounted to 100,000 people, 622 guns, 26 tanks, 141 aircraft. 272

the walkie-talkie, supposedly, continues. Too hard for a circus! On May 22, the Germans go on the offensive from the line of the Northern Donets, pushing the Soviet troops back to the south and east. By the end of the month, the second "necessary condition" for the general German offensive of 1942 had been fulfilled. The Barvenkovsky ledge was destroyed, 240,000 prisoners were captured, 2026 guns, 1249 tanks¹. Germany returned the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front and on June 28, 1942, launched a general offensive along the entire front south of Kursk.

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The general offensive, however, did not live up to the expectations of the Nazi strategists. Initially, everything seemed to go well: the defense of the Bryansk Front was once again broken through, on July 3rd the encirclement was closed in the Stary Oskol region, on July 6th the Don was forced in the Voronezh region. The Stavka throws four armies near Voronezh (including the 5th tank armies), forcing the enemy to be drawn into direct battles in the region of this city. To the south, the German troops slide freely in the great bend of the Don, but Voronezh continues to hold out, and this forces the Germans not only to lose time, but also to divert the mobile units of the 4th Panzer Army north of the direction of the main attack. In the period 5.5 - 28.6.1942 (that

¹ is, for the Kerch, Kharkov, Kupyansk operations in the south, the Luban operation in the north-west and the next battle near Rzhev in the center of the Eastern Front), the total losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to 131,849 people. The Soviet

² tank armies of 1942 had a heterogeneous composition and poor balance of the combat arms. They should not be confused with the German tank armies or the Soviet tank armies of the "second formation", which are an instrument of highly maneuverable warfare. For the battles near

³ Voronezh, which did not meet the "intentions of the Fuehrer", von Bock again lost his post. Von Weichs took command of Army Group B, who, naturally, was forced to continue fighting near Voronezh, since it was necessary to ensure the left flank of Army Group B and its junction with von Kluge's troops. Interestingly, almost simultaneously with von Bock (July 12), S. Timoshenko was removed, the Southwestern Front, renamed Stalingrad, was headed by General Gordov. 273

Having correctly assessed the geometry of the German offensive, the Headquarters withdraws the armies beyond the Don. The Germans win an operational victory, capturing Rostov-on-Don, the gateway to the Caucasus, on July 23, 1942. The total breakthrough reached a depth of 400 kilometers, but unlike in 1941, unlike the recent battles in the Crimea and near Kharkov, there were few prisoners.

In late July - early August, it seemed that the Germans were on the verge of victory, and the Soviet Union was facing total defeat. Donbass is lost. Communication with the Caucasus could henceforth be carried out only through the Caspian Sea and the Volga. Along the entire front, there was a sharp drop in the combat capability of the troops, who had lost faith in their ability to stop the enemy. But with the exit

of German troops into the big bend of the Don, the element of surprise was completely exhausted. The enemy's goals were determined: the Caucasus and Stalingrad. And the Headquarters, realizing that a quick offensive in the Caucasus is impossible for road reasons, begins a grand casting of reserves near Stalingrad. The famous (infamous) order No. 227 is issued: "Not a step back." July 23 OKW issues "Directive No. 45". In full accordance with the

original plan of Operation Blau, two goals are set for the Nazi troops at the same time: Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Again, the operational lines of the German groupings diverge, and a gap appears between the adjacent flanks of Army Groups "A" and "B".

By autumn, the front of the German offensive stretches for 2,700 kilometers, the connection between Army Groups "A" and "B" disappears completely: it is provided by the only 16th motorized division stationed in the Elista area,

scattered over a three-hundred-kilometer front. The operational density of troops is already three times lower than the norm adopted during the offensive, and the pace of advance is continuously falling.

Nevertheless, by the end of August, the 4th Panzer Army was reaching the inner defenses of Stalingrad, and Army Group A was advancing towards Krasnodar, Maikop, and Tuapse. Mozdok was occupied, an attack on Ordzhonikidze was launched. In early September, German troops crossed the Terek, the "greatest achievement of military mountaineering" - a flag with a swastika raised over Elbrus - dates back to the same time.

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Panzer divisions are losing pace after pace, waiting for weeks for fuel, which is delivered to them in cans on donkeys. A. Hitler removes W. List and takes over the command of Army Group A, which is now carried out by radio from Berlin and East Prussia.

A month later, in November, the 1st Panzer Army, shackled in an operational "sack", is pulled out to the south with an incredible effort, affecting the suburbs of Ordzhonikidze. But more Army Group "A" could not do.

As for Army Group B, it was involved with all its might in the struggle for Stalingrad. In a huge city, the advantage of the Germans - in tactics, in mobility, in maneuver, in the art of interaction between military branches - is completely depreciated. On the contrary, Russian trump cards are beginning to "play": unconventional thinking, contempt for danger, the ability to fight "without rules". By the beginning of October, the Germans were advancing towards the Tractor Plant, in some places reaching the Volga. The pace of advancement is reminiscent of the First World War - 400 meters in 12 days of continuous fighting. German mobile formations (300 tanks) are crushed in tactical battles for the urban quarters of Stalingrad².

The second strategic offensive of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front stopped.

The fourth plot: Japan's only chance -1 - By the beginning of

the spring of 1942, the strategic situation in the Pacific Ocean was difficult for all parties involved in the "game". In this regard, it is amusing to

¹ read that the German command should have also turned the 4th Panzer Army to the Caucasus. The total losses

² of the Germans in the battles for Stalingrad were very high: 700,000 killed and wounded, 2,000 guns, 1,000 tanks, 1,400 aircraft. The losses of the Soviet troops were also huge: 643,842 people, 1,426 tanks, 12,000 guns and mortars, 2,063 aircraft.

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The British Empire lost the war and lost every opportunity to maintain its position on the "world chessboard"; the fall of Singapore was a momentous event, foreshadowing her doom. But Great Britain remained a significant political and military force, she continued to fight against the Axis countries, and the outcome of this battle depended at least on what form the post-war process of decolonization would take. With the loss of Malaya, Britain's operational situation deteriorated sharply. First of all, her ships were driven

back not only from the Pacific, but also from the eastern sector of the Indian Ocean. Further, Japanese troops controlling Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula posed threats to Australia and Burma at the same time. Since in the winter of 1942 the British also suffered a serious defeat in Cyrenaica, Great Britain went on the defensive on all fronts, and her strategy for 1942 was purely negative. "In the spring of 1942, the Royal Air Force struck the first

massive strike on the territory of Germ

¹ "Britain singled out Burma as a separate administrative unit only in 1937. Immediately the question arose of who should be responsible for the defense of the country. The Indian government, by no means, was interested in this and argued that Burma should be considered as a deep rear of the Malay zone. The command in Singapore was not happy with such a gift: in his opinion, Rangoon belonged to the Indian zone. The Burmese administration did not express any opinion, and London pretended that these disassemblies did not concern him at all. Only in November 1940, when Great Britain had been at war for a year already and it was finally necessary to decide something (especially since after the defeat of France there was a real threat to Siam), Burma was included in the Malay zone. By this time, there were two regular battalions in the country, and some rather conventional forces scattered along

borders, several planes and not a single tank.

By spring, the situation improved: two brigades equipped according to the state were transferred from India, two more brigades were formed by the imperial administration on the spot from the small nationalities of Burma (the British did not give weapons to the native Burmese - a traditional colonial precaution, this time justified by the pro-Japanese sympathies of the people) ". (S. and E. Pereslegins "Pacific Premiere") 276

research institutes. On the night of May 30, 1,046 bombers destroyed 600 acres of Cologne. (A dismal record that stood for nearly two years.) The Thousand Force planes later crashed into Essen and Bremen. The raids caused

serious losses among the civilian population, but had no military significance. The British themselves understood this: having counted the losses following the results of three raids (116 four-engine bombers), they disbanded the Thousand Force and returned to more traditional patterns of using strategic aviation. The United States of America implemented the main idea of its

strategic plan (using the Japanese fleet and the German army to destroy the British Empire), but at a prohibitive cost. The US Navy lost its dominance in the Pacific Ocean, the world communications system, the "sine qua non" of the high efficiency of the American economy, began to fall apart. Communication between the West Coast of America and Australia was threatened, and this coast itself was under the threat of a raid by Japanese aircraft carrier formations. There was a direct threat to Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, the Panama Canal. F. Roosevelt understood that he had already provided his country with an unconditional advantage in the "endgame" of the world war. But on the "board" was the position of the "middlegame", and, calling a spade a spade, the position of the United States in the Pacific was bleak.

So far, the American leadership has changed the command of the Pacific Fleet, entrusting this most important post to a man who has never stood on the deck of an aircraft carrier in his life - submariner Charles Nimitz. Under his calm and unobtrusive leadership, the fleet conducted its first successful operations - raids against Kwajalein and Rabaul. American strike forces used bite-and-run tactics, ineffective but safe. No one invested strategic content in these raids, it was important to cheer up people. In the future, however, it will

¹ S. Pereslegin, E. Pereslegina. Pacific Premiere.
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Xia that the raids of American aircraft carriers on the defensive perimeter of the enemy had far-reaching consequences.

Japan has fully implemented its war plan. In 90 days of continuous offensive, she took possession of the equipped bases and airfields in Singapore, Davao, Manila, Kendari, Rabaul, Kavieng. The Philippine Islands, Malaya, Indonesia, and a number of Pacific islands passed into the hands of the Empire. The combined fleet seized dominance in the western sector of the Pacific Ocean and created strategic threats to Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, and India.

And with all these successes, Japan has not come a step closer to the goal of the war: ensuring the security of the mother country and the uninterrupted supply of its oil. Moreover, it turned out that it is now difficult for the Empire to even formulate a positive strategy. The Land of the Rising Sun has already received more than it expected to keep after the war. She would be only too happy to exchange the occupied lands for peace with the United States and a new alliance with Great Britain (beneficial to both sides), but after Pearl Harbor there was no question of any compromise peace. Japan was forced to continue the war, in which she could no longer set herself any reasonable goals.

"In March, the offensive continued, rather, by inertia. Japanese cruisers bombarded Christmas Island. The paratroopers captured several dozen prisoners and a full transport of phosphates, after which they were disappointed that the soils of the island were unsuitable for the construction of an airfield. With a feeling of some awkwardness, the operation had to be curtailed and the garrison evacuated.

It was the first case in the entire war of a completely unprofessional work of the intelligence department of the Main Naval Staff.

At the end of the month, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were occupied. Actually, the capture of this position pursued purely auxiliary goals - covering Singapore and the Malay Peninsula from the west, it constituted the last link of the defensive perimeter .

¹ S. Pereslegin, E. Pereslegina. Pacific Premiere.

In the Christmas days of 1941, the inter-allied conference "Arcadia" took place, at which a decision was made to unite the military efforts of the USA, Great Britain and the USSR against Germany. The front in Europe was recognized as the main one, resources for the Pacific Ocean were to be allocated according to the "leftover principle". This meant that the United States would not favor the Empire of Japan in the form of assistance in organizing a general naval battle in the western sector of the Pacific Ocean. As part of the "operations of the first stage", that is, actions against Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, the new strategy of the "English-speaking peoples" was to be welcomed. However, it naturally turned the local "war for oil" into a world war of annihilation, for which Japan was not ready and which it did not really plan. In fact, F. Roosevelt "passed the move" in the Pacific Ocean, leaving I. Yamamoto "to attack under the threat of losing the advantage gained." The commander of the Combined Fleet knew that from 1943 heavy aircraft carriers of the Essex series, light aircraft carriers of the Independence class (hastely assembled on the basis of light cruisers of the Cleveland class that were almost completed), battlecruisers Alaska " and "Guam", heavy cruisers of the Baltimore project. The South Dakota-class battleships were already under construction; their completion fully offset the damage inflicted on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor. And after the Dakotas, the Iowas were supposed to leave the stocks.

The Japanese fleet also had to be replenished with ships, but not in such numbers. The battleships Musashi and Shinano and the aircraft carrier Taiho were under construction. Thus, it was necessary

to achieve victory in 1942. For its part, the United States had to take into account the possibility of a quick collapse of the Eastern Front. This would jeopardize the whole plan of F. Roosevelt, based on maintaining the "balance" of battles in Europe and the Pacific. ocean.

In any "schedule" of winners and losers, the United States

The Americas were strategically losing if before

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the next "Versailles" they did not have time to prove themselves the most important member of the coalition economically and militarily. To play its intended role in post-war regulation, the US military would have to take an active part in the war in Europe, while excluding Britain and the Soviet Union as actors in the war in the Far East. F. Roosevelt would have preferred that the decisive events in both theaters of operations would have played out in 1943-1944, but he had to have a backup plan in case the Wehrmacht in 1941 would repeat the fate of Napoleon's Great Army of 1812; the opposite version - the victory of Germany near Moscow or on the Volga and the exit of the USSR from the war - after Pearl Harbor and the loss of the Philippines was a danger of a different kind. In the end, with all the undeniable moral, economic and political superiority of the anti-Hitler coalition, it could lose. The probability of such an outcome of events was small, but it existed, and, above all, because the "shadow" of the economic crisis of 1929 still hung over America. In a different sense than Great Britain or the Soviet Union, but the United States also went to victory along the only path over the abyss of defeat.

Thus, F. Roosevelt was also in dire need of an impressive victory in Pacific Ocean in 1942.

The current operational situation led the parties to a grandiose general naval battle, which became the logical outcome of the "clash of strategies" and a very interesting "opening game".

-3-

F. Roosevelt (it was he who made the decision on the operation) made the first "move" by organizing an unexpected raid on the territory of the Japanese metropolis. The problem was that at that moment the States did not yet have a strategic bomber capable of "getting" Japan, while using aircraft carrier formations against Tokyo was - with a real radius of action of the Dountless carrier-based bomber of about 200 miles - pure suicide.

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US Air Force Colonel D. Doolittle proposed to strike by placing on aircraft carriers heavy army bombers B-25 "Mitchell".

"First of all, it was organizationally impossible: naval and army aviation belonged to different branches of the armed forces, and the idea of "putting" land-based bombers on an aircraft carrier looked no more realistic than a proposal to reform the Supreme Court, including representatives of women's workers' organizations and a delegation of British parliamentarians. ... Doolittle agreed with everyone. When he was informed

that naval and ground aviation

used different radio frequencies (this alone made it fundamentally impossible to control the Mitchell air group from an aircraft carrier), the lieutenant colonel shrugged: "I'm not going to use the radio at all." It did not fit into any gates so much that the experts simply remained silent. Doolittle took this silence for

consent sign.

The B-25s were too big for an aircraft carrier, they couldn't fit in the hangar and couldn't use the lift. "They'll go on the flight deck," Doolittle said indifferently, another completely impossible idea.

B-25s could not take off from an aircraft carrier. More precisely, they could, but only very theoretically. Doolittle got hold of two copies of the Mitchell, agreed in February with the commander of the Hornet (the aircraft carrier was then undergoing combat training

on the East Coast) and demonstrated that it is still possible to take off, although it is very difficult, but for some reason this was not included in the report.

B-25s could not land on an aircraft carrier, and this was already a reality on a purely physical level: the bomber's mileage exceeded the length of the flight deck by two or three times. "We will break through to China and land there." (...)

Finally, the aircraft carrier with the Mitchels on deck could not use its air group and turned out to be practically incompetent. As part of the general madness, this problem was unexpectedly resolved by Halsey, declaring that "within the framework of the assumptions made" one can agree that the Enterprise is capable of covering both ships with its aircraft . S. Pereslegin, E. Pereslegina. Pacific

¹ Premiere.

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... The D. Doolittle raid on April 18, 1942, did not cause serious damage to the Japanese cities of the Kanto region, but initiated a long chain of events that ultimately led to the clash of the main forces of the Combined Fleet of Japan and the US Pacific Fleet.

-4-

In the spring of 1942, the Japanese naval command took a number of actions aimed at reaching a peace agreement between Russia and Germany. This initiative, however, was not heard on either side of the front. In the USSR, it was rightly believed that Germany should recognize itself as defeated. As for the Reich, as the horrors of the "Russian winter" were left behind and the armies, stretched on a huge front from the Crimea to Murmansk, regained combat capability, the top leadership of the Nazi Empire was more and more inclined towards the idea of solving all the problems of the Eastern Front with a new offensive.

The last opportunity to limit the scope of the war has

disappeared. -5- In the spring of 1942, the headquarters of the Combined Fleet faced the same problem of turning a won battle into a won war, which the Nazi leadership unsuccessfully tried to solve in the second month of the "OKH war". There was no shortage of offers. The analysts of M.

Ganda were inclined to strike at the very link of the enemy coalition, which, undoubtedly, was England. It was supposed to capture Ceylon, destroy the British Eastern Fleet or throw it into the Mediterranean Sea, create a threat to India from the south. This operation organically included the already outlined continuation of the Malaya campaign (the 15th Army of Yida - in fact, an army corps without reinforcements - from the last days of December 1941 began to penetrate into Burma; defeating the opposing British units in January-February

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Yida on March 8, on the day of the surrender of Java, entered Rangoon, empty of troops and residents, thereby creating strong pressure on India from the east), consistent with the intentions of the German command in the 1942 campaign, which M. Genda did not know, but guessed and was a natural development of the "reconnaissance in force" that the Nagumo aircraft carriers carried out at the beginning of April in the Bay of Bengal . was given freedom of action, and the attributed to the fact that the US Pacific Fleet was operation itself in the Indian Ocean was to a certain extent "obscured" by Australia remaining on the flank: relying on Perth and Port Darwin, the allies could cause certain troubles, if not to Nagumo aircraft carriers, then to tankers support and trance Here was the first "fork" of the war in the Far East. T. Nagumo exactly fulfilled

the task assigned to him: disrupted shipping in the Bay of Bengal, destroyed the port facilities of Colombo and Trincomali, sank all British warships that fell into the operational radius of his air reconnaissance (that is, the old Hermes aircraft carrier, the Cornwall and Dorsetshire cruisers, the destroyer "Tenedos" from the T. Philips compound and a couple of auxiliary vessels) and returned to the metropolis. The commander of the Eastern Fleet of Great Britain, Admiral D. Sommerville, evaded the battle, retreating to the Maldives. In principle, nothing prevented T. Nagumo from extending the operation to the west of the Colombo meridian (problems with the supply of ships with fuel were completely solvable). In this case, he would inevitably destroy the Eastern Fleet - Sommerville had two excellent aircraft carriers at his disposal, but with completely unusable air groups; for the five Nagumo aircraft carriers (Kaga was under repair in the Metropolis), these ships were "legitimate prey". Having secured dominance at sea and refueled, T. Nagumo had the opportunity to attack the British oil fields in the Persian Gulf. On a general imperial scale, this was not so significant: as already mentioned, in 1942 the Persian Gulf had not yet become the "world gas station", but the British 8th Army, operating in Cyrenaica, was supplied with fuel from Abadan through Aden. In principle, within the capabilities of the Aircraft Carrier Strike Force, there was also a raid into the Red Sea with air strikes on Alexandria and Suez. Purely by chance, Nagumo's raid into the Indian Ocean coincided with a heavy British defeat in North Africa. Under these conditions, the psychological consequences of such strikes could be monstrous - up to the collapse of the British defense in Egypt and Rommel's breakthrough into Iraq friendly to the Reich ... (see Appendix, diagram 6). 283

ports of the invasion fleet. Besides, Ganda's plan demanded too much from the army.

I. Yamamoto worked out various deployment schemes against the Aleutian and Alaska: if there were no hopes for a "limited war" left, the fighting should have been transferred to the most vulnerable point of the "American empire". I. Yamamoto understood that as soon as the United States loses dominance at sea, Alaska becomes a territory with negative connectivity, and it will be very difficult for the Americans to "keep" it within the framework of the emerging "positional game" in the Pacific

Ocean. In turn, the General Naval Staff developed by mid-March "the theory of the paramount strategic importance of Australia", considering the "fifth continent" as a springboard " *which the enemy can use to prepare and carry out a counteroffensive against the Dutch East Indies.*" Accordingly, the MGSN planned a long multi-stage operation, during which it was supposed to first capture Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea and the Eastern Solomon Islands, then completely isolate Australia from the United States, establishing control over Fiji, Samoa, the New Hebrides and, at the same time, and the Cocos Islands . At the last stage, a landing operation was to take place against, in fact, Australia, and the choice of the direction of the main attack - Perth, Darwin or Townsville - was provided to the command of the Combined Fleet.

In addition, no one has yet canceled the pre-war doctrine, providing for the transition to defense in the occupied territories.

As a result of the emergence of several alternative and promising plans, the top military leaders of the Empire of Japan found themselves in a state of "clinch" by early April 1942: the MGSN was unable to obtain approval for its own combat scheme, but it could prevent the adoption of an alternative option. Under these conditions, "bargaining" between the commanders was

inevitable, accompanied by an endless loss of time (again, following the model and likeness of "Barbarossa"). The Doolittle Raid, which endangered the Emperor's security, gave I.

Yamamoto the opportunity to insist on pre

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creation into life of his own plan, which received in its first

configuration name "MI". This plan included everything meaningful that was in the Aleutian, Australian and Ceylon deployment options, but subordinated private operations to the logic of a general battle with the enemy fleet in the central sector of the Pacific Ocean. The "trigger" of such a battle was to be the capture of Midway Atoll, located in the center of the conditional "triangle" formed by Pearl Harbor, Wake and Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands.

"According to Ganda's plan, an operation in the Aleuts was initially prepared - as part of preliminary studies on the Northern Option. Observers on Attu and Kisku were bound to see the aircraft carriers, which were Ryuze and Zuiho. Nimitz was given three days to react. In the ideal case, he immediately sent an aircraft carrier north

compound.

Then events would have developed most favorably. The enemy carriers would be exactly halfway to Dutch Harbor by the time Nagumo's planes attacked Midway. Genda planned on a grand scale, realizing that one could not be strong enough at the decisive point: six aircraft carriers and two assaults on the airfields and defenses of Midway. Then - the landing of the SMDM. It was assumed that one or two battalions of marines would surrender immediately, but if not, the paratroopers would crush them. Because they will be ordered to capture the airfield at any cost and regardless of any losses. So did Yamashita's sappers in Kota Bharu and Ozawa's paratroopers in Palembang.

Further, base aviation was transferred to the Midway airfield, the atoll lagoon was occupied by "flying boats" (everything was delivered aboard Nagumo aircraft carriers). From that moment on, Genda counted down the time of the "main operation". *The last chance is fleet against fleet.* For both sides.

Yamamoto saw the beginning of the upcoming battle in the most advantageous edition for the Japanese fleet. The enemy is doomed to "act according to the situation", constantly lagging behind in pace. First - six aircraft carriers against one non-standard airfield. Then - the same six aircraft carriers plus base aircraft against Halsey and Fletcher's formations, which, most likely, will not approach at the same time. And only

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when the Americans, having assessed the advanced position of the Nagumo ships (aircraft carriers will have to move east of Midway during the operation), throw linear forces against them, the battleships of the Combined Fleet will enter the battle with decisive effect.

Yamamoto did not tell Genda that all this would hardly be enough to win the battle. It is enough that the enemy fleet will be forced to return to Pearl Harbor, just as Russian battleships had to return to Port Arthur on July 28, 1904.

(...)

The capture of Midway created a completely new situation in the Pacific theater of operations. The American fleet was doomed to passivity, which in the real conditions of a poorly developing war should have caused the enemy's morale to decline. Meanwhile, pressure in the north (Aleutians, Dutch Harbor, Alaska) and in the south (Eastern Solomon Islands, New Guinea) would increase.

The situation near the Hawaiian Islands would also worsen. By basing submarines and cruisers on Midway, Yamamoto would blockade Oahu, gradually tying to the ground - due to lack of fuel - the enemy's aircraft and fleet. By mid-July, he would have been probing the defenses of Pearl Harbor using the American "bite and run" method: aircraft carriers approach at night, strike at


dawn and immediately return to Midway. By the end of the month, Nimitz would start receiving reports of concentrations of amphibious transports, fast destroyers, heavy transport flying boats off Midway. Simultaneously, the Japanese aircraft carriers would suddenly disappear from the anchorage at Midway: a radio game would be organized that would convince the enemy that they were drawn to Wake in order to unexpectedly enter the game with decisive effect. And so, when the operational tension in the Central Pacific becomes unbearable, when the "invasion fleet" will seem to American observers *"in any fishing line that appears on the horizon"*, when the Emperor will make a solemn appeal for peace on Tokyo radio, which the Americans will have to interpret as an announcement of the beginning of the operation, then the Nagumo force will leave Truk and head towards the northern coast of Australia.

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A new strike on Darwin, accompanied by the release of the Second Fleet's transport formation to the sea, will draw the enemy's attention to the fifth continent and completely disorient him. And Nagumo's ships will pass through the Sunda Strait for the second and last time in this war and head for Ceylon. (...) It was not about a raid - about the complete displacement of the English fleet from the Indian Ocean, about the occupation of Lanka, about the blockade of western India. And this time, Nagumo would have a direct order to attack Aden and Abadan. After the capture of Colombo, this operation would no longer be either fantastic or even simply risky.

Yamamoto did not guess whether these funds would be enough to capitulate Great Britain. It would not matter from now on - the English position in the Indian Ocean would still fall apart completely, the remnants of the enemy fleet were thrown into the Red, if not into the Mediterranean Sea, and a huge sword, the tip of which was the Nagumo formation, began a decisive reverse movement ...

(...) The aircraft carriers returned by the same route: Batavia - northern or northeastern Australia (depending on the context created by the Fourth Fleet) - Rabaul - Truk - Wake - Midway. This regrouping was supposed to be slow: it was necessary to give the Americans time to get involved in protracted battles in the Aleutian direction. (A counteroffensive in the north was almost inevitable for Nimitz in view of the obvious need to demonstrate. perishingly



coral sea

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his ally at least some kind of active action - despite the fact that the presence of Japanese forces at Midway prevented the deployment of the American fleet to the west of the Pearl Harbor meridian.)

By the beginning of the second year of the war, the blockade of the Hawaiian Islands was to enter its final phase. Yamamoto could not foresee what the enemy would be planning - a belated and hopeless attempt to recapture Midway or a breach of the core of his Pacific Fleet at San Diego. In both

In the case of Nimitz, a rout awaited, the return of the fleet to Pearl Harbor and the inglorious death of the remnants of ship formations there. And on the West Coast of the United States at that time, the next Second Pacific Squadron would be hastily equipped .

The MGSF authorized the operation on the condition that, even before the attack on Midway Atoll, the Combined Fleet would assist the local command in Rabaul, which, without any connection with Tokyo's plans, had come to the conclusion that the capture of Port Moresby was desirable. I. Yamamoto, within the framework of whose plan a demonstration of pressure on Australia was necessary, agreed to support this operation with the 5th aircraft carrier division, temporarily withdrawn from the Nagumo formation.

In turn, C. Nimitz, who received a message through undercover channels that after a raid in the Indian Ocean, Japanese aircraft carriers urgently needed repairs (which was true), decided that the Pacific Fleet had the ability to prevent the clearly emerging active operations of enemy light forces against the southern coast of New Guinea and with luck, maybe "catch" a couple of Japanese cruisers. In this logic, the Lexington AVU, which had returned to Pearl Harbor the day before for refitting, was urgently sent back to the South Seas, where the Yorktown AVU was already operating. The development of the maneuver of the Japanese 5th Aircraft Carrier Division and the American 16th and 17th Operational Formations inevitably led to the first battle of aircraft carrier fleets in history. It took place on May 7-8, 1942 in the Coral Sea.

¹ S. Pereslegin, E. Pereslegina. "Pacific Premiere"

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It began with the fact that Vice Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi, who was entrusted with the overall leadership of the seven naval formations operating in the New Guinea area,¹ came up with the idea that two heavy aircraft carriers were the best suited to deliver from Truk in Rabaul 9 (!) Pieces of fighters. Rear Admirals Takaga and Haara requested Tokyo. While negotiations were going on, the 5th Carrier Division was spinning around a square with a side of 100 miles.

At this time, F. Fletcher, who united the 16th and 17th operational formations under his command, was engaged in refueling aircraft carriers at sea. The calculated points for receiving fuel at Yorktown and Lexington were different, so the ship groups acted separately; May 4, it was supposed to combine them, reinforcing the Anglo-Australian cruiser squadron.

But on May 3, Rear Admiral Sima's group occupied Tulagi without interference, which had been evacuated by the Australians a day earlier. F. Fletcher did not know about this, but in the evening he intercepted a message about enemy ships in the harbor of Tulagi, which an Australian observer aircraft transmitted to Townsville.

¹ Transport Connection Port Moresby: 12 transports with paratroopers and army units; Rear Admiral Kajioka's Port Moresby Strike Force, consisting of a light cruiser, six new destroyers and one obsolete, classified as a minelayer, providing direct cover for transports.

Rear Admiral Sim's Tulagi Invasion Force: transport, two destroyers, two mines minelayer.

Support Unit, Main Forces of Rear Admiral Goto, consisting of two battle groups: in the area of New Georgia Island (west of Tulagi), the heavy cruisers Aoba, Kunigasa, Kako and Furutaka (actually. Connection Support), further to the northwest was the Sekho light aircraft carrier and the destroyer covering it (the Sekho group).

Cover Force: two light cruisers, three gunboats and a seaplane base (support for landing operation).

Carrier Strike Force: 5th Carrier Division, i.e. Shokaku, Zuikaku, Haguro and Myoko SRTs and six escort destroyers.

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F. Fletcher, maintaining radio silence, turned to approach the enemy. Both formations began to quickly move away from each other, since Admiral Fitch on the Lexington did not know anything about the Tulagi attack. F. Fletcher, however, sent the Neosho tanker with fresh information to the rendezvous point of both formations. On the

morning of May 4, planes from the Yorktown attacked Tulagi without prior reconnaissance. If the 5th division of aircraft carriers had acted according to the original plan, this mistake by F. Fletcher would have been the last for the Yorktown: it would have been attacked and probably sunk. But Shokaku and Zuikaku were still maneuvering well to the north. Meanwhile,

the Japanese command in Rabaul did not yet know that Sima's ships were attacked by American carrier-based aircraft, so the Invasion Force began to move according to the operation schedule. Now the backlog of the 5th division was already simply dangerous: the Japanese transports were going directly under the air

attack. It was only at night that Inoue became convinced that a critical situation was developing, and ordered the Carrier Force to proceed at full speed to the Coral Sea. F. Fletcher, in the morning, turned south and the next day, without much incident, met with the Lexington group.

By the end of May 6, the operational balance remained zero: the Japanese and American aircraft carriers did not find each other, although at times they approached by 100 miles. By evening, the American commander knew at least the course and speed of the Japanese Transport Link. Hara and Takaga, oddly enough, didn't even know that. The 5th carrier division bypassed the Eastern Solomon Islands from the south and entered the Coral Sea in order to be between the enemy and their own transports in any "situation".

"In those days, unusual weather conditions developed in the northern part of the Coral Sea, which had a huge impact on the course of the battle. As a result of the collision of cold and warm atmospheric fronts, a stable, with sharply defined boundaries, an extensive "bad weather zone", elongated in a latitudinal direction, arose south of the Eastern Solomon Islands. Inside - low, heavy clouds saturated with rain charges almost touch the water and

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hide the ships from all observation. On the other side of the almost vertical cloud wall, there is a transparent clear sky and a million-on-a-mile visibility. million".

Fletcher's compound was the first to enter the cloud zone at about 1 am on May 7. The American aircraft carriers sailed west-northwest all night, trying to create a threat to the amphibious transports discovered the day before. Shortly before dawn, Fletcher singled out the British cruisers and the destroyer Farragut into a separate group under the command of the English Admiral Crace, who was tasked with intercepting the enemy at the southern exit from the Jomar Strait.

Takagi's aircraft carriers continued to cruise east of the Louisiade archipelago. At 01:15 a.m. another turn to the south was made. The 5th division followed this route until dawn. At 7:30 a.m.

on May 7, a reconnaissance aircraft transmitted to the Zuikaku that it had discovered an aircraft carrier and a cruiser far to the south. Hara immediately raised carrier-based aircraft, which at about 10 am attacked the enemy, which turned out to be the Neosho tanker and the Sims destroyer. This air strike cost the Japanese six planes and five hours of their

time. At 9.50, the Lexington pilots, raised to attack the Covering Forces (light cruisers Tatsuta and Ternes), found only 90 miles from their

aircraft carrier group Sekho. The light aircraft carrier received seven torpedoes and about 13 bombs. Four minutes after the start of the attack, she capsized and sank. The 17th task force won the first undeniable victory in the Pacific War. By noon, Hara


concluded that the elusive American aircraft carriers were hiding in a "bad weather zone", but it was not until 4:30 pm that he managed to get the air group into the air: too much time had been lost because of the Neosho. While the Japanese pilots were looking for the enemy among the rain squalls, the sun went down. Takahashi, commander of the strike group, ordered the return.

... On the way back, his planes were suddenly attacked by carrier-based fighters. Departing from the blow, the Japanese pilots finally lost their bearings: in front of the

ism, S. Pereslegin, E.

¹ Pereslegina. Pacific Premiere.

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Fight in the Coral Sea

mirages of ships appeared all the time by trained pilots, which disappeared as soon as they got closer. Finally, finding a real aircraft carrier, Takahashi's plane went to land. Already above the deck of the ship, by the huge superstructure-chimney complex, he identified the Lexington and realized that the group was trying to board the American ship.

"Japanese pilots were crying. Never in this war - neither before this night, nor after - were there such ideal conditions for an attack: aircraft, invisible in the dark, went straight to the illuminated hull of an aircraft carrier. But before the "landing" Takahashi's group dropped bombs and torpedoes into the sea.

The radar operator on the Lexington was able to identify the Japanese planes leaving to the east. He was surprised to see that only 30 miles from the American ships, the echoes disappear into the clutter from the surface.

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water. The sergeant immediately informed the ship's commander: "What does this mean?" Sherman asked.

"Obviously, here," the sergeant pointed to a place on the map, "Japanese planes make a circle and land on their aircraft carrier. Sir, it's only 30 miles away, and we have cruisers and destroyers!

Sherman called Yorktown, but Fletcher was already fed up with surprises

of the past day. It is difficult to say whether he simply did not believe the "orientation" from the Lexington, or whether he decided that the night attack could fail, and then in the morning his aircraft carriers would be left without cover, but the 17th task force went west.

... Takagi knew for sure that American aircraft carriers were nearby. He, too, dreamed of a night attack. But there were no more experienced night crews - from Takahashi's group only four mortally tired pilots returned to their ship. ... The scouts of Hara picked up even before dawn. Immediately after sunrise, the strike air group went into the air. She was ordered to turn around in a wide fan, find and destroy enemy aircraft carriers. Hara understood that yesterday the Americans had gained an advantage in carrier-based aviation.

The opponents switched places: the 17th task force left the bad weather zone, and the Japanese aircraft carriers were on its edge. At 0722, Lieutenant Smith, after finding a "window" in the clouds, discovered the Shokaku and Zuikaku. Three minutes later, Petty Officer Kanno Kezō identified Lexington and Yorktown. Both commanders knew they were discovered. The account went by minutes. The strike air groups were heading in opposite directions, but the

Americans were at low altitude, while the Japanese were above the clouds, so there was no air combat. At 0920, Takahashi's planes formed a "star raid" pattern over the American ships, and 10 minutes later both aircraft carriers were on fire. "Lexington" suffered very badly, "Yorktown" escaped with one hit and soon

could already take planes. S.

¹Pereslegin. E. Pereslegina. Pacific Premiere.

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The American pilots showed rather poor combat training. The attack was uncoordinated, some of the aircraft were unable to find the Japanese aircraft carriers at all, despite continuous and detailed "reporting" from Smith's aircraft. As a result, Zuikaku, which got into a rain squall in time, avoided hits altogether, and Shokaku received several bombs and for some time lost the ability to receive aircraft.

Another crisis of the battle in the Coral Sea has come. At about one o'clock in the afternoon on the Lexington there was an explosion of gasoline vapors, the fires got out of control. Yorktown took over the remnants of both air groups. After counting the remaining aircraft, Fletcher abandoned a new attack.

Hara made a similar decision, having received Inoue's order: the operation to capture Port Moresby was canceled, the aircraft carriers were ordered to proceed to Truk. At night, having received the first reports from the 5th division, I. Yamamoto would cancel Inoue's order and demand that Zuikaku find and finish off the damaged enemy aircraft carrier at any cost. "Zuikaku" turns south again and develops maximum speed, in the morning reconnaissance aircraft leave for the range limit.

But all this is no longer needed. At 8 pm on May 8, the Lexington sank. From the next morning, the 17th task force retreated at full speed to Pearl Harbor. Yorktown will be back on time.

-7-

The Americans received the first information about the upcoming operation "MI" in mid-May. Without even "splitting" the code completely, cryptographers were able to report that this time we are talking about a general battle in the central sector of the Pacific

¹ As already mentioned, the Americans were quite fluent in reading Japanese ciphers. The automatic encryption system adopted in Japan was, in fact, two mechanical

typewriters connected by a "black box". If one of them was stuffed

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ocean. At that moment, there were only two aircraft carriers in Pearl Harbor: the Saratoga, which received an accidental torpedo, was being repaired on the west coast, and the boilers were "sat down" at the Yorktown after escaping from the Coral Sea, and the ship needed dock repairs, the duration of which was determined at three months.

The logic of a general battle meant that I. Yamamoto would attack a target that Ch. Nimitz could not help but defend. Thus, it could be about Midway Atoll, the Aleutian Islands - Alaska, or the west coast of the United States. Washington analysts were inclined to the latter option, and it will forever remain a mystery of the Second World War, why C. Nimitz accepted the version of the head of the cryptographic department of the fleet D. Rochfort without the slightest hesitation and insisted on concentrating all forces in the Midway Atoll area.

"Until mid-May, the atoll garrison did not receive a single meter of barbed wire, not a single anti-aircraft or field gun, not a single fresh unit. Now the cargoes on the island were in a continuous stream. On May 23, the Kittyhawk rail ferry was sent from Pearl Harbor to Midway, converted into a heavy military transport. He delivered 2 squadrons of 5 light tanks to the defenders of the atoll. An even more important event was the installation of two search radars at Midway at once.

By the first days of June, an entire air army was deployed on the island: • 221st fighter squadron (21 buffaloes, 7 wildcats), • 240th dive bomber squadron (34 downless), • 8th torpedo bomber squadron (6 "avenger"),

the original text, the second printed encrypted, and vice versa. Long before the war, American intelligence got a "black box" in their hands, after that the work of cryptographers was reduced to determining the current settings of the system. Another question is that the initial data for decryption was gibberish in a foreign language, caught by radio direction finders at the limit

audibility. 295

• 7th Air Corps (4 V-26s, 17 V-17s), • 30 Catalina flying boats1 .

The defense of the atoll was entrusted to three fortress battalions of marines, 10 field, 16 anti-aircraft guns and 60 machine guns. With all the desire to place more troops and equipment on two small islands, it was impossible"2 . "Yorktown" only on May

27 stood in the dock. Nimitz played his main trump card - the excellent organization of production. 1,400 workers were transferred to the ship, the situation was explained to them and they were asked to complete the repair of the aircraft carrier in 48 hours. There was not enough electricity for welding, Nimitz phoned the industrialists, and they disconnected almost all other consumers from the sources (due to thunderstorms).

Due to Halsey's illness, Spruance, who had never previously commanded an aircraft carrier, was to lead the 16th task force. 16th Fr. With. was the main force. Nimitz advanced it to the northwest of Midway: maneuvering in this area, Spruance's aircraft carriers naturally found themselves on the flank of the Nagumo Strike Force, which, according to Rochfort's calculations, should have approached Midway from the northeast. In addition, the location of the 16th about. With. made it possible to make, if necessary, a quick maneuver towards the Aleut and cover the west coast, unless, of course, Japanese aircraft carriers bypassed Midway and Hawaii from the south. "We still hope they don't," Spruance replied to a question from one of the

their pilots.

Force 17 was late, but Rochfort claimed that Yorktown would join Hornet and Enterprise at the same time Nagumo's main force approached Midway.

¹ Almost all of these aircraft were delivered to Midway between 23 and 28 May 1942. IN At the beginning of the month, "several fighter and patrol aircraft" were based on the island.

² S. Pereslegin, E. Pereslegina. Pacific Premiere.

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-8- "The deployment of the Japanese fleet began on May 20: on this day, transport ships left the ports of the metropolis for the Mariana Islands, and the first ships of the 5th Expeditionary Fleet of Hosogaya anchored in Ominato Bay, on the northern tip of Honshu. The concentration of operational formations and combat groups continued until the 25th: the bulk of the Combined Fleet began to move and again froze for a moment - just like, having finished taxiing, a heavily loaded aircraft stops at the very beginning of the runway, waiting for the dispatcher's orders and "spin" engines for forced mode. Three staging areas were allocated for Operation MI. The Midway Invasion

Forces were based on Saipan. A minesweeping group and a hydro-aviation reconnaissance group ("Chitose" and "Kamikawa-maru"), direct guard destroyers, tankers and support vessels were also located there. In the same sector of the Pacific Ocean, Admiral Kurita's Close Cover Force was concentrated: four Mogami-

class heavy cruisers crossed to the island of Guam. In the north, at Ominato, forces were assembled to invade the Aleuts. They were based on Admiral Kakuta's "Second Mobile

Connection" consisting of the aircraft carriers Ryudze and Zunie, accompanied by the

heavy cruisers Maya and Takao. The cover of the operation was provided by the Northern Connection (TKR Nati), while the landing itself was assigned to the Attu and Kyska

formations, together numbering three light cruisers and seven destroyers.

Finally, in the Inland Sea of Japan, the main forces of the fleet were waiting for the order. Submarines were the first to go to sea, even before the final staff game. According to the plan, ten of them provided deployment in the north, ten more formed a curtain between Pearl Harbor and Midway. It was assumed that they would go into position a day before the start of the battle.

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and will keep Yamamoto informed of all movements of the American Task Forces. Then

came the turn of Kakuta's aircraft carriers. On May 25, the Ryudze and Zuiho passed through the Sangar Strait and headed due east, to a point dividing the Midway-Dutch Harbor segment in half. This route masked the operational plans of the Japanese; in addition, until June 2, it remained possible to turn the Second Mobile not to the north, but to the south - to Midway Atoll. The need for such a

maneuver could arise if, contrary to all expectations, the enemy concentrated his aircraft carriers in the vicinity of Midway. Although this was considered unlikely (intelligence indicated that the Enterprise and Hornet were in the Solomon Islands, and the Saratoga was being repaired in San Diego; Yorktown was considered sunk or heavily

damaged), Genda provided for such an option.

The final decision was to be made on the basis of air reconnaissance data. In the critical days between the withdrawal of the Japanese fleet from their bases and the attack on Midway Atoll, the mission of the "flying boats" from Kwajalein included taking Pearl Harbor under surveillance. It was supposed to refuel the scouts in the area of the French Frigate reefs, for which three submarines were sent to this area (Operation K). Turning Mobile Second to the south was considered an emergency

maneuver that could be carried out if Operation K detected the withdrawal of the American fleet from Pearl Harbor. Only in this case was it supposed to break the radio silence and inform Nagumo and Kakuta about the impending crisis. On May 27, Ominato was leaving the landing force. The Addu formation was sent directly to the target, the rest of the ships - to the

Paramushir island, so that, after the Ryudze and Zunie diverted the attention of the enemy in a southerly direction, calmly approach the archipelago from the west.

The day before, the aircraft carriers of the 1st and 2nd divisions had raised anchors: Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. As always, they were accompanied by "Haruna" and "Kirishima", as well as "Tone" with "Tikuma". Of course, the Nagumo route did not lead directly to Midway: after passing the Bungo Strait, the ships turned south

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east, creating the illusion of movement to Guam and further to the South Seas (or, for example, to Hawaii, bypassing them from the south). Having marked this maneuver, the aircraft carrier formed a general course leading to the same conditional point halfway between Midway and Dutch Harbor. On May 28, the

battleships of the Combined Fleet began to move. The Aleutian Support Force included four old battleships (Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro), two light cruisers, and twelve destroyers. He was to create a positional barrier northeast of Midway, intercept and destroy American line forces, if any were sent to the Aleuts.

Vice Admiral Takashi Shiro was following the Nagumo carriers. Only in mid-afternoon on June 3rd, his ships were to turn north.


The main forces of Admiral Yamamoto followed the same route, 300 miles behind Akagi: Yamato, Mutsu, Nagato¹. On June 3, they were to turn south to "cut the corner" and go directly to Midway, with the 1st and 2nd carrier divisions on their left flank.

Hiei, Kongo, Tekai, Atago, Myoko, Haguro² proceeded east-southeast: Kondo concentrated the entire Second Expeditionary Fleet southwest of Midway. The transports left Saipan on May 27, by which time the minesweepers had already arrived at Wake. Cruisers of Kurita, May 28


¹ Direct air reconnaissance in the interests of the connection was carried out by an obsolete aircraft carrier Jose.

² There is a small mystery associated with the composition of this group. Most researchers include the Zuiho light aircraft carrier in it, while others indicate that the Zuiho did not go to sea until early June 1942, and then was transferred to Kakuta's Second Mobile Connection.

The most plausible version is that the ship was excluded from the operation already at the deployment stage - after its name was included in all staffing tables: The reason for such an unexpected decision could be an investigation into the circumstances of the death of the same type of Seho in the Coral Sea, most likely, Kondo was dissatisfied with the level of training of the air group. (When, ten days later, the Zuiho is called to participate in the Aleutian operation, it will turn out that its pilots can only take off and land in ideal weather.)



Battle of Midway Atoll. Deployment



Aleutian operation

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left Guam, took their place - forty miles north of the "Midway Invasion Connection". They were followed by the hydro-aircraft carriers Chitose and Kamikawa Maru. On June

1, the air forces were put on high alert. forces on Jaluit, Kwajalein and Wake Island .

-9- The first clashes of the general battle in the Pacific took place in the area of the Aleutian Islands. The aircraft carriers of Kokuta moved north through a heavy and dense fog that even strong gusts of wind could not disperse. It was freezing rain.

A group of aircraft from the Zunie was unable to break through the storm and returned entirely to the aircraft carrier. Bombers from the Ryuze reached the target and bombed the empty Dutch Harbor. After a second bombardment, on June 3, the Japanese gained air supremacy over the western Aleuts. Dutch Harbor and, to some extent, Alaska panicked.

-10-

On the same day, June 3, 1942, at 9.40 am Midway time, the Catalina discovered a Japanese transport connection 500 miles from the island. In the evening, it was bombed to no avail by "flying fortresses", at night by seaplanes with torpedoes suspended under the right plane². This did not create any particular problems: the Akebono-Maruk tanker received a torpedo, but remained in

¹ service. S. Pereslegin, E. Pereslegina. "Pacific

² premiere" Continuous reports of "contacts" in the western hemisphere persuaded F. Fletcher to

the idea that Japanese aircraft carriers are still to the west of Midway. All doubts, however, were resolved by direct order from Nimitz. The commander of the Pacific flag confidently stated: "The ships discovered by seaplanes from Midway are not an attack, I repeat, not an enemy strike formation. Vice Admiral Nagumo's aircraft carriers will strike at dawn on June 4th and approach from the north."

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Messages from the transports caused alarm in the field headquarters of the Combined Fleet on the battleship Yamato. The Americans found the transport connection too far away, reacted too quickly. For some time, the question was discussed whether to break the radio silence in order to report the latest news to T. Nagumo. However, the point of view prevailed that it was better not to unmask the ships of the line¹ by turning on the transmitter. "Besides, T. Nagumo is even closer to the Jinsu and probably intercepted a report from the cruiser." But the Nagumo connection went through a zone of bad weather, and the

reception range of outdated radio stations on the Akagi in the rain was close to zero. The 1st and 2nd carrier divisions (Shokaku was under repair, and Zuikaku was left in the Inland Sea of Japan - either because of losses in the air group, or as a "punishment" for insufficient activity in the battle 8 May) continued to move forward, not knowing anything about the numerous "contacts" of Japanese transports with the Catalinas. As we moved southwest, the weather improved, and at 4.30 in the morning Nagumo launched the "first wave" of aircraft into the sky,

intended to attack the Midway airfields, without any problems. At the same time, scouts were raised along with Tone and Tikuma. This routine operation did not go entirely smoothly: two planes were delayed with a departure for half an hour due to technical problems. Nobody paid any attention to it.

¹ The Japanese only suspected that something had become known to the enemy. Operation "MI" was supported, among other things, by the actions of a curtain of submarines, which, if the American fleet left Pearl Harbor, were supposed to break radio silence and transmit a message to the flagship of the Combined Fleet. Additionally, it was supposed to carry out additional reconnaissance of the "Pearl Harbor" from seaplanes refueled from a submarine (Operation "K"). However, Operation K fell through as American destroyers "by coincidence" were exercising at a seaplane refueling point. They knew about the failure of Operation K on the Yamato. What they didn't know, however, was that the "veil" submarines were silent not because the American fleet was still at Pearl Harbor. but because of the delay in deployment. For various reasons, not a single submarine arrived at the site on time. As a result, the 16th and 17th operational units passed through the line of observation unnoticed. 302

The reconnaissance was carried out for the sake of formality, the enemy ships were not expected, especially since the Yamato radio stations were silent, which meant that the Japanese operational units had not yet been detected by the enemy. Nevertheless, the "sense of danger" prompted T. Nagumo or M. Gende to leave half of the aircraft in reserve with the most experienced pilots.

At 0510, the Enterprise intercepted a report from the reconnaissance Catalina: an aircraft. At 5.30, Lieutenant W. Chase, ignoring all instructions, reported in plain text: "Many aircraft going to Midway, bearing 320, distance 150." And at 5.34 Lieutenant G. Eddy reported the discovery of four enemy aircraft carriers.

A simple one-way trap, built by C. Nimitz on the basis of cryptanalysis data, slammed shut, task force 16 turned into the wind and began to lift aircraft. "Yorktown" was still following the same course: Fletcher decided to first take scouts on deck. ... Midway's radars detected the enemy 74 kilometers away. With an incredible effort, the Americans managed to lift all the planes at the airfield in 15 minutes.

At 0625, American fighters unexpectedly attacked the formation of Japanese carrier-based aircraft. They managed to shoot down two bombers, but that was all: the Japanese Zeros spent only two minutes destroying the Buffalo and Wildcats.


... Midway airfields were empty, and the attack lost its meaning. At 0700, the commander of the attacking wave, Tomonaga, informed Nagumo that surprise had not been achieved and a second raid on the Midway installations was

needed. Five minutes later, the base aviation, including 10 aircraft, bombed the ships of the aircraft carrier formation. There were no hits, only 3 returned home aircraft.

At 7.45. Nagumo ordered that the planes prepared to attack the American ships be rearmed with bombs instead of torpedoes. And at 7.55 a seaplane from the Tone transmitted: "De At

¹ 7.55 this report was deciphered and transferred to the Akagi marked 6.28.

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Battle of Midway Atoll. Intelligence service

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10 surface ships, obviously enemy, bearing 10, range 240 miles from Midway, heading 150, speed over 20 knots.

-11

- At that moment, T. Nagumo did not even pay attention to this report. Only after 15 minutes, he ordered to leave torpedoes on those aircraft on which they had not yet had time to replace them with bombs. Around this time, Japanese aircraft carriers were attacked by Dountless dive bombers that approached

from the southeast. Eight American planes were shot down, hits on ships
No.

T. Nagumo asked the scout what, in fact, he sees for the ships. "Five
cruisers and the same number of destroyers," the pilot replied.

It was now clear that the danger came from Midway. But Nagumo's ships maneuvered a
lot, repelling attacks, they lost formation. It was necessary to consolidate the order. This,
however, was prevented by another attack: "downless" and "B-17", "flying fortresses". The
obsolete "vindicators" did not even reach the aircraft

carriers. Their commander attacked the nearest detected enemy ship, which turned out to
be the battlecruiser Haruna. There are no hits. At 8.20, almost an hour after the first report, the
pilot from the Tone suddenly

transmitted: "The connection of the enemy closes the ship, similar to an aircraft carrier."

By this time, everyone on Akagi had already realized the crisis nature of the situation,
although no one had any idea about the causes of the crisis. There was also a chance to quickly
lift the planes of the "second wave" into the air, no longer paying attention to whether they were
armed with bombs or torpedoes. But by this time, Tomonaga's planes had already been circling
over their ships, constantly repelling air attacks, for an hour, and they were running out of fuel.
Nagumo ordered the planes prepared for take-off to be lowered onto the hangar deck, re-
equipped, and the escort fighters were refueled during this time. At 0837, the ships of the 1st
and 2nd divisions turned against the wind and received the "first wave" in just 15 minutes.

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At 0917, Nagumo turned sharply to the east-northeast and increased his speed. By this
time, all the commanders of the aircraft carriers reported that their air groups were ready for
takeoff. "Opponents

were separated by about 200 miles. Nagumo's sharp turn to the north was not tracked by
the Americans: Spruance's planes unsuccessfully searched for enemy aircraft carriers on
southeasterly courses. One squadron of Hornet dive bombers returned home, the second one
landed on the Midway strip (two downless bombers fell into the lagoon). All ten fighters ran out
of fuel and landed on the water. No one will ever know how and why the 6th torpedo bomber
squadron of the Hornet aircraft carrier,

following the same course as the dive bombers, turned out to be much to the north and,
alone, without any cover, went directly to the guard ships of the Nagumo formation. Military
historians agree that the captain of the third rank Waldron, in whose veins the blood of the Sioux
Indians flowed, chose the route purely intuitively. In any case, before taking off, he said: "Follow
me, and I will lead you to the enemy aircraft carriers." At 9.20. first a cover destroyer, then
"Tone" began to put up a smoke screen. "Akagi" threw fighter-interceptors into the air. Fifteen
slow torpedo bombers too far - ten miles from the target - fell on the

combat course. About fifty "Zero" attacked them from a dive, and within a few minutes the
group of Waldron was exterminated.

(...) At 9.36, the Akagi anti-aircraft guns ceased fire. But literally through
minute signalman shouted:

"Enemy torpedo bombers, starboard, thirty degrees. They go low over the water. It was the
Enterprise

squadron. She, too, went without cover, but the captain of the third rank Lindsney led,
probably, the best crews in the entire American fleet. Seven aircraft were able to drop torpedoes.
The Kaga performed a brilliant evasive maneuver. Again - not a single hit; ten Devastators,
including the Squadron Leader's plane, were destroyed.

And the Enterprise's fighter squadron was burning hot five kilometers up to no avail. Linds -

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Ney did not know that the cover promised by Spruance was nearby, and the commander of the Wildcats, Lieutenant Gray, was waiting for the order. In the next quarter of an hour, he unsuccessfully tried to contact the already downed torpedo

bombers and turned home at 9.52. The attacks of American aircraft followed one after another, merged in the memories of the combatants. "Futida wrote after the war that the third group of torpedo bombers - aircraft from the Yorktown" attacked from the port side almost simultaneously with Lindsney's squadron. This, however, is not consistent with the time of takeoff and

chronology of the battle. Apparently, the "devastators" of the captain of the third rank Massey reached the target after 10 a.m. Ten of his twelve cars were shot down, only four or five managed to drop torpedoes - either on the Hiryu, or on the Soryu ".

Fighters "Yorktown", attacked by the remaining "Zero", on a dive left the battle and went to their torpedo bomber.

The formation of the strike formation broke up again, the distance between the ships increased to several miles. Nagumo already knew that at least two enemy aircraft carriers were operating against him, and counted the minutes remaining before the takeoff of the shock wave. Rearmament and refueling are completed, the aircraft are raised to the flight decks, but the incessant evasive maneuvers do not give the aircraft carriers the opportunity to turn into the wind. For the last ten minutes, they could not even replace the air

patrol aircraft. At 1020 hours, with the last of the torpedo bombers still finishing off the Zero, Nagumo ordered his squadrons to "take off as soon as they were ready." Four minutes later, the first Akagi torpedo bomber lifted off the flight deck. Take-off intervals were reduced to a minimum: in five minutes, all aircraft of the shock wave were to be in the air. So successful

was the initial plan of the operation, so high was the training of the pilots of the "Genda fleet", that even at this moment - one minute before the rout - with all the mistakes made and inaccurate "moves",

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with the complete failure of Japanese intelligence and the brilliant work of American cryptographers, all chances remained on the side of the Nagumo compound. In fact, he has already seized air supremacy. Midway's "Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier" disabled; Hornet almost completely, and Yorktown and Enterprise half used up their air groups without achieving the slightest result. American pilots could only confirm with their blood the right of the Great Western Democracy to succeed in this battle. They showed courage that even the Japanese recognized. But commanders of all ranks and times knew that courage is not skill. Spruance and Fletcher had only one trump card left: three incomplete squadrons of dive bombers. Between 0950 and 1000 there was every reason to believe that at least two of them would return to the aircraft carriers without finding the enemy. Airplanes "Enterprise" expended already untouchable supply of fuel. Within the next few minutes, they had to either detect the enemy or turn home.

Again, fortune intervened, whether it was a pattern - a single destroyer attacking an American submarine. Third-Class Captain McCulsky assumed that this ship was heading towards the main forces of Nagumo and followed in the same direction. The assumption was wrong, but brought the American dive bombers to the target. At 10:20 a.m., McCulsky publicly radioed the "location" of the Japanese aircraft carriers.

There was not a single Japanese fighter "above": the patrol had not yet managed to return to the "waiting zone" after the destruction of the torpedo bombers. Silent and anti-aircraft guns. There were no radars on the Japanese ships, and the signalers either were carried away by the spectacle of air combat at low altitudes, or they simply did not see the American planes - it just so happened that one squadron approached from the direction of the sun, and the other two

¹ were hiding in thick clouds. A total of 49 cars, of which 3 made an emergency landing due to engine malfunctions, and 4 were left without bombs due to unauthorized operation of bomb releasers. Of the remaining vehicles, 16 carried half the bomb load.

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"Downless" attacked from a vertical dive. Nobody interfered with them. Usually, regardless of the orders received by the pilots, in such cases, all pilots choose the same target - the largest enemy ship. So it happened this time, however, in the clouds, two squadrons lost their orientation and went instead of "Akagi" to "Kaga" and "Soryu".

At that moment the whole strategy of the Pacific War ended . -12-
The

battle was still going on. The aircraft carriers of T. Nagumo received not so many hits, the Shokaku in the Coral Sea suffered more. But the flight decks were crowded with fueled and equipped aircraft, fuel hoses were streaming everywhere. The bombs, which were urgently removed to replace them with torpedoes, did not have time to be sent to the combat cellars, and they lay openly between the machines prepared for take-off. Within minutes, Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu were completely engulfed in flames. On the Akagi, hot, oxygen-deprived air from the deck was sucked into the engine room by fans. Everyone who was there died. The Hiryu, which had kept a little to one side, remained


unharmd. It seemed that not everything was lost: one Hiryu against one enemy aircraft carrier, and fires, after all, can be extinguished ... 2 Hiryu Air Group took off in 4 minutes. The commander of the 2nd Division, Yamaguchi, simply told his crews: "You are all that is left of the 1st Air Fleet."

And the incomplete air group "Hiryu" passed the zone air defense built by the Americans. Although only seven of the 18 bombers reached the target, the Yorktown received three hits. The aircraft carrier was on fire.

¹ S. Pereslegina, E. Pereslegina. Pacific Premiere. Soryu sank at 19.13. "Kaga"

² at 19.25, "Akagi", devoid of progress, scuttled at 4.55

next day. 309



Battle of Midway Atoll. Aviation actions

The hastily repaired boilers failed again, the ship gave no more than 6 knots, and there was no question of any takeoff and landing operations. ...


When the remnants of the Hiryu air group (three "zeros" and five "velos") returned to their aircraft carrier, a reconnaissance aircraft, launched a long time ago from the Soryu, landed on its deck. The tired pilot reported: "The radio went out of order, I had to return. Three enemy aircraft carriers. Hornet,

Enterprise, Yorktown. Yamaguchi continued the hopeless attempt to fight one aircraft carrier against three larger and more protected ones. At 13.30, he took off his last planes - 6 fighters and 10 torpedo bombers. The pilots were ordered to attack

only undamaged ships. Once again, the Americans were rescued by their amazing ability to fight for survivability. The fires were extinguished at Yorktown, the ship again gave 18 knots of speed. And the Hiryu air group mistook it for an undamaged ship. The Hiryu pilots broke through the fighter screen set up by the Enterprise and hit the Yorktown

with two torpedoes. R. Spruance threw into battle the last thing he had - two incomplete squadrons of "downless" without a fighter

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Battle of Atomic Midway. Actions of Nagumo on June 4

leg cover. The commander of the American fleet hoped that the Japanese had also run out of fighters ... Yamaguchi

scheduled the third wave to take off at 17.15, hoping that twilight would give his pilots at least some chance to survive. But again, as in the morning, the rise of the planes was late, and the cars prepared for takeoff became food for fire. Spruance's streak continued: at 17.03 AVU "Hiryu" received four hits.

"Hiryu fought for life until almost midnight. At 23.58 there was a strong internal explosion, the fires again got out of control. The roll was 15 degrees, the turbines stopped. At two thirty minutes, Yamaguchi gathered the surviving crew on the flight deck: "I alone bear responsibility for the death of Hiryu and Soryu," Yamaguchi said. "I remain on the ship, and I order you to leave it and continue to faithfully serve His Majesty the Emperor ". The commander of the 2nd Aircraft Carrier Division and the commander

of the Hiryu committed seppuku . In the coming night, I. Yamamoto tried to "get" the enemy

aircraft carriers by throwing the heavy cruisers of the Kondo formation. Perhaps Halsey, a fanatic of aircraft carriers, would fall into this trap, but R. Spruance served on cruisers all his life and imagined what they would do with the Mogami-type SRT with the cover of his aircraft carriers, and with the aircraft carriers themselves. Ignoring almost open accusations of indecision, R. Spruance at full speed took the ships out of a possible strike.

The next day, for the Americans, the battle was replaced by the usual "combat work" to destroy the Japanese ships left without air cover. They did not achieve great success, but the heavy cruiser Mikuma, but S. Pereslegin, E. Pereslegina. Pacific Premiere. The

¹ loss ratio was catastrophic for the Empire of Japan. In the battles on June 4 and during the retreat on June 5, the Japanese lost 4 aircraft carriers and the heavy cruiser Mikuma (another heavy cruiser and 2 destroyers were badly damaged). At this price, they were able to sink only 1 enemy aircraft carrier and 1 destroyer. The Nagumo formation lost all aircraft - 377 regular and 36 stored in disassembled form on the Akagi and intended for transfer to the captured Midway airfields. Spruance and

Fletcher lost 151 aircraft. Of these,

14 sank along with Yorktown (2 dive-bombers and 2 torpedo bombers of the first wave - that is, all that was left of it - and 10 "downless reserve"; the rest managed to fly to the "Enterprise" and then took part in the battle along with his air group) and 137 lost in air battles. Nagumo lost only 54 aircraft in the battle, the remaining 259 aircraft went to

bottom along with the sunken aircraft carriers. 312



Aircraft carrier Agaki

whose Mogami, which collided with its sistership, was sunk, the Mogami received 5 aerial bombs, lost its bow, but reached Truk¹ . On June 4 at 10:25 a.m. 12th time zone

west of Greenwich, Japan lost the war in the Pacific. Talk about the new strategy of the United Fleet - the "strategy of defeat", which led to the post-war Japanese "economic miracle", and in a sense, the post-industrial "spurt" of the 1990s - is the topic of a separate book, the main topic. the holding of which should be not the past, but the present and the future.

Plot Five: Stalingrad!

"Operational Order No. 1"

The summer and autumn campaigns of this year, with the exception of some still ongoing operations and planned offensive actions of a local nature, have been completed. Major results have been achieved. As a result

of a powerful offensive, the enemy was driven back to the Caucasus and the Don, and the central part of Russia was basically cut off from the regions of the Caucasus, which have vital

¹ See also Appendix 9 for an analysis and "alternatives" of the Battle of Midway.

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nie for the further conduct of the war. On the rest of the front, all the distracting blows of the Russians were successfully repulsed with insignificant losses for us. At the same time, huge human losses were inflicted on the enemy.

The successes of the command and troops achieved during these summer and autumn battles are worthy of being included in the glorious annals of the war of the past years. They inspire confidence that in the subsequent period of this war the German people can rely on their army in any circumstances.

We have to conduct a winter campaign. The task of the Eastern Front in it, with the exception of offensive operations still ongoing or planned, is to hold the achieved lines at all costs, to repel all attempts by the enemy to break through them and thereby create the preconditions for the continuation of our offensive in 1943 in order to final destruction of our most dangerous enemy. Preparations for the winter campaign are in full swing. This second Russian

we will meet the winter more thoroughly and in a timely manner prepared.

The Russians themselves were seriously weakened during the last battles and will not be able to have the same large forces in the winter of 1942/43 as they had last winter. Unlike last, this winter cannot be harsh and difficult. I charge all headquarters and military commanders with the duty to complete all preparations for winter as quickly and thoroughly as possible, so as not only to facilitate the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to them, but also to create the best possible conditions for them to live and fight for the entire winter period. At the same time, it is important that no one hopes that everything necessary will be delivered by the highest headquarters. Each military commander must help himself with all sorts of improvisations and find additional means and equipment to facilitate the deployment of his troops. I, in turn, will see to it that, through major

organizational measures, we will strengthen the combat units, replace the front-line soldiers during this winter, who have been continuously fighting on the front line for a year and a half, and send them to rest. But I'm waiting

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from the command and troops that they will enter the winter campaign of 1942/43 with a proud consciousness of the successes achieved, with firm faith in their own strength, with an unshakable will to defeat the enemy and in this winter campaign wherever he tries to break through our front. Primary requirements:

1. By all means, hold winter positions.
2. The defense must be active everywhere, preventing the enemy from calm down and mislead him about our intentions
3. In case of attacks from the enemy, do not move a single step.
4. Eliminate local breakthroughs immediately by counterattacks and counterattacks.
5. Localize large breakthroughs, hold the stabilized sections of our front at all costs as bastions that will facilitate

taking countermeasures. 6. Cut off or surrounded parts must be defended until

help won't arrive.

For the unconditional fulfillment of these requirements, the commanders are responsible directly to me ... *Adolf Hitler* " " In written orders,

there is an increasing disregard for the correct use of words. Instead of well-thought-out formulations, various emotionally colored words and expressions (destroy, defeat, prevent a detour) even when this is generally impossible ... "F. Halder, former¹ Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces.) An undated entry on the last page of the diary.

¹ F. Halder was dismissed from his post on September 24, 1942: "After the afternoon report - the resignation handed over by the Fuhrer (my nerves are exhausted, and he has frayed his own; we must part; the need to educate the personnel of the General Staff in the spirit of fanatical devotion to the idea; determination persistently carry out their decisions also in the ground forces). 315

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- Noteworthy coincidence: in the fall of 1942, the German leadership repeats the mistake made by the Soviet command in the spring. A formal order was given for strategic defense. Since the goals of the summer campaign were not achieved either absolutely or relatively, this order testifies, firstly, to the lack of forces for conducting large-scale operations, and secondly, to the general tendency towards the formation of a positional front in the south that had already emerged by the end of August. Both of these circumstances meant, in particular, that the disposition of troops that had developed as a result of the offensive of Army Group B in the bend of the Don and Army Group A in the North Caucasus did not correspond to operational reality. The German higher authorities, it seems, all understand this, nevertheless, instead of the immediate regrouping of the armies of the southern wing (even at the cost of pulling it back), they insist that the troops "at any cost" maintain the positions achieved and, moreover, carry out - with general transition to the defense - several offensive operations. In practice, it was about the 6th Field Army, which, with the support

of the 4th Tank Army, fought street battles in Stalingrad and in some areas reached the Volga, and about some corps of Group A, still moving south by inertia. In other words, the order simply fixed the current state of affairs: the disintegration of the Blau strategic maneuver into a series of private operations with obscure goals.

By the end of October 1942, the position of German troops on the southern wing The Eastern Front looked like this.

The Voronezh region is covered by the small 2nd Army, its connection with the Army Group Center is weakened. Further along the Don River, the 2nd Hungarian, 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies lined up in a chain. There are several divisions in reserve. The 6th field and 4th tank armies are concentrated in the area of Stalingrad, and the offensive mission was assigned to them and repeated in the order of November 17. In the bare steppe hangs with open flanks the 4th Romanian army. Then - the 16th motorized division and - after 300 kilometers - the 1st tank army advancing to the south. along the coast

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The Black Sea is trying to break into Abkhazia the 17th field army, the rear of which is covered by the operational group "Crimea". In the reserve of the entire southern sector of the front there is one Romanian (!) army corps.

And where is the 11th army of E. Manstein? Its main forces, as having experience in attacking fortresses, were urgently transferred to Leningrad! The command of the Wehrmacht is true to itself: although the main task of the war is being solved in the south, the released troops are sent to the north, and they are given a separate task that is in no way connected with the main strategic idea of the Blau offensive. One such mistake is enough

to lose any campaign. The first sketches of a future brilliant strike against the weak points of the endless German "blockade line" were probably made by Zhukov and Vasilevsky back in July, when the contours, as well as the boundaries of the German offensive, became visible to the "naked eye". The Russian General Staff got the opportunity to show that it, too, knows how to plan for

victories. According to A. Vasilevsky, the situation is favorable. shaft to conduct a major two-stage operation aimed at the complete destruction of the entire southern wing of the German front. The rate did not dare to the extraordinary proposal of the best Soviet strategist of the Second World War, but the adopted "small" plan made an impression.

The Stalingrad operation is somewhat "hackneyed" in Soviet memoirs, so it gives the impression of "quite obvious" and "very easy." In reality, the Germans, in contrast to the winter of 1941, avoided the formation of large, east-facing salients in the front line; their positions were covered by the Don River for a considerable distance. The gap between the adjacent flanks of Army Groups "A" and "B" in winter was not dangerous, since impassability, cold, lack of settlements - all this made it extremely difficult for operational maneuver in the Elista area. In the summer, the Soviet army experienced a severe

internal crisis: not only soldiers, but also commanders lost faith in themselves. The successful defense of Stalingrad and the Caucasus somewhat raised the mood of the troops, but when planning the winter campaign, one had to take into account the fact that one more

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The plans of the parties for the autumn and winter of 1942

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a defeat like that in Kharkov could lead the army to complete disintegration. Accordingly, many

commanders on the ground were categorically opposed to any active action. In their opinion, it was a miracle that the troops stopped their disorderly retreat.

In order to decide in this situation on a large-scale, strategic-scale offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had to deeply delve into the position and evaluate all those fatal and difficult to eliminate weaknesses that formed in the location of the Nazi units and formations in the process of implementing the Blau plan. When planning Operation Saturn, G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky

proceeded from

the following prerequisites:

1. The enemy does not have strategic reserves on the southern wing of the front or at least on an operational scale;

2. The most combat-ready units of the enemy - the 6th field, 4th tank, 1st tank, 17th armies are operationally pinned down by heavy offensive battles on terrain unsuitable for maneuvering;

3. In the autumn-winter of 1942, the Germans will not be able to organize a quick maneuver with large formations. Such a maneuver will be hampered not only by the outline of communications, but also by the Fuhrer's order of 24.10 1, dooming the troops to a tough defense of non-attacked sectors; 4.

Hitler's troops are defending on terrain poor in roads: the communication line of Army Group "A" without fail passes through Rostov-on-Don, and Group "B" - through Voroshilovgrad and Kharkov, and further to the west both lines intersect in Dnepropetrovsk, where the only completely serviceable bridge across the Dnieper² is located. This makes the position of the enemy strategically unstable;

¹ The Soviet leadership, of course, knew about this order. Yes, it wasn't difficult predict A. Hitler's way of thinking, based on the experience of the winter of 1941-1942.

² As of November 1942, "the railway bridge in Zaporozhye, the route leading through Ukraine (through Nikolaev-Kherson) to the Crimea and from there through the Kerch Strait, was not partially restored, and partially was not yet completed by construction" (E. Manstein).

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5. Romanian, Hungarian, Italian units occupy an extended positional front, and their defense is poorly provided in depth and insufficiently saturated with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. The personnel of the "allied" contingents are significantly inferior in terms of combat training to both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army (with regard to the Romanians and Italians, one can even speak of a well-established "inferiority complex"); 6. Therefore, although the weak connection between Army Groups "A" and "B" cannot be directly used, the lack of flank

support will seriously affect the combat stability of the 4th Romanian Army.

The position of the German troops would have been significantly (but not radically) improved if they had succeeded in pushing the Soviet troops back over the Caucasus Range in the summer, and by the autumn reaching the Volga in a wide sector from Stalingrad to Astrakhan and planning an offensive along the western coast of the Caspian Sea. That's where, in fact, the 11th army of E. Manstein was needed! But the time for such a maneuver has passed, and, according to A. Vasilevsky, the Germans could no longer do anything with their positional weaknesses. It was possible to prepare an offensive without haste.

-2-

Given the favorable operational situation and the weakness of the defense of Germany's satellites, the Stavka did not involve large reserves in the operation,

located in the Moscow area. This played a positive role: the surprise that was planned was fully ensured, and the forces already transferred to the south turned out to be quite sufficient¹. Operation "Mars" played a certain role in diverting the attention of the enemy - the next offensive of the Soviet troops in the traditional Rzhev direction. It is difficult to say whether Mars is to blame or German analysts did

¹ On the balance of forces in the Stalingrad direction, see Appendix 1.

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whether his conclusions from the distribution of the reserves of the Red Army, or the weakness of the 2nd Army, which worried the new chief of staff of the OKHK, played a role. Zeitzler, but the enemy was convinced that the expected major Russian offensive would be directed at the junction of Army Groups Center and B.

This time, the Soviet command achieved complete surprise - on strategic, operational and tactical levels.

The order to go on the offensive was read to the troops of the Don Front on the night of November 19. The Stalingrad Front began active operations a day later, where the troops learned about the upcoming operations only on the night of the 20th.

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On the morning of November 19, 1942, it turned out that the aircraft could not take off. There was thick fog over the Don and Volga steppes, and heavy snowfall north of Stalingrad. Soviet sources call the weather non-. favorable, in reality it only contributed to the surprise attack and the complete disorganization of the Romanian defense. Artillery preparation began at 7.30. By 12 noon

on the front of the 5th Panzer Army, the advance in the center reached 2-3 kilometers, and the attack slowed down on the flanks. Army Commander General P. Romanenko decided to use the tank corps of the mobile group - the 1st and 26th - to break through the enemy's tactical defense zone. In different weather or with a different enemy, this would have led to heavy losses in armored vehicles, road blockages and a sharp drop in the pace of the operation. But the anti-tank defense of the Romanian troops did not even meet the requirements of the First World War. By the end of the day, the 1st Panzer Corps had advanced 18

kilometers, and this was already a breakthrough. The 26th corps stumbled upon several pockets of resistance, but the Romanian defense began to lose integrity, fall apart, and the corps easily bypassed the positions of the still resisting units of the 3rd Romanian army.

In the evening, both sides brought reserves into battle: P. Romanenko threw the 8th cavalry corps, and P. Dumitre

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sku - the 1st Romanian Panzer Division, which ceased to exist on this. The commander of the 26th Corps, A. Rodin, acted simply with this division: he cut off the Romanian tanks from the rear, and included these rears in his tank column. The commander of the 21st

Army advancing to the right, I. Chistyakov, also used his mobile corps to break through the defenses, and achieved greater success than P. Romanenko, who delivered the main blow. By evening, the 4th Tank Corps of the 21st Army advanced 35 kilometers to the south and entered the operational space. At this point, the German command did not realize the full

danger of the situation. "At the top", in the Fuhrer's Headquarters, the opinion prevailed that Geim's 48th Panzer Corps should stop the Russians with a counterattack and push them back to their original positions. But already M. Weichs, head of Army Group B, expressed doubts about this, referring to the "ambiguity of the situation" in the zone of the 3rd Romanian army. Even closer to the front line for sure

knew that Geim's corps consisted of two tank divisions - the 22nd, which had 45 tanks, and the 1st Romanian, which no longer existed.

Be that as it may, the 48th Corps tried to counterattack on November 20, but was surrounded, its remnants barely made their way to the south-

west¹. On this day, the Soviet offensive began against the 4th Romanian army of C. Constantinescu. If in the north the Romanians had a "miserable defense", then in the south there was no defense at all. All German reserves in the Stalingrad area (that is, basically the same 48th Corps) are fighting against the 5th Panzer and 21st Armies. Unfortunately, A. Eremenko, heading the Stalingrad Front, acted in his usual style and failed to properly organize the entry into battle of the 4th Mechanized Corps and the 3rd Mechanized Corps. As a result, the depth of the breakthrough south of Stalingrad did not exceed 12 km by the end of the day.

¹ Geim was removed from command, court-martialed, and first sentenced to death. execution, and then fully acquitted for lack of corpus delicti. 322

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The commander of the 6th field army of the Wehrmacht, Lieutenant-General F. Paulus, was in his post, to a certain extent, by accident. From the very beginning of the war, the army was led by W. Reichenau, a staunch Nazi who did not value the Fuhrer's military talents at all, and, moreover, equally despised both the OKH and the OKW. Clever, resourceful, resolute, successful, he achieved that the journalists called the 6th Army nothing more than "the winner of the capitals." Colleagues loved him no more than he deserved, but recognized his originality. In November 1941, it was W. Reichenau who replaced G. Runstedt as commander of Army Group South, and he retained leadership of the 6th Army. However, on January 17, Reichenau suddenly dies of a heart attack. The South group, as

already mentioned, is received by von Bock, and the leadership of the 6th Army passes into the hands of its former chief of staff, General F. Paulus, at that time acting as the 1st quartermaster of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. Until this day, F. Paulus, a diligent and assiduous staff worker, never commanded a large military formation. His

appointment was the result of behind-the-scenes intrigues in the top leadership of the Wehrmacht: it was believed that F. Paulus, having received the combat experience necessary for promotion, would replace F. Halder as chief of staff of the ground forces. This would ensure some continuity in the activities of the OKH. F. Paulus commanded the troops quite competently, but without the "light" that distinguished the actions of E. Manstein, G. Kluge, the same W. Reichenau. Being by nature an

executive worker, he honestly carried out the orders of the Fuhrer of October 24 and November 17, that is, until the last opportunity he continued to fight street battles in Stalingrad. By the evening of November 20, F. Paulus, for the first time in his life, was required

independent solution.

By this time, he knew that the 3rd Romanian Army, as a fighting force, no longer exists, and the left flank of the 6th Army is deeply engulfed by the enemy. The commander of the German grouping in Stalingrad was aware that

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that an equally dangerous situation has developed on the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army, as a result of which all formations operating between the Volga and the Don are threatened with encirclement. F. Paulus turns to M. Weichs (on command!) with a request to give immediate permission to withdraw troops beyond the Don. M. Weichs begins negotiations with A. Hitler, who categorically forbids leaving

Stalingrad.



Operational situation on November 24, 1942

However, even if F. Paulus for the first time in his life decided on an independent act, this would hardly have helped the 6th Army much. The enemy had already penetrated far into her rear: on the night of November 22, the advance detachment of the 26th, since a night attack with headlights turned off, captured the key bridge across the Don in the Kalach region. The 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front also fought in the operational depth, approaching the Soviet, through which the only railway 324

the highway that feeds the German troops in Stalingrad. So it was

no longer a retreat, but a breakthrough. But on the morning of November 19, the 6th Army, supported by the 4th Panzer, was advancing east with its best forces, trying to break through to the Volga in the Stalingrad region. Meanwhile, as the Soviet historian M. Galaktionov rightly remarked in his book on the Battle of the Marne, "deploying an army is somewhat more difficult than a battalion." November 23 at 16.00 4th tank

corps A. Kravchenko and 4th mechanized
V. Volsky's corps united in the Sovetsky area.

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Let's give F. Paulus his due: the 6th Army did not disintegrate into isolated pockets of resistance, but in an organized manner withdrew to Stalingrad and built some sort of all-round defense. After all, these were not Romanians: they failed to break through the new battle line of the 6th Army with the tank corps of the Don and Stalingrad fronts. By November 24, a completely new situation had developed on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, and both sides had to take this into account.

The Soviet command faced a difficult choice between two possible strategic decisions and one "natural".

Firstly, it was possible, leaving the 6th Army to its fate, the Stalingrad Front and the orders of the Fuhrer, to force the Chir with the forces of the 5th Panzer and 21st Armies and begin sliding to the south-west in the space of the large bend of the Don, empty of enemy troops. Secondly, there was

the opportunity to turn "Uranus" into "Big Saturn", extending the offensive to the north, where the 8th Italian army was defending, which was inferior in its combat effectiveness even to the Romanian troops.

And, of course, the most simple and natural remained: to finish off the army of F. Paulus.

Unfortunately, this is the decision that was made.

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The 11th field army of the Wehrmacht never launched an attack on Leningrad. First, this was prevented by the Soviet counter-offensive in the area of Lake Ladoga, then by the lack of ammunition. By autumn, the army (or rather, its headquarters) was transferred to the Vitebsk region as a strategic reserve for von Kluge.

On November 20, when the situation near Stalingrad was finally determined, Hitler ordered the immediate dispatch of the headquarters of the 11th Army to the south, creating on its basis the command of a new army group, called "Don". It included the remnants of the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies, the 6th army, the 4th tank army, the mixed German-Romanian Hollidt group (an impromptu formation, knocked together from all the units that were at hand and not captured in orbit of the Soviet offensive). The real free strike force of an improvised army group was something like two corps.

E. Manstein, who was appointed commander of the Don group, had two tasks: to restore the integrity of the front in the south, where a three hundred-kilometer gap gaped, and to release the 6th Army. Both of them were

impossible.

For some time, E. Manstein tried to convince F. Paulus to make a decision on his own¹ to break through the 6th Army. Then, making sure that nothing came of it and, probably, it would not work, he began to put together a shock group for an attack on Stalingrad from the southwest.

By the end of November, the Luftwaffe organized an "air bridge" to deliver food and ammunition to the "Fortress on the Volga". However, the Germans did not have heavy transport aircraft, and the available Yu-52s, under the best circumstances, could provide about a third of the minimum requirements of the 6th Army. At the same time, slow-moving and weakly

¹ Neither E. Manstein nor F. Paulus wanted to answer to A. Hitler for violating his direct orders regarding the "Stalingrad Fortress", so E. Manstein, who had the right to order F. Paulus, turned to him with advice and hints. F. Paulus did not understand the hints, for which he received the rank of colonel general on December 1.

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protected "Junkers" needed fighter cover throughout the route. The Stalingrad "ring" began to grind not only the ground, but also the air forces of Germany.

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The operation near Stalingrad lost momentum, but there was an opportunity to give it a new impetus. In early December, A. Vasilevsky's attention was drawn to the middle reaches of the Don, where the Southwestern Front was preparing the Saturn offensive - a double blow against the 8th Italian Army, followed by an exit to the Millerovo area. The Stavka, on the contrary, is exclusively concerned with the fate of the 6th Army and is very nervous about the prospect of a breakthrough by Army Group Don to Stalingrad.

E. Manstein, realizing that with the right "game" nothing will save Army Group Don (and after it Army Group A, still in the Caucasus), is preparing his counterattack almost defiantly. The calculation for a nervous breakdown of the Soviet command is justified. In vain the best strategist of the Red Army argues, convinces, proves that the Kotelnikov group

the enemy is advancing into the void, that its flanks are open and the rear is not secured, that even having broken through to Stalingrad, G. Goth will not change the situation that is catastrophic for the Wehrmacht on this sector of the Eastern Front and will only increase the number of troops blockaded in the "Fortress" and supplied by air, that the start of Operation Saturn will force E. Manstein to immediately curtail all active operations between the Volga and the Don (see Appendix, Diagram 7.)

But I. Stalin did not want to take risks. "Saturn" rolls up to "Small Saturn", and the 5th shock and 2nd guards armies are urgently transferred to Stalingrad. On December 12, Operation Winter

Storm begins. The German offensive, which was discussed for a long time in both Headquarters

¹ The strike force was created on the basis of the headquarters of the 4th Panzer Army.

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of the High Command, and which was almost reported on the Berlin radio, turned out to be unexpected only for one person - the commander of the Stalingrad Front, General A. Eremenko. G. Goth breaks through the defenses of the 41st Army and goes to the Aksai River. The next day, the struggle for bridgeheads over Aksai begins. G. Goth's group is losing momentum. Its offensive, strategically completely safe for the Soviet troops, is quickly losing its tactical perspective. Nevertheless, the Headquarters requires A. Vasilevsky to postpone the operation against the Stalingrad group of Germans (6th Army) and move the 2nd Guards Army of R. Malinovsky in a forced march to the south.

G. Goth, apparently completely unaware of why he is doing this and what he is pursuing, losing tanks and people, breaks out of the bridgehead on Aksai and in one leap moves towards the Myshkovka River. Only 48 kilometers remain to Stalingrad, but G. Goth's group is covered from three sides, and the 2nd Guards Army is deployed in front of it on the banks of the Myshkovka. The mechanized corps of the Stalingrad Front are finally ceasing the practice of oncoming battles with German tanks, instead proceeding to the systematic destruction of the remnants of the 4th Romanian Army, which is still trying to cover Goth's flanks.

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And on December 16, the troops of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts delivered a long-awaited blow to the 8th Italian army. Oddly enough, on the first day the offensive developed slowly. Serious success was not achieved, the tank corps stopped, hitting the minefields. But in 1942, the troops learned a lot, and for the Italians the realities of the Eastern Front were still "new" (the 8th Army was located only in the most peaceful areas). On the second day, the tank corps found or made gaps in the minefields, and on the third, the command of the Italian army fell apart, and the operation began to steadily build up. After passing 240 kilometers in 5 days, the 24th tank corps of V. Badanov went to Tatsinskaya, intercepting the supply lines of Army Group Don. Here, of course, E. Manche

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Tein was no longer up to Stalingrad. The leading commander of the Reich literally scraped together troops for a counterattack from nothing and surrounded the 24th Panzer Corps. But it was not 1941, and Badanov calmly retreated, breaking through the front of the encirclement without much difficulty.

The 8th Army "evaporated", and a gap over 100 km wide appeared to the north of Millerov, which was covered by the only 19th Panzer Division. In the entire zone of the Don group and the right wing of Army Group B, there were no more than 18 German divisions in a 700-kilometer section. Now Rostov-on-Don has acquired critical importance. The

armies of the Stalingrad Front from the southeast and the mobile corps of the South

Western front - from the northeast. To the city, through which all the supplies of Army Group A were carried out, they had 200 kilometers of space almost free from the enemy. Meanwhile, the 1st Panzer and 17th Armies are still fighting in the Caucasus and are almost five hundred kilometers to the south.

Nobody removed the task of liberating the 6th Army from E. Manstein, there was generally nothing to reinforce the Don group, and A. Hitler rejected the request to transfer the tank corps from the 1st Panzer Army to G. Goth. Meanwhile, the position of the 6th Army was deteriorating day by day.

Under these conditions, both sides behave completely inadequately.

The army of F. Paulus is the weakest point of the German position. As long as it exists, the Luftwaffe will lose aircraft and crews in a vain attempt to supply the 300,000th group with aircraft with a maximum payload of 2.5 tons. Consequently, Army Group "Don" is obliged to "keep" the base airfields of Morozovsk and Tatsinskaya and to the last opportunity to maintain bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Don. In general, the entire operational structure of the Don group is tied to the director Tatsinskaya Kalach-Stalingrad. To regain some freedom of action, the German

¹ "Aviation lost 488 aircraft near Stalingrad and about 1,000 people from their crews" (E. Manstein "Lost Victories.")

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Operational situation on December 20, 1942

This command should immediately remove Army Group A from the Caucasus and "hand over" the 6th Army¹.

For its part, the Soviet command had to protect the enemy's 6th army in every possible way (even to the point of sometimes turning a blind eye to the Yu-52 landing at the Gumrak and Pitomnik airfields). The troops of F. Paulus had nowhere to go: the army, left without fuel and trying to make a two-hundred-kilometer march along

¹ In any form. Obliging her to start a breakthrough (the army would have died in the snow, but 8-10 percent of its strength without heavy weapons would have reached the positions of the Don group). Simply by disbanding the army and demobilizing its soldiers (as V. Model, surrounded in the Ruhr with the remnants of Army Group B, will do in 1945). Giving F. Paulus permission to "honorably surrender." Finally, just say "Goodbye guys!"

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bare winter steppe, will perish regardless of whether someone will interfere

this march or not.

It goes without saying that the "Stalingrad Fortress", at least from mid-December, should have been considered as a large self-governing prisoner of war camp, entrusted with its protection to the most bloodless armies in the autumn battles (62nd, 64th, 57th) and urgently transfer the rest four armies, together with the headquarters of the Don Front, into the great bend

of the Don. Further, "Small Saturn" turned into "Big", and the operational "shadow" from the Soviet offensive immediately reached Rostov. In general, E. Manstein had nothing to oppose to this plan: he had to defend a position with a negative connection with a general lack of strength.

Again, A. Vasilevsky is trying to convince I. Stalin and the Headquarters that the time has come to win this war with one blow, and again the highest authorities insist on carrying out Operation Ring, that is, on dismembering and destroying the 6th Army in Stalingrad.

For its part, the Fuhrer's Headquarters issues Operational Order No. 2, in which Army Group Don is ordered to continue operations to liberate the 6th Army. On the 31st, an addition appears, explaining that a grouping of 4 tank and 3 mechanized divisions (2 SS tank corps) will be concentrated for this offensive, which will be able to launch an offensive "already in mid-February." Since it was extremely obvious that the 6th Army would not live up to this date, the order made a strange impression. True, he allowed the withdrawal of troops from the Caucasus. But - very slowly.

-9- In early January, Soviet troops launched a general offensive. The comedy of mutual mistakes continues: having a real opportunity to completely destroy the entire southern wing of the enemy, for some reason we concentrate 22 divisions with 500 tanks and 900 aircraft near Sinyavin and turn the Nevsky Piglet into the Nevsky Corridor. Renewed (though "without excessive fanaticism") active operations near Rzhev.

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And in the region of Stalingrad "slowly and methodically" the liquidation of the 6th Army is being carried out. By February 2, the fighting in the completely destroyed city finally ends. Everything that remains of the 6th field army of the Wehrmacht capitulates. 91,000 soldiers¹ 2,500 officers, 24 generals and one field marshal. (This title was awarded to F. Paulus on January 30 and was an "invitation to suicide": never in the entire history of Prussia / Germany did German field marshals surrender. F. Paulus decided to

become the first). In January, the battles in Stalingrad were no longer military, but symbolic. In some ways, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was right: "The people were really looking forward to this victory."

Strategically, from the very beginning of 1943, the center of gravity of the campaign shifted south of Stalingrad. The task was set by the forces of the Southern (former Stalingrad) and Transcaucasian fronts to cut the troops of Army Group A and destroy them with concentric attacks on Rostov and Tikhoretsk.

This plan was not the best possible, but it also fully ensured the defeat of the German army groups "A", "Don" and "B". Unfortunately, the Southern Front was still commanded by A. Eremenko, and the leadership of the Transcaucasian Front ended up in the hands of I. Tyulenev, who was completely unprepared to manage maneuver operations.

K. Zeitzler managed to convince A. Hitler to begin the withdrawal of the troops of Army Group A, and this happened two days earlier than the Transcaucasian Front went on the offensive. I. Tyulenev did not notice the retreat of the enemy, moreover, he immediately lost control of his units, which were advancing in a free from

enemy troops space. In three days, the Transcaucasian Front covered 25-60 kilometers and did not catch up with the enemy. The headquarters informed the command of the Polar Front that the enemy was systematically withdrawing from the Caucasus, burning warehouses and blowing up roads, that the front, by no means, had the task of "pushing out" German units, on the contrary, it should prevent their retreat as much as possible, that mobile troops must be used concentrated. "Military educational program" in the form of orders Stav

¹ In the ruins of Stalingrad and in the steppe around it, 147,000 corpses of German soldiers and officers.

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ki of the Supreme High Command continues with short breaks until the last week of January 1943.

A. Eremenko's business was a little better. Again, the Supreme High Command, and not the front commander, gives the order to form mobile groups and assigns offensive tasks to these groups. However, the pace of the operation is somehow lost, and its geometry is far from perfect. And the forces at the disposal of the Southern Front were no longer enough to quickly capture Rostov.

Gradually, troops from the West arrived in the zone of the Don Army Group: the SS divisions Adolf Hitler, Reich, Totenkopf, three infantry divisions. The division "Grossdeutschland" was transferred from the army group "Center". As the operation "Ring" developed, E. Manstein was less and less concerned about the agonizing 6th Army, and the "Don" group gained freedom of maneuver. Near Bataysk and Rostov on January 19-24, 1943, E. Manstein for the first time managed to stop the winter offensive of the Red Army. On January

24, the German command makes the final decision to evacuate Army Group A from the North Caucasus. The 1st Panzer Army withdraws through Rostov, the 17th Army no longer has time for such a maneuver, and it receives an order to gain a foothold on the Taman Peninsula .

¹ According to another version, A. Hitler without fail wanted to keep the Taman Peninsula as a base for a new campaign in the Caucasus, and this is precisely what explains the withdrawal of the 17th Army and some parts of the 1st Panzer Army behind the so-called "Blue Line". There is no doubt that the Fuhrer really had such a desire, and one of the reasons for the catastrophic development of events on the southern wing of the Eastern Front was an attempt to simultaneously solve three tasks: to unblock Stalingrad, to gain a foothold in the Caucasus and, under any conditions, to keep the Donbass. (That is, the bifurcation of operational thought at the first, offensive stage of the campaign turned into a complete "disorder" at its second stage). However, by the end of January, it was already about the withdrawal of the German armies beyond the Dnieper (the Soviet command really put the attack on Kharkov-Kursk, and then on Poltava-Kremenchug "into the plan"), and under these conditions, the problem of holding the Donbass should have been of interest to A. Hitler much stronger than the ghostly prospects of someday using the Taman Peninsula to organize an offensive. In addition, the German command was aware that the Soviet Black Sea Fleet could completely interrupt the supply line of the 17th Army, passing through the Kerch Strait. 333

The Germans managed to "remove" the 1st Panzer Army literally at the last moment: on February 14, 1943, Rostov-on-Don was liberated. Too late! The enemy armies broke out of the "operational bag", the time for a decisive victory on the southern wing of the Eastern Front was lost. The Soviet troops, however,

have the initiative and continue the offensive. Throughout the spring, the North Caucasian Front is trying to break through the defenses of the 17th Army on Taman. Both sides throw all free aircraft to the Kuban. As a result, from April 17 to April 24, 1943, a grandiose oncoming air battle takes place. The fading fighting would continue until early June, and Luftwaffe losses would exceed 1,100 aircraft, with 800 shot down in dogfights. Like the Battle of Britain in 1940, the Kuban Meat Grinder in 1943 will end in a draw.

The general offensive of the Red Army is gradually spreading to the north. The 2nd Hungarian army was defeated, the 2nd German army was withdrawing. Without any pressure from the enemy, Army Group Center surrenders Rzhev, the "bastion of the Eastern Front." Demyansky "bag" was evacuated. By mid-February, Soviet troops everywhere reach the starting line, from which the Wehrmacht began the spring campaign of 1942. In the strategic balance of this

campaign, the Nazi command was left with three completely destroyed armies: the 6th German, 8th Italian and 2nd Hungarian. Three more armies were defeated.

This ends the story of Operation Blue.

The sixth plot: the war is over - long live the war! -1 - E.

Manstein still managed to stabilize the Eastern Front! At the last moment, having pulled the 1st Panzer Army through Rostov-on-Don, he withdrew the troops across the Mius River, where they managed to gain a foothold on the high right bank. "Mius

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front" became the cornerstone in the dam that the commander of the army group (now renamed "South") erected in the path of the advancing Soviet troops. On the left wing of the army group,

the situation remained threatening. Here the Voronezh Front launched the ambitious Operation Zvezda, the first in a chain of large offensives envisaged by the plan of the Supreme High Command at the beginning of 1943. Three Soviet armies: the 40th, 69th and 3rd tank armies advanced on Kharkov and Belgorod, meaning to throw back Manstein across the Dnieper. The Southwestern Front has already set Dnepropetrovsk and Dneprodzerzhinsk as its next targets; in response to this, the commander of the Voronezh Front decided to attack Poltava, Kremenchug. The headquarters made some amendments to this plan, which facilitate the interaction of the fronts, but do not change the essence of the plan.

However, having created the Mius Front, E. Manstein gained freedom to maneuver with reserves. He managed to concentrate two strong groupings - the 1st Panzer Army and the SS Panzer Corps in the amount of 3 Panzer Divisions - and dealt a strong blow to the troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts. Both

fronts rolled back, again losing Kharkov and Belgorod to Army Group South. It would not be an exaggeration to say that E. Manstein's counterstrike frustrated all the offensive plans of the Soviet command for the first half of 1943. Operations near Pskov and Smolensk were cancelled. Both sides went on the defensive (with the exception of the Taman Peninsula, where heavy but strategically meaningless battles continued). For the first time since the beginning of the war, silence reigned on almost the entire Eastern Front.

In the excellent movie Deliverance, made in the 1970s, this situation commented by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command as follows:

"- They can't come to their senses after Stalingrad ... — And we — after Kharkov, — noted Comrade Stalin.

This time there were no private offensive operations. All fronts were buried in the ground, creating several lines of defense. The headquarters was waiting for the enemy to attack and knew exactly where it would happen. Realizing that the Germans would fight hard for the Donbass, the Soviet command came to the conclusion that the OKH would make every effort to

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take advantage of the favorable configuration of the front line near Kursk, where

a huge ledge facing west was formed - the Kursk Bulge.

If the very outline of the front made Operation Citadel quite transparent, then the interval of more than three months between the decision to launch an offensive and its implementation finally turned it into a secret.

Open 1 . Rovno, Orel, Dnepropetrovsk, Smolensk, Berlin, even in Trondheim were whispering about the upcoming offensive near Kursk. As a result, the Soviet command did not have any problems with the deployment of its reserves. From April to July, 10 rifle divisions, 10 destroyer anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate destroyer regiments, 14 artillery regiments, 8 regiments of guards mortars, 7 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments and other units were transferred to the Central and Voronezh Fronts from April to July. The number of personnel during this period increased by 782 thousand people, the active army received 22,714 guns and mortars, 5,223 tanks and self-propelled guns, 4,360 aircraft. Only on three fronts of the Oryol-Kursk Bulge - Bryansk, Central and Voronezh, the number of vehicles increased by 195,000 thousand trucks ("Studebakers"). Let us once again pay tribute to E. Manstein: he tried in every possible way to accelerate the beginning of

¹ the Battle of Kursk, knowing full well that immediately after Kharkov, when a significant part of the reserves were involved in offensive operations already underway or being prepared, the Soviet command was faced with a completely unexpected development of events and was experiencing a real shock, and the Soviet operational formation in the south has lost stability, the mobile units of the Army Group "South" have some chances to break through to Kursk. E. Manstein hoped to achieve surprise. K. Zeitzler, in full agreement with A. Hitler, who postponed the offensive until the Wehrmacht's tank divisions were re-equipped with new equipment, could rely only on force. But the German troops, on the Eastern Front in general and on the Kursk Bulge in particular, did not have any advantage in strength.

It is difficult to understand what the German command was really counting on when it planned to crush the most fortified sector of the Eastern Front, knowing for sure that the enemy knew the plan of the operation, the grouping of the attacking forces, the day and almost the hour of going over to the offensive. 336

By July, the Stavka reserve had 1.111 million people, 16,782 guns and mortars, 2,688 tanks, and 663 aircraft. Half of this reserve was part of the Steppe Front, deployed at the base of the Kursk salient. On July 5, E.

Manstein went on the offensive against the Voronezh Front, G. Kluge (more precisely, V. Model, commander of the 9th Army) attacked the Central Front. With a general advantage in forces and means on the side of the Soviet troops, the battle turned out to be quite difficult for them. In the end, the Headquarters transferred the 5th Guards and 5th Tank Armies from the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front, and this immediately dotted the i's. The last strategic offensive of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front failed.

In the spring and summer of 1943, the Axis defenses in North Africa collapsed. In Tunisia, the remnants of Rommel's army capitulated. Having seized absolute supremacy at sea and in the air, the Allies landed in Sicily, and the Italian troops did not offer them the slightest resistance. By this time, Italy was ready to find any excuse to withdraw from the war.

The campaign in Europe played out much faster than the fighting in the Far East developed. In August 1942, US Marines, with the assistance of the Pacific Fleet, landed on the island of Guadalcanal in the Eastern Solomon Islands. The operation was not organized in the best way and led to heavy positional battles in a strategically pointless direction. In early February 1943, the Allies captured Guadalcanal, but at such a high price¹ that no serious offensive operations were in question in 1943.

¹ The Allies lost an entire fleet sunk with a total displacement of 180,300 tons: 2 heavy aircraft carriers, 6 heavy and 2 light cruisers, 15 destroyers. The losses of the Japanese were also huge: a light aircraft carrier, 2 battlecruisers (though obsolete), 3 heavy, 2 light cruisers, 14 destroyers (total displacement 159,848 tons). The Allies, however, lost the most valuable ships for the development of further offensive operations - heavy aircraft carriers and heavy cover cruisers. We had to wait until the Essexes, Alaskas and Baltimores entered service, that is, until the summer of 1944.

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This meant that the war in the Far East would under no circumstances end before the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945.

The situation in Europe developed much faster. At the end of 1942, there was no guarantee that the Germans would be able to restore the front in the east at all. Operation Torch radically changed the balance of power in Africa, and it was clear that Italy's exit from the war was not far off. This meant that already in the first half of 1943, Germany would find itself in a hopeless military situation and would begin to seek peace on any reasonable terms.

Thus, the US strategic defeat¹ in the battle for Guadalcanal could put an end to F. Roosevelt's hopes for a post-war reformatting of the world under the auspices of America. The President, however, found a simple and ingenious solution to the problem. At the inter-allied conference in

Casablanca (January 14-24, 1943), a directive was adopted to launch an air offensive against the industrial centers of Germany, the goal of which was defined as "the consistent destruction and disorganization of the military, industrial and economic system of Germany and the undermining of the morale of the German people, until its capacity for armed resistance is decisively weakened. At the same conference, coalition leaders demanded the unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy, Japan and their allies. This requirement deprived not only Great Britain and the USSR, but also any political forces in Germany of any diplomatic initiative. The Reich and its European opponents were doomed to "exterminate each other for as long as possible"² and this created the necessary prerequisites for the implementation of the US geopolitical plans. Let me remind you once again that war is a non-zero-sum game. Japan, of course, also suffered a heavy strategic defeat in the battles for the

¹ Eastern Solomon Islands. Another question is that after Midway this was no longer of fundamental importance for the Land of the Rising Sun. In contrast to the United States, for which the defeat in the South Seas significantly hampered the implementation of the original plan of the war. G. Truman.

2

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The Casablanca conference dragged out the war for two years, because after the failure of the Kursk offensive and the catastrophe in Africa and Sicily, any military prospects for Germany were reduced to zero. In reality, the position of the Reich in August 1943 was worse than the position of the Kaiser Empire in November 1918, and the German high command was aware of this. The demand for unconditional surrender, however, compelled them to fight to the end.

What the generals and politicians of the Reich never understood (even after the war) was that in itself this demand contained absolutely nothing but the magic of words. And the "unconditional surrender" in August 1943 (when France, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Poland and a significant part of the Soviet Union are still under German control, and the German armed forces retain the ability to resist) would have had a completely different character than in May 1945 of the year. It is surprising that such a subtle and intelligent politician as A. Hitler did not use the decisions of the Casablanca

conferences, beneficial, first of all, to the United States, for a political game with Great Britain and the USSR. In any case, the war continued. In August 1943, E. Manstein withdrew his army group behind the Dnieper in relative order, Kyiv was liberated in November, and battles unfolded on the right-bank Ukraine. In 1944, the Eastern Front finally collapsed.

The armies of the Third Reich rolled back behind the Vistula, where they managed to stop the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front of K. Rokossovsky until winter (mainly due to the overvoltage of the communication lines of the Soviet army). The Anglo-American allies finally landed in France and, after several weeks of painful fighting on the bridgehead, entered the operational space. Germany was still capable of snarling: its troops suppressed the Warsaw Uprising, blocking all efforts of K. Rokossovsky to immediately force the Vistula, the winter counteroffensive in the Ardennes by the forces of the 5th and 6th tank armies created a large-scale crisis on the Western Front and, perhaps, even sent troops allies to the brink of disaster. For its part, Japan tried to contain the general offensive of the United States on

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in the Pacific through excellence in operational art and extensive use of suicide pilots, the last resource of the Empire.

Soviet troops paid dearly for the liberation of Ukraine, Hungary cost even more. The US Army and Navy suffered disproportionate losses on Saipan and Okinawa. But none of this mattered, and had nothing to do with the

subtle art of strategy. "Black doesn't have any compensation for the exchange lost, so what happens next doesn't really require any special comments. It should only be noted that White played the second part of the game far from in the best way .

F.

Roosevelt largely succeeded in implementing his strategy in 1941-1945. Sometimes one has to read that the sick and old president in Yalta "ceded Europe to the Russians." Nothing could be further from the truth. The Yalta conference, which built the post-war world according to American geopolitical blueprints, was the apotheosis of F. Roosevelt's activities as leader of the Great Western Democracy. Of course, he could not trust anyone to carry it out and had to fly to Yalta himself. But the strategic defeats in the battles for the Malay-Indonesian barrier

and the Eastern Solomon Islands, as well as the delay in the opening of the "Second Front" in Europe (largely caused by the incapacity of the British army, convincingly demonstrated by E. Rommel in the African campaign of 1941-1942) led to the fact that the US victory was not as complete and comprehensive as the president wanted. And if he managed to brilliantly play the option that ensures the destruction of the British Empire by the forces of the Axis countries, then the Soviet Union D. Bronstein. However, the comment of E.

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Gufeld: "... sophisticated masters in such positions give up immediately."

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came out of the war in much better condition than expected.

President F. Roosevelt was not very worried about this. He relied on his diplomatic sophistication, good personal relations with I. Stalin and, last but not least, on the possibility of geo-economic game with the USSR in the framework of the "Marshall Plan". It goes without saying that this plan was to

to be extended to the USSR — this was precisely the “main variant” of F. Roosevelt's strategic plan for 1945-1948. But F. Roosevelt died before

the end of the war in Europe, before the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, before the surrender of Japan. For W. Churchill and even more so for the new US President G. Truman, the Soviet “Bolsheviks” were and remained “baboons”. Not that at the end of the 1940s

Europe was seriously faced with the prospect of a military conflict between the former allies, but ... such “Alternatives” exist¹. In May 1945, the Soviet army was the leading military force in

Europe. Of course, I. Stalin did not have a capable fleet, lagged behind in air defense forces and practically did not have strategic aviation. However, front-line aviation was ready to cover ground forces from any attack from the sky; several more or less random air skirmishes between Soviet and American fighters demonstrated this quite clearly. In 1945, the United States already had atomic weapons. So far, these were first-generation uranium and

plutonium bombs - with a capacity of about 20 kilotons, delivered to the target with the help of B-29 strategic bombers. Staff calculations done in

¹ See, for example: S. Anisimov. “Option “bis””. In 2004, A. Ivakin's semi-documentary film “Endless War” was shown on Russian television screens, dedicated to “alternative versions” of the Second World War and the post-war world order; one of the scenes presented in the film was the 1949 war between the USSR and the Anglo-American coalition.

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In 1948, during the development of the Dropshot plan, it was shown that the atomic bombing of the Soviet Union, even with the most optimistic ideas about its effectiveness, would cause less damage to the economy and armed forces of the USSR than Operation Blau in 1942. That is, a nuclear war against the Soviet Union remained a risky undertaking with unpredictable results and consequences. Therefore, the Dropshot plan was not implemented. A cold war has begun that will stretch for more

than five decades and will bring the world face to face with the real prospect of universal destruction. By the Caribbean crisis of 1962, the Soviet Union and the United States no longer possessed atomic, but thermonuclear weapons and reliable means of delivering them - intercontinental missiles. “Strategic parity” was achieved, and “balance of fear” reigned in the world for a long time. The war passed first into the economic, then into the informational and, finally, into the psychological stage. The Soviet Union was unable to find an adequate response to the challenge from the Western world, which is much superior to the USSR in economic and resource terms.

The United States once again enjoyed a victory that, this time, gave them the opportunity to reshape not only the geography of the world, but also its history. However,

the laws of strategy, which are one of the forms of the provisions of classical dialectics, have not been canceled by anyone, and equal positions are still transformed into equal ones. And this means that the American Empire, which replaced the British, inherited its chronic diseases. Like Great Britain in 1939, the modern United States is overwhelmed with commitments around the world, unable to articulate its goals, and lacking a positive strategy. Consequently, with all the might of

the American armed forces and all

the possibilities of the American economy, the Great Western Democracy is doomed to defeat in the "new generation war" that is now unfolding in

before our eyes.

"But that's a completely different story."

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The last story: about wars, myths, probabilistic history and ways of packaging information

Of course, it would be very arrogant to try to recount the history of the Second World War in one short essay. The author focused on what seems to him the most interesting and has not lost its value so far: the struggle of strategic plans and the tempo operational "game".

The Second World War was neither "the last of the wars" nor, moreover, "a war against wars in general." In the most minimal degree, it should be considered from an emotional and ethical standpoint, since in the "era of totalitarian wars" everyone fought equally cruelly. German crimes are only better known because Germany lost the war.

But there is no need to go to the other extreme, portraying the German soldiers as meek defenders of Western civilization from the "Russian Ivans". It was not the USSR that attacked Germany and its allies. The Germans were the active, warring, initiative-wielding side. Soviet soldiers defended their country and their land, and you need to have a lot of hatred for Russia in order to deprive them of their legitimate pride in a great victory.

Except for the United States of America, all the warring countries "paid the bills of the Second World War." Germany was deprived of the province and divided into two parts, which went to different military-political camps. Japan lost its army and navy, ceasing to be an Empire for a long time. Italy has withdrawn from the list of subjects of world politics. The defeat in the 1945 elections saved W. Churchill from the dubious honor of "presiding over the collapse of the British Empire", but did not save him from the painful fate of being present at the same time.

The Soviet Union, having adopted from Germany the "transitional pennant" of the "Empire of Evil and the enemy of all liberal-minded humanity", lived until 1991, suffering severely for the last fifteen years from the insanity of leaders and the strategic futility of fighting alone with the whole world. Then there was a collapse, the accession of the Baltic

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ki to the EU, American troops in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

But history is very fair, therefore, its own retribution - for an active role in unleashing the Second World War, for the strategic bombing of European and Japanese cities in 1944-1945, awaits the Americans. The myth of the "liberation mission" lives on for a long time, but it is not eternal. One should not deceive oneself

about the "inevitability of the defeat of totalitarianism" - be it fascist Germany or the communist Soviet Union. If history teaches something, it is its probability, alternativeness. And there is no such Alternative Reality, over which its own star does not shine! Any Alternative Reality aspires to become Current - to turn into that

History, in which the vast majority of the inhabitants of the earth believe. And those Reflections (Shadows of Events) in which Germany won the Second World War, or the Soviet Union succeeded in the space race, are as authentic as our world. They affect us, breaking through from the imaginary Reality into the real one, in texts, signs, dreams, role-playing games.

"The verifiability of history falls as one moves away from the current Reality and its nearest Reflections; "on the edge" of the continuum lie the event lines with

zero or even negative probability (historical vacuum)¹. If the analogy with quantum field theory is appropriate here, then this vacuum should determine the structure of the continuum. Those areas of high probability that we call "history" (at least

¹ It is clear that the term "probability" is used here in the most general sense - as a measure of the uncertainty of our knowledge about the system. Events that are incompatible with the system definition have a negative probability. For example, when throwing a standard dice, the probability of throwing any number from one to six is the same and tends (from below) to 1/6. The probability that the bone will stand on a corner or on an edge (or fall apart on impact) tends to zero. The probability that two different numbers will fall out at the same time is strictly equal to zero, since it does not correspond to a priori certain information about the behavior of the system. But the probability that a seven will fall out during a throw is negative: it contradicts the very definition of the "dice" system. 344

and "alternative"), is only a weak "ripple" on the surface of the bottomless entropy ocean. In a sense, the very existence of "history" (and us as representations of it) is determined by processes in the historical "vacuum".

Comparison of an alternative reality with the unconscious, and the current one with the consciousness of the historical process, is apparently correct. Just as unconscious impulses leave their marks in the conscious activity of the psyche, so alternative versions signify themselves as projections onto the current Reality. Projections can be almost imperceptible - like the presence of minor discrepancies in the sources: the city of Lvov was / was not taken by German troops in 1939, the battlecruiser Gneisenau received a torpedo hit on June 20/21, 1940, Best's squadron of dive bombers attacked and sank the Akagi "/" Kaga "June 4, 1942. However, they can be arbitrarily large, representing technical solutions, artistic texts or social structures that are impossible or extremely unlikely in the current Version. Sometimes whole countries are a metaphor for an alternate Reality'. Their fate is sad: since their very existence denies the current Reality, the current Reality denies their very existence.

Like any highly complex system, history is not only stable but also changeable. Any change, no matter how particular it may look, modifies the probabilities of all events and can be traced in all subsystems. In other words, you will not be able to get a self-consistent and self-behaving world in which Apollo 11 would explode on its way to the Moon, but this would only and exclusively affect the results of the "moon race". In the same way, the short "yes" thrown by Hitler to Raeder at the Abbeville meeting rearranges the whole context of personal relations in the Reich, the course of the World War, the post-war development of science and technology, and so on, up to and including the political history of the 23rd century.

¹ To a large extent, these countries were the USSR and the German Reich. But the purest example is Paraguay, the only example of a non-state industrial culture. 345

A priori, all attempts to depict a historical alternative are absurd, having clarified in advance what kind of challenge your constructions are the answer to.

Reich: The one we know was *doomed* to lose the war. Any alternative version that provides for the victory of Germany must necessarily provide for such changes in the socio-psychological structure of Nazism that would make the Reich a state more adequate for civilizational tasks than bourgeois democratic regimes. Only then will the alternative history become a true system.

"The day will come unexpectedly and not expected, when Reflection appears in the glass,

Then the whole world will recede into the background and everything depends

only on the point of view..." (M. Treger)¹ If the system of myths corresponds to a sequence of stories, each of which is true and real in some ways, and false in some and invented, the myth becomes not an object of adoration or refutation, but a "building material" for creative work. The historical myth "packs" not only a certain pattern of events and relations of the past, from someone's point of view, is essential for understanding the present, but also entire probabilistic worlds. With their culture, art, science and "memory of forty centuries".

¹ S. Pereslegin. "Alternative History as a True System". In book. K. Maxi "Invasion". M., St. Petersburg, ACT, Terra fantastica, 2001.

APPLICATION

Chronology of the Invasion according to K. Maxi¹

1940

April 9 - German landing in Denmark and Norway. May 10 - German troops go on the offensive in the Western European theater of operations; Germany's attack on Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, the capture of the Belgian fortifications on the Meuse River with the help of an airborne assault. May 14 - Panzer Group Kleist crosses the Meuse. May 15 - Churchill turns to the United States for help. May 21 (*)² - Guderian's corps reached the English Channel. On this day, according to K. Maxi, a change in Reality takes place: at a meeting of the highest hierarchs of the Reich, Hitler positively responds to Raeder's request regarding the upcoming landing in England. May 22 - The Extremist Groups Act is passed in England. May 24 — in reality, K. Maxi decided to invade (in the Current Reality, this happened much later — on July 13 at a meeting in the Berghof). May 27 - June 3 - the evacuation of British troops from Dunkirk. June 4 - The battlecruisers Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper left Kiel and headed north, with the task of preventing the evacuation of Narvik. June 5 - completion of the redeployment of troops for the second phase of the offensive against France (Operation "Rot"), the beginning of the preparation of communications for the needs of the operation "Sea Lion". June 5 - The Germans resume their offensive in France. June 7 — Directive No. 16 was signed in K. Maxi's version (in the Current Reality it happened on July 16). June 8 - The Allies begin the evacuation of Narvik. June 8 - Scharnhorst sinks the aircraft carrier Glories and two destroyers in a naval battle, but she herself receives serious damage. June 10 - The 7th Armored Division surrounded and destroyed the French 10th Army and the British 51st Mountain Division at Saint-Valery-en-Caux. June 10 - Italy enters the war. June 14 - German troops enter Paris. June 16 — Prime Minister Reynaud resigns and is succeeded by Marshal Pétain.

¹ K. Maxi "Invasion". ACT, Terra Fantastica; Moscow, St. Petersburg,

² 2001. Here and below, the "asterisk" denotes events that are absent in the Current Reality.

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June 20 - The Italian army tries to go on the offensive. June 22 - An end to the war treaty is signed in Retonda. June 25 - Completed evacuation of British and Allied troops from France. 27 June - Compound H leaves for Gibraltar. June 29 (*) - "First Battle of the Pas de Calais" - carried out as part of the preliminary activities under the plan of operation "Sea Lion". July 1 - (*) The Luftwaffe attacks English ships in the ports of southeast England (as part of the preliminary actions of the Sea Lion plan). July 3 — British capture, disarm or sink French ships in harbors (Operation Catapult). July 5 - Luftwaffe begin daily bombardment of England.

July 5 – France breaks off diplomatic relations with Britain. July 8 — in K. Maxi's Reality, the air battle for England began (in our world, "Eagle Day" was scheduled for August 13). July 14 (*) - The invasion began: German airborne troops and land divisions landed in England in the Dover area. night of 14/15 July (*) - the first attempt by the Royal Navy to block the beachhead. July 15 (*) - Dover Castle falls in the morning. July 15 (*) - unsuccessful counterattack of the 1st armored division. night of July 15-16 - naval battle at Calais. July 17 (*) - another (and again unsuccessful) attempt by the British fleet to counter the invasion with at least something real. July 20 - the H formation, withdrawn from Gibraltar, arrived in Plymouth (in real history, this formation was really used to reinforce the mother country's fleet, for example, its ships participated in the operation against the German battleship Bismarck in May 1941). June 21 (*) - the battle for the "line of the General Staff" begins. July 23 (*) - Rommel breaks through the English defensive position and enters the operational space. July 27 (*) - Royal family and government evacuated from London. July 28-31 (*) - negotiations in Stockholm on the terms of the surrender of the British Isles. July 31 - (*) The royal family left England on the battleship Nelson. August 1 - (*) A peace treaty is signed between Germany and England. The British Empire, however, continues the struggle, relying on its colonial possessions. 349

On the night of August 1-2 (*) - Churchill's government went into exile. August 2 (*) - A "government of national treason" is formed in London under the leadership of Fuller. **Operational schedule of the**

English campaign (rough planning) Greenland operation

- during July-August, a

covert landing of the main and reserve meteorological groups in Greenland. **Air blitz** The operation is going on during July-October

as usual

(corresponding to the Current Reality)

order with the following exceptions:

1) There is no switching of efforts to the bombardment of cities.

2) There are no attacks on convoys, ships on the English Channel and large industrial enterprises. In this regard, the dive bomber corps was used until November 1940 to a very limited extent - only against especially important targets. 3) Efforts are concentrated

on the fight against RAF fighter aircraft, their control and basing systems. Between September 10-15 and October 10-13,

an imitation of direct preparations for the Invasion is carried out: strikes on roads, communication centers, communication lines, and British troops. In September, the 2nd Air Corps is replaced by the 4th. On

November 1, reserves are introduced into the battle line - the 26th

and 54th fighter squadrons. November 3 - Eagle Day, the beginning of the general air

offensive. November 6 - the conquest of air supremacy, the switching of

aviation to the direct support of troops. November 7 - entry into the battle line of the 7th air corps.

November 8 - the

entry into the battle line of the 3rd group of night fighters.

November 12 - the beginning of the relocation of advanced aviation units to airfields in southern England.

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Schedule of the Jan-Mainen operation ("Polar Express") November 1,

8.00. Submarine exit to Jan Meinen. November 1, 23.00. Transport exit to Jan Meinen. November 3, 20.00.

The approach of the boat to Jan Mainen, the landing of the landing group, the capture of the strongholds of the island and the

pier. November 4 11.00. Transport approach to Jan Meinen,

unloading. **Schedule of the Faroese operation. ("Scandinavian**

beginning") November 3, 6.00. Exit of a group of destroyers to the Faroe Islands

(26 knots). November 4 4.00. Departure of the "flying boat" to the Faroe Islands. November 4 6.00. The landing of the landing group, the

capture of the berths,

the destruction of the radio. November 4 8.00. The arrival of a group of

destroyers, the landing of the port "Nordland". November 4 12.00. Capturing the airfield, preparing it to receive aircraft.

November 4 14.00. Departure of torpedo bombers from Bergen to the Faroe Islands. During the night - unloading destroyers (a minimum set of aircraft torpedoes + fuel for aircraft), receiving a submarine with a cargo of aviation gasoline (insurance). Transport is also sent (the old seaplane carrier Westfalen). **Schedule of the Icelandic operation.** ("Northern Gambit", "Arrens Gambit", "English Party") During October - the transfer of ships to Trondheim. 30 October 15.00. Exit "Nils Yuel" and "Tiger" to Reykjavik. November 1, 23.00. Departure of warships to Reykjavik. November 2, 15.00. Exit liners to Reykjavik. November 3 19.30. Departure of "flying boats" from Trondheim to Reykjavik. November 4 4.00. The landing of landing groups from "flying boats" in Reykjavik. Preparations for the reception of the strike fleet. 9.20. The approach of the main group to the Reykjavik raid, the beginning of unloading liners. 351

11.00. The arrival of "Tiger" and "Niels Yuel", unloading torpedoes, equipment, field artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, fuel. 17.00. Group exit from Reykjavik. (Here the Sheer goes straight south - cruising, battleships and liners make an arc and also go south. Speed 26 knots.) November 5, late in the evening - transfer of torpedo bombers to Keflavik. November 7 7.00. Arrival of the group in Cork. During the day, she stays there as part of the Free Ireland program. November 7 12.00. Exit of a group of destroyers escort to Cork. November 7, 23.00. Exit liners to Liverpool and warships to Brest. November 8 7.00. Arrival of "Admiral Scheer" in Cork. November 8 7.00. Return of warships to Brest. November 8 7.00. Liverpool landing. **Schedule of the Cornish operation** 6 November 20.00. The exit of the landing transports of the first wave. 7 November 6.00. Airborne landing in Cornwall. 10.00. Capturing critical points in Cornwall. 10.00. The approach of combat and landing ships. 12.00. Landing of the 21st AK in Cornwall. 14.00. Airfield capture. 20.00. Establishing the first defensive position. 24.00. Preparing the airport for work. During the night - the transfer of fuel supplies and minimum ammunition for fighters. November 8 7.00. Commencement of Cornwall airfield as a jump airfield. November 9. The transfer of torpedo bombers to Cornwall. **Timetable for Operation Sea Lion** On the night of the 7th, the transports of the first wave and ships of direct cover leave. During the 7th - the landing of the first wave occurs. 7th - 8th November - the struggle for bridgeheads and airfields. On the night of the 9th, the transport of the second wave leaves. During November 9-11 - the struggle for ports, putting them in order.

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November 10 - change of demarcation lines and transfer of corps. On the night of the 12th, transports with heavy weapons leave and go to ports ready for acceptance. 13-16 - unloading tanks, establishing rear lines, reaching positions. November 17 - breakthrough of the front and the entry of the operation into the growth phase. November 22 - The organized resistance of the British troops is expected to end. APPENDIX 1

Statistical data on some operations of the Second World War1

1. Polish campaign Balance

of forces on the Polish front: Germany Poland 1.6

million people. 1 million

population

armed forces

Divisions	62	39
Tanks with	2800	870

wedges

Artillery 6000 guns Combat	4300
----------------------------	------

aircraft

2000	407
------	-----

(payroll) In

total,

there were 3,195 tanks in Germany, of which T1 - 1,445, T2 - 1,223, T3-98, T4-211. Minimum information about the structure of troops:

Structure of a tank division: tank brigade (324 tanks); motorized brigade; motorcycle infantry battalion; motorized reconnaissance battalion; tank destroyer battalion; sapper battalion; battalion of communications and rear services; anti-tank artillery - 37-mm guns. An infantry division consists of: 3 infantry regiments; an artillery regiment - 36 field howitzers (105 mm), 12 howitzers (150 mm), an anti-tank battalion - 36 guns (37 mm), 12 anti-aircraft guns, a sapper battalion and a communications battalion. (For more details on the structure of the German army as of September 1, 1939, see Appendix 2). On September 1, 1939, the German armed forces had 11,200 anti-tank guns, 4,624 (81 mm) mortars, 2,933 (75 mm) guns, 4,845 (105 mm) howitzers, 2,049 (150 mm) howitzers, 410 (150 mm) guns, 22 (210 mm) mortars. A. Vasiliev, V. Goncharov, R. Ismailov, S. Pereslegin, B. Pereslegin, A. Polyakhov. Articles and tables in the book. joint

¹ publication of ACT and Terra Fantastica: E. Manstein "Lost Victories", B. Liddell-Gart, "World War II", F. Sherman "American Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War", S. and E. Pereslegins "Pacific Premiere", K. Maxi "Invasion", N. Poppel "Tank battles 1941-1945." (in 2 volumes. M., St. Petersburg, 1998-2002). 354

The Polish infantry division consisted of three infantry regiments, a light regiment and a heavy artillery battalion. It consisted of 16,000 men, 42-48 guns, 18-20 mortars, 27 anti-tank guns, 4 anti-aircraft guns. The number of the cavalry brigade was 3,427 people. The armored forces included a motorized brigade, three separate battalions of light tanks, several separate tank, reconnaissance and armored car companies, and a subsection of armored trains. The motorized brigade consisted of two regiments, an anti-tank and reconnaissance division - 2,800 people, 157 machine guns, 34 guns and mortars. The tank battalion included 13 tanks. **Side losses:** German losses in the campaign were 8,082 killed, 27,278 wounded and 5,029

missing. 217

tanks were destroyed, including 89 T-I, 83 T-II, 26 T-III, 19 T-IV. (S. Mitcham. "Hitler's Field Marshals and Their Battles." Rusich: 1998, p. 87). According to K. Tippelskirch, the losses are higher: 10.6 thousand killed, 30.3 thousand wounded and 3.4 missing. (K. Tippelskirch. "History of the 2nd World War", p. 28). The losses of the Poles are much more significant: 66.3 thousand killed, 133.7 thousand wounded. About 420 thousand captured (ibid.). **2. Campaign in the West** **Balance of forces:** France England

			Belg	Niederl	Total	at Germ	
			and I	ndy		allies	nia
						kov	
Private compound	2440	395 600	350			3785 3300	
(thousand people) Divisions		13	22	10		149	136
104 Of which: tank	3+1	— — —	3				10
Formed)	3 —						
mechanized			—	— 3 —			
motorizes data	7	10 -		-		17	7
cavalry to their	5		2			7	1
Tanks	2789	310				3099 2580	
Combat aircraft	1648	1837 186	120			3791 3824	
Of them: fighter	946	800 84 -				1730 1264	
her scorer sheepmen	219	544 — —	763				1462

(The forces in the operational area of the campaign are taken into account - that is, in Northern France, Belgium, the Netherlands. For aviation - on the territory of England and France and Germany.) **Force grouping:** For the offensive in the West, Germany deployed 136 divisions (10 of them tank and 7 motorized) , consolidated into three army groups: Army Group "B" F. Bock - from the North Sea to Aachen - as part of the 18th and 6th armies (29 divisions, including 3 tank and 2 motorized), Army Group "A" K. Runstedt - from Aachen to the junction of the borders of France, Germany, Luxembourg - as part of the 4th, 12th and 16th armies (45 divisions, including 7 tank, 3 motorized); Army Group "1D" V. Leeba - from the junction of the borders to Basel - as part of the 1st and 7th armies (19 divisions). There were 42 divisions in the OKH reserve. In total, 3.3 million soldiers, 2,580 tanks, 3,824 aircraft are concentrated (for more details on the balance of forces in aviation, see Appendix 3.2.), 7,378 artillery pieces. The Allies also concentrated three army groups for the operation: the 1st P. Billot - northwest of the Ardennes, prepared for entry into Belgium - the 1st, 2nd, 7th, 9th French armies, the British Expeditionary Force (41 division, of which 7 motorized and 3 light motorized; the Belgian army, consisting of 23 divisions, and the Dutch army, consisting of 10 divisions, also operated in the band of this army group); 2nd G. Pretela - from Longwy to Celeste on the Maginot Line - 3rd, 4th, 5th armies (39 divisions); 3rd A. Besson - from Celeste to the Swiss border - the 8th army and a separate corps (11 divisions). There are 17 divisions in the reserve of the commander of the North-Eastern Front, and 6 divisions in the reserve of the commander-in-chief (including three tank divisions). The total concentration (including Belgium and Holland) is 3.785 million people, 147 divisions (including 3 tank, 3 mechanized, 17 motorized, 7 cavalry), 3,099 tanks, 3,791 aircraft, 14,544 guns. **Side losses:** Wehrmacht losses in the campaign were 27,074 killed, 18,384 missing and 111,043 wounded. French losses far exceed these figures: 84,000 killed, 1,547

thousand prisoners. According to T. Weber, the loss of the Royal Air Force in the French campaign of 1940 amounted to 959 aircraft, including 477 fighters. 356

3. Air Battle for England **Forces of the**

Nazi Air Force: It is rather difficult to establish the total number of serviceable aircraft in service with the Luftwaffe on a particular date. Data from different sources do not agree well with each other. The "maximum" forces of the Germans are estimated at 1,314 bombers (316 dive bombers) and 929 fighters (of which 702 are Bf-109s of all modifications). B. G. Liddell Garth in the "Second World War" speaks of 1,100 bombers and 578 fighters (obviously, only the combat-ready "one hundred and ninths" are meant). This English official estimate agrees well with the known distribution of German single-seat fighters by squadron (see Appendix 4). Some idea of the total number and production of aircraft in Germany in the summer of 1940 can be given by the following table:

aircraft	line up		affinity	Notes
At 196A 2	21	20	98	in a year
Bf 109E 766		674	120	per month
Bf 110C 227			102	per month
Bv 138A 1	25	10		there are differences in data
Bv l38B 1	13	9	79	in a year
Bv 142 2		1		
Do 24T-l 23				
Do 26D-l 2		1		pre-series instances

Do 215			101	per month
Fw 200C	eleven	5	2	4 - until the end of September, 26 - until the end of the year
Ju 52/3m	329		401	in a year
Ju 86 P-2			40	until the end of the year
Ju 87 B-2	316		611	in a year
Ju 88	875		2184	per year

The total production of fighters in the Reich amounted to about 3,000 vehicles in 1940, or 250 vehicles in month.
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Royal Air Force: There are even more

discrepancies in the sources here. The fact is that it was precisely in the summer of 1940 that there was a sharp break in all the parameters characterizing military production: Churchill and the ministers appointed by him were rebuilding the British economy on a war footing. According to official British data, the smallest number of fighters in the country was noted on the day of the fall of Dunkirk - 446 aircraft of all types. By mid-August, the fleet had grown to 704 vehicles, which practically corresponded to the norm proposed by Dowding of 60 squadrons. Data for the beginning of summer speak of 650-700 fighters, of which about 100 are obsolete, and 500-550 bombers. The distribution of fighters by squadrons (as of 07/07/40) is given in Appendix 4. Assuming that the squadrons are staffed according to the state (that is, taking their number as 12 aircraft), we get 168 Spitfires, 288 Hurricanes, 12 Defiants and 48 Blenheims, that is, 516 combat-ready aircraft. The monthly production of fighters during this period grew rapidly, by the end of the year it exceeded 350 aircraft. **Side losses:** The Germans lost 610 Bf-109E and 235 Bf-110C (in the "hunter" squadrons), so that the total losses of the Luftwaffe for July-October 1940 amounted to 845 fighters. British Fighter Command lost 1,172 fighters during the same period (631 Hurricanes, 403

Spitfires, 115 Blenheims and 23 Defiants). Statistics for face-to-face meetings between Bf-109 and Spitfire for the entire Battle of Britain (Ted Hooton "Spitfire Special"): 219 Bf-109 victories against 180 Spitfire victories (1: 1.2 in favor of Bf-109). Face-to-face meetings between Bf-109 and Hurricane: 272 Bf-109 victories against 153 Hurricane victories (1:1.8 in favor of Bf 109). **4. Balkan campaign Losses**

of the parties: Losses in the Balkan campaign, which lasted 24 days, on the part of the Germans amounted to approximately 2.5 thousand people killed, 3 thousand missing and about 6 thousand wounded. Only prisoners were captured 375 thousand Yugoslav soldiers and officers and 225 thousand Greek

¹ According to the state, the squadron consisted of 12 combat aircraft and 6 spare aircraft. There were 26 pilots in the squadron. In practice, during the "Battle of Britain" period, the squadron never had more than 12 aircraft.

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ical. The British lost 12 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. (The 12-volume History of the Second World War, vol. 3. P. 268.) **5. "Barbarossa" The**

balance of forces

and its discussion: As part of the main

attacking army groups "North", "South" and "Center", we have 111 German divisions (including 9 security, 16 tank, 13 motorized, 3 light, 2 mountain) and 1 Leibstandarte, as well as - as part of the 11th German army - 3 Romanian divisions and 3 brigades. Two German divisions were stationed in Norway. Thus, on June 22, 1941, we count 114 German divisions and 37 Allied divisions, or 151 divisions in the first echelon (counting the Great Germany Leibstandarte as a division, which is too high). Sources, however, give different figures: they speak of 153 German divisions (129 in the first echelon) and 37 Allied divisions. This gives 190 divisions, of which 166 are in the

first echelon. It is difficult to explain this significant discrepancy, especially since the figures in the sources generally converge poorly: for example, 37 satellite divisions are mentioned everywhere, however, the formal calculation according to the same sources gives 40 divisions, assuming two brigades per division (12 infantry, 4 cavalry, 1 Romanian armored division and 3 mountain infantry and 2 Romanian fortress brigades; 2 Slovak infantry divisions and a motorized brigade; 18 Finnish infantry

divisions). During July-August, 3 Italian infantry divisions, 2 Hungarian motorized and 1 cavalry brigade were added, which gives 44.5 Allied divisions. Most likely, such a "floating" number of large compounds is associated with a defect in the calculation method. In 1941, 58 divisional headquarters were formed in Germany (including 11 headquarters of tank and 8 headquarters of motorized divisions), 16 corps and 4 army headquarters. By June 22, 1941, some of these formations existed only on paper. So, for example, the number of divisions in Norway is determined by sources at eight (four two-divisional corps), while in reality there were only two divisions and three "empty" corps

command.

To a large extent, this remark also applies to the OKH reserves (21 infantry, 2 tank, 1 motorized divisions), in particular, the 2nd Army. It is clear that over time, corps and divisional commands turned into real corps and divisions, some of them (not all) really went to the Eastern Front. Further, when analyzing the ratio, it should be taken into account that not all formations of the satellite countries were actually at the front; a formal account by list divisions is unacceptable in this case.

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Even more problems arise with the definition of the forces of the Soviet Union. Official Soviet sources give 170 divisions and 2 brigades in the Western districts (the total number of divisions is estimated at 303, of which 81 are being formed), while indicating that the divisions were not completed to their regular strength (the percentage of staffing is not given). Taking into account the fact that these were personnel divisions of the first strategic echelon, significant deviations from the regular strength are assumed to be unlikely. Most likely, we will not be mistaken in determining the number of divisions of the first wave at 150 for Germany and its allies and 170 for the Soviet Union in the Western districts. Taking into account the "understaffing" and the fact that the regular strength of the Soviet division is somewhat smaller (14,483 people and 210 guns versus 15,859 people and 237 guns), we are unlikely to seriously deviate from the truth, defining the forces of the parties as approximately equal. The Soviet Union, however, had a significant advantage in technology. In nine mechanized corps, concentrated on the western border, the state should have had 9,279 tanks. In reality, these corps were not staffed according to the state. On the other hand, a considerable number of tanks were not part of the mechanized corps and were scattered

by divisions.

Not a single Soviet source reports the exact number of tanks in the Western districts. A priori production estimates give an upper limit of 18,000 old-style tanks and about 2,000 new ones. A posteriori estimates for destroyed and captured Russian tanks (according to the diaries of F. Halder) give a figure of 9,400 tanks. The lower limit, as far as one can judge, is 7,000 tanks, of which 1,861 are new. As part of the 19 tank divisions of Germany, concentrated on the Eastern

Front, there were nominally 3,289 tanks. Taking into account the technology of the allies, we get the "generally accepted" figure of 4,000, of which 60-65% (that is, about 2,500 units) belonged to new types. Thus, we must determine the real advantage of the Soviet army in tanks as 3-3.5: 1. The most accurate, at the moment, calculation gives 19,810 serviceable Soviet tanks, tankettes and self-propelled guns (not only on the Eastern Front) and 5,395 units armored vehicles of Germany and its satellites (on the Eastern Front, but perhaps not in the first line). See also Appendix 6. Aviation concentrated against the USSR was about 4,000 aircraft. The Soviet air force in the Western Districts included 2,739 new types of aircraft and, as all sources indicate, "a significant number of old ones." According to some reports, new aircraft accounted for 17% of the total, which gives 360

about 16,000 aircraft. It is difficult to say which part of them could take off (that is, they had spare parts, fuel, ammunition and crew). As a result, it is not possible to determine the real balance of forces; we can only diagnose the apparent superiority of the Soviet side. The artillery of Germany and its allies is estimated at 42,000 guns, the Soviet

Union at 67,000 guns, which gives a ratio of 1.6:1 in favor of the USSR. Both figures appear to be overestimated.

fifteen to twenty. **6. Pacific**

campaign 1941-1943 The ratio of the naval forces

of the parties on December 7, 1941 The USA and their allies Pacific Ocean - East Indies and

Indian Ocean - Japan Battleships - 8 (+1) 2 + 2 * 10 Heavy aircraft

carriers - 2 (+1) 06 Light

aircraft carriers - 003 (+1)

Escort aircraft carriers - 001

Heavy cruisers - 10 (+2) 318

Light cruisers - 92320 - at

the passage to the Indian Ocean;

Here and below, the number of combat-ready ships is indicated. The number of non-combat-ready (repaired and incomplete) ships is indicated in brackets.

The ratio of the naval forces of the parties on May

1, 1942 The USA

and their allies Pacific Ocean - East Indies and Indian

Ocean - Japan

Battleships - 5 (+2) 511 Heavy

aircraft carriers - 4 (+1)

26 Light aircraft carriers - 004

Escort aircraft carriers - 001

Heavy cruisers - 12118

Light cruisers - 9520 **The balance of naval forces of the parties on August**

1, 1942 The USA and its allies Pacific Ocean - East Indies

and Indian Ocean

- Japan Battleships-7 (+2) 511

Heavy aircraft carriers -

421 (+1) Light aircraft carriers

- 005 Escort aircraft carriers - 102

Heavy cruisers - 14216

(+1) Light cruisers - 13520 361

7. 1942 campaign on the Eastern Front

Military production in 1942: In 1942,

tank production in the Soviet Union reached 24,446 tanks per year (an average of 2,030 per month). This is higher than the United States (23,884 tanks per year), Britain (8,611 tanks), Germany (6,189), Italy (667) and Japan (1,165). ("History of the Second World War", Volume 5, pp. 48, 57, 63, 92, 94 and 96). In terms of coal production, the Allies outperform "Axis" by 1.5 times, in steel production by 2.0 times, pig iron - 2.3 times, oil - more than 20 times. The balance of forces in

the spring of 1942 By the spring of 1942, the armed forces of the USSR numbered 5.6 million people, of which 4.9 million were in the ground forces. The number of tanks - from 3,900 ("History of the Second World War") to 4,065 (G. Zhukov), aircraft - from 2,200 ("History of the Second World War") to 3,164 (G. Zhukov). The active army consisted of 293 rifle divisions, 34 cavalry divisions, 121 rifle brigades (3-4 battalions each), 56 tank brigades. The number of divisions ranged from 5 to 9 thousand people. There were 205 thousand people, 1,632 guns, 155 tanks, 255 aircraft in reserve. 40 divisions covered the Far East. Great Britain deployed 54 rifle divisions, 49 separate brigades, 12 tank divisions, 9 tank brigades. Of these forces, about half (27 rifle divisions, 16 rifle divisions, 6 detached divisions, 9 detachment divisions) were stationed in

the Metropolis. The armed forces of Germany numbered 8.6 million people, 226 divisions, 11 brigades, 43,200 guns and mortars, 5,719 tanks, 4,750 aircraft. Of these forces, 176 divisions (including 21 tank, 14 mechanized) and 9 brigades were located on the Eastern Front. In addition, there were 14 Finnish divisions and 8 brigades, 7 Romanian divisions and 7 brigades, 3 Hungarian divisions and 2 brigades, 3 Italian, 2 Slovak, 1 Spanish ("blue") division). In the following months, the number of Allied formations deployed on the Eastern Front increased.

Italy deployed 77 divisions. In

general, there was an approximate equality on the Eastern Front. According to Soviet data, superiority in manpower was 1.2:1, in artillery 1.3:1, in aviation 1.5:1 in favor of Germany, in tanks 1.2:1 in our favor. According to German data, the overall superiority of forces was on the side of the Soviet Union (about 1.2 - 1.3: 1). **Grouping of**

forces on 06/28/1942: North-West

direction. Soviet troops: 7th

Army, Leningrad, Volkhov, North-Western Front. Hitler's troops: Army Group North, 16th, 18th armies.

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Western direction.

Soviet troops: Kalinin and Western fronts. Hitler's troops: Army Group "Center", 9th, 4th armies, 2nd, 3rd tank armies.

Southwest direction. Soviet troops:—

Bryansk, South-Western, Southern front. Hitler's troops: Army Group "B" (2nd, 6th, 2nd Hungarian, 4th Panzer Army), Army Group "A" (1st Panzer, 17th, 11th Army, 8 -Italian army). **The balance of power on the Eastern Front in early November 1942:** Slight superiority in the forces of the Soviet army. For people 6.6 million against 6.2 million (1.1:1), for guns 77.8 thousand against 51.7 thousand (1.5:1), for tanks 7.350 against 5.080 (1.4:1) , for aircraft 4,544 against 2,500 (1.3: 1). **The balance of forces in the Stalingrad direction in early November 1942:** Personnel - 1.103 million against 1.0115 million (1.1: 1), guns and mortars - 15,501 against 10,290 (1.5: 1), tanks - 1,462 against 675 (2.2: 1), aircraft - 1,350 against 1.216 (1.1: 1). **Total losses of German troops during the Stalingrad strategic operation (November 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943):** Germany and its allies: 800,000 people were lost in total, about 2,000 tanks and assault guns, over 10,000 guns and mortars, up to 2,000 combat and transport aircraft, about 70,000 vehicles. 32 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed, 16 divisions suffered losses in personnel from 50% to 75% and lost their combat capability. USSR: 485,777 people, 2,915 tanks, 3,591 guns and mortars, 706 aircraft.. **APPENDIX 2**

The structure of the ground forces of Germany in**1939-1941** 1. The structure of the German army

on 09/01/1939 The main tactical unit is a division. The standard numbers of divisions are presented in the table:

	Infantry division	Infantry division (mot.)	Tank division	Light division
Officers	578-491* 492 133		394	332
Officers 94-102 Non-			115	105
commissioned	2165-2722 2456		1962	1616
officers Privates	12264-14507	13364	9321	8719
Total:	15019-17901	16445	11792	10772

¹ R. Ismailov. Article and tables in the book. joint publication of ACT and Terra Fantastica: E. Manstein "Lost Victories". M., St. Petersburg, 1998. **The level of equipping**

divisions with equipment is as follows: Infantry Infantry Tank

	division	division (mot.)	division	Light division
Machine guns 457-709 Mortars		504	226	466
147** 26***		138	48	66
75 mm infantry		24	8	12
37 mm				
guns	75	72	48	54
anti-tank				
* Infantry				

divisions were divided into "waves" - mobilization did not occur simultaneously and the divisions of different "waves" had a slightly different structure. This table shows the divisions of the first four waves. In almost all graphs, the maximum number is the third wave, the minimum is the fourth. The exceptions are mainly motorization means. ** Only in divisions of the 1st wave. *** The divisions of the 1st wave had twenty 75-mm and six 150-mm infantry guns.

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	Infantry division	Infantry division (mot.)	Tank division	Light division
105 mm howitzers	36	36	16	24
150 mm	12	12	8	—

howitzers				
20-mm anti-aircraft	12*	12	12	12
guns Armored vehicle 3**		thirty	10	70-131
Armored	0-3	thirty	421	217
personnel carriers	Tanks		324	86
Trucks 248-615 Cars		1687	1402	1868
330-394		989	561	595
Motorcycles 415-529		1323	1289	1098
Sidecars	168-201	621	711	606
Motorcycle				
Horses	4077-6033			—
Covered wagon	823-1529 — —			

The divisions had combat strength and rear services. The organization of the infantry division of the 1st wave is presented in the table posted on the next page: * Only in divisions of the 1st wave. ** Only in divisions of the 1st and 2nd waves.

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Parts and divisions	Office ry	officials Nicky		Ordinary	Horses	Carriage	Cars	Cargo or	iki	Motots ikla	stroller And
I. Combat troops											
Division Headquarters		13	28 114 1	482				10	13	43	1,
18 Three Infantry 255 shelf		21	7422		6 1923	588		102	75	138	39
One reconnaissance battalion	19	2	90	512	260	5		29	20	50	28
One artillery regiment	114	10	427 2621		2208	240		76	80	47	8
One sapper battalion	22	2	100	655	52	19	eleven		58	41	23
One fighter battalion — anti-tank battalion	22	3	132	551 — — 45					91	78	46
One battalion connections	15	3	79	379	56	7		78	25	32	3
Total	465	54	2338 122	54 4505		859		351	362	439	148
2. Rear divisions and institutions 3.	53	46	235	1413	277	36		43	248	85	53
Field spare battalion	16	2	128	730	60	24 - 5				3 -	
Total in division 534		102	2701 143	97 4842		919		394	615	527	201

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The structure of the German army before the invasion of Poland is as follows:

Army Group North (sixteen infantry, two panzer, two motorized divisions) **3rd Army** (seven infantry divisions)

1st Corps: 11th, 61st divisions, tank division

Kempf 21st Corps: 21st, 228th division Brand Group: two infantry

brigades Vodrig Group: 1st, 12th,

217th divisions, cavalry brigade 4th Army (**six**

infantry, one tank, two motorized divisions) 2nd corps: 3rd, 32nd divisions

3rd Corps: 50th Division, Infantry Brigade

19th Corps (m): 2nd, 20th Motorized Division, 3rd Panzer Division Directly
subordinated to: 23rd, 207th, 218th divisions Directly

subordinated to: 73rd, 206th,

208th divisions, 10th tank division. **Army Group**

South (twenty-one infantry, four armored, four light, two motorized divisions, one mountain division) **8th Army** (four infantry

divisions) 10th Corps: 24th Division

13th Corps: 10th, 17th 1st

divisions Reserve: 30th

division **10th army**

(six infantry, two tank, three light, two motorized divisions) 4th corps: 4th, 46th divisions

11th corps: 18th, 19th -I

divisions 14th corps (m): 13th,

29th motorized division 15th corps (m): 2nd, 3rd light

infantry divisions 16th corps (m): 14th, 31st

divisions, 1st, 4th tank divisions Reserve: 1st light division

14th army (six infantry,

two tank, one light, one mountain divisions) 8th corps: 8th, 28th I, 239th division,

5th tank division 17th corps: 7th, 44th, 45th divisions 18th

mountain corps: 3rd mountain

division, 4th light infantry division, 2nd Panzer division 22nd corps: (until 09/02/1939 without divisions) Directly subordinated to: 7th

corps: 27th, 68th divisions 62nd,

213th, 221st divisions Arrive

at 14 1st Army: 1st, 2nd

Mountain Divisions **Army Group Center** (thirty-one

divisions) **1st Army** (thirteen divisions) 9th, 12th,

24th Corps **5th Army** (seven

divisions) 6th building

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7th Army (six divisions) **Army Group Reserve** (six divisions) **OKH Reserves** (twelve divisions)

Directly subordinate OKH Group Belgium (six divisions) 30th Corps **2. Structure of the German**

Army on 22/6/1941. The structure of the tank

divisions has undergone a significant change. In order to give them greater maneuverability and independence in operations, the ratio between tank and motorized units was changed: the share of tank units was reduced and the share of motorized units increased. Of the nineteen tank divisions intended for operations in the east, eleven began to have one two-battalion tank regiment and two motorized regiments each (one hundred and forty-seven tanks), eight divisions each had one three-battalion tank regiment (two hundred and nine tanks). The motorized division also underwent a regular reorganization. Now it included two three-battalion motorized infantry regiments and an artillery regiment. The infantry division consisted of three infantry and one artillery regiment. Infantry Infantry

	I division	division (mot.)	Tank Light division	division	Mountain division
Man 15859		14029	16000	11000	14000
Tanks — —			147-209 — —		
Bronema tires	— 37		27 — —		
guns and mortar v	237	237	192 — —		

Structurally, the Wehrmacht on 22.6.1941 had the

following form: Army Group North (twenty infantry, three security, three tank, three mechanized

divisions) **16th Army** (eight infantry divisions) 2nd Corps: 12th, 32nd , 121st divisions 10th

corps: 30th, 126th divisions 27th corps: 122nd, 123rd divisions

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Reserve: 253rd
division 18th **army** (seven infantry divisions) 1st corps: 1st, 11th, 21st divisions 26th corps: 61st, 217th divisions 28th reserve corps: 58 1st division Reserve:
291st division **4th tank group** (three tank, three mechanized, two infantry divisions) 41st corps: 1st, 6th tank divisions, 36th mechanized division, 269th division . 56th Corps: 8th Panzer Division, 3rd Mechanized Division, 290th Division. Reserve: SS "Dead Head" mechanized division Directly subordinated units
23rd Corps: 206th, 251st, 254th
Divisions 101st Logistics Directorate:
207th, 281st, 285th Security Divisions **Army Group "Center"** (twenty-nine infantry, three security, seven tank, six mechanized divisions, one cavalry division and a Leibstandarte) **4th Army** (twelve infantry and two security divisions) 7th Corps: 7th, 23rd, 258- I, 268th division, 221st security division 9th corps: 137th, 263rd, 292nd divisions 13th corps: 17th, 78th divisions 43rd corps: 131st , 134th, 252nd divisions Reserves: 286th security division **9th army** (seven infantry divisions) 8th corps: 8th, 28th, 161st divisions 20th corps: 162nd , 256th divisions 42nd reserve corps: 87th, 129th divisions **2nd tank group** (three tank, three mechanized, one cavalry, six infantry divisions, Leibstandarte) 12th corps: 31st, 34 45th division 24th corps: 3rd, 4th tank divisions, 1st cavalry division, 10th mechanized division, 267th division 46th corps: 10th tank division, mechanized SS Reich Division (3), Leibstandarte Grossdeutschland 47th Corps: 17th, 18th Panzer Divisions, 29th Mechanized Division, 167th
Division Reserves: 225th Division 3rd Panzer **Group** (four tank, three mechanized, four infantry divisions) 5th corps: 5th, 35th divisions 6-1 corps: 6th, 26th divisions 39th corps: 7th, 20th tank divisions, 14th, 20th mechanized divisions 57th corps: 12th, 19th tank divisions, 18th mechanized division

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Directly subordinate units 53rd Corps:
293rd Division 102nd
Logistic Directorate: 102nd Division, 403rd Security Division
Army Group South (eighteen infantry divisions, three Romanian infantry divisions, three Romanian brigades, three security divisions , three light divisions, six armored, four motorized divisions) **6th Army** (five infantry, one security division) 17th corps: 56th, 62nd divisions 44th corps: 9th, 297th divisions
Reserve 55th Corps: 168th Division, 213th Security Division
11th Army (seven divisions, three Romanian divisions, three Romanian mountain brigades) 11th Corps: 76th, 239th divisions 30th Corps : 198th divisions, 8th, 14th Romanian divisions, 6th Romanian cavalry division 54th corps: 50th, 170th divisions Romanian mountain corps: 7th Romanian division 1st, 2nd I, 4th Romanian Mountain Brigades
Reserves: 22nd Division Mission in Romania: 72nd Division **17th Army** (five divisions, three light divisions, two mountain divisions, 2 security divisions) 4th Corps: 24th , 71st, 295th, 296th divisions, 97th light division 49th mountain corps: 257th division, 100th light division, 1st, 4th mountain divisions 52nd corps: 101st light division 103rd logistics department: 444th, 454th security divisions **1st tank group** (four motorized, five tank divisions)

3rd Corps: 25th Motorized Division, 13th, 14th Panzer Divisions 14th Corps:
9th Panzer Division, SS LAH (1) and Viking (5) motorized divisions 48th corps: 16th motorized
division, 11th, 16th tank divisions. **Directly subordinate units** 46th Division,
2nd Panzer Division **OKH reserves** - (21
infantry, 2 panzer, mechanized
divisions) **Army Group D 1st Army** 27th Corps 370

Command 45th Corps **7th**
Army 25th
Corps
Command 31st Corps
Command 54th Corps **15th**
Army
Command 32nd Corps
Command 37th Corps
Command 60th Corps OKH
Direct Command **Norwegian Army** Command 33 th
Corps Command of
the 34th Corps Command of
the 70th Corps Norwegian
Mountain Corps: 2nd, 3rd
Mountain Divisions **12th Army** 18th Mountain Corps:
5th, 6th
Mountain Divisions Command of the 65th
Corps **2nd Army (Yugoslavia)**
51st Corps 1 In this case,
only corps
services were left from the corps. APPENDIX 3

Structure of the German Naval Forces1 Organizational

structure of the Kriegsmarine: In contrast to the
land army, the organization of the leadership of the navy was somewhat less ordered. First of all, it
concerns the existence of two parallel structures - administrative and operational. At the head of the
Navy was the High Command -
OKM (Oberkommando des Marine). There were seven departments in the OKM. He was subordinate to
the headquarters of the leadership of the war at sea, which was an element of the operational
management of the fleet. The main department of this headquarters was operational. For
direct leadership, group headquarters were created, similar to land formations; the commanders
of the fleets of this group were subordinate to the headquarters of the groups, who closed the control of
the ships. In addition, the admirals who led the war at sea in separate directions were subordinate to
the commander of each group, these territorial leaders,

v

High Command of the German Navy (OKM)

09/24/1928 01/30/1943	Grand Admiral Raeder
01/30/1943 05/01/1945	Grand Admiral Dönitz
05/01/1945 05/23/1945	Admiral General Friedeburg
05/23/1945 07/22/1945	Admiral General Varzecha* *

Varzecha

Naval Warfare Headquarters (RWM)

09/28/1931 09/28/1934	Admiral Dr. Groos
09/29/1934 10/31/1938	Admiral Hus
10/31/1934 13.XI.1943	Admiral General Schniewind
06/13/1943 02/20/19 43	Admiral Frick
20.02.1943 22.07.1945	Admiral Meisel, in turn,

obeyed the naval district commanders (base commanders) and commanders of permanent
ship formations (for example, guard forces).

¹ V. Goncharov, R. Ismailov, S. Pereslegin, A. Polyakhov. Articles and tables in the book. joint
publication of ACT and Terra Fantastical by K. Maxi "Invasion", "Twilight of the Sea Gods".

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Heads of Marine Operations Department (Operational)

09/29/1934	09/22/1936	Admiral Ziliaks
09/22/1936	10/01/1937	Admiral General Marshall
10/01/1937	06/12/1941	Admiral Frick
06/12/1941	06/29/1944	Rear Admiral Wagner 06/29
1944 07/22/1945	Rear Admiral Meyer	Group

(Marineoberkommando) :

"Ost" ("Ostsee")

11/01/1938	10/30/1939	Admiral General Albrecht
10/31/1939	09/20/1940	Admiral General Karls
06/22/1943	03/01/1944	Admiral Schmundt
03/01/1943	07/23/1945	Admiral General Kummetz

"West"

08/23/1939	09/21/1942	Admiral General Saalwachter
09/21/1942	04/19/1943	Admiral General Marshall
04/20/1943	04/18/1945	Admiral Kranke
04/19/1945	05/08/1945	Admiral General Marshall "N

Ord"

09/21/1940	03/02/1943	Admiral General Karls
03/02/1943	07/30/1944	Admiral General Schniewind

"Zuid"

06/31/1941	12/07/1941	Admiral Schuster
12/07/1941	03/26/1942	Admiral General Marshall
03/26/1942	03/21/1943	Admiral Shue erased
03/21/1943	12/11/1944	Admiral Frick 01/01.
1945 05/02/1945	Vice Admiral Lovis	"Norway"

03/04/1943

04/25/1945	Admiral Ziliaks	04/25/1945
08/26/1945	Admiral Kranke	"Nordsee"

06/22/1943	07/10/1945	Admiral Dr. Furst
Baltic Fleet		

09/21/1941	10/21/1941	Admiral Ciliax
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373 The administrative structure of the German Navy included inspectorates, Naval Station Commands, the Navy, and the Danube Flotilla. The commander of the fleet had in his subordination the commanders of the classes of ships (linear forces, reconnaissance forces, etc.). The command of the submarine forces was actually removed from his subordination. **High Command of the German**

Navy (OKM) Directorates: Commands of Personnel Protection of Navigation
Repair of Shipbuilding Administrative General

Fleet (Flottenchef)

09/30/1931	09/22/1933	Admiral Gladisch
09/22/1933	12/21/1936	Admiral Forster
12/31/1936	11/01/1938	Admiral General Karls 01.11.
1936 10/20/1939	Admiral General Boehm	
10/20/1939	03/11/1940	Admiral General Marshall
03/11/1940	04/23/1940	Admiral Lutyens
04/23/1940	06/18/1940	Admiral General Marshall
06/18/1940	05/27/1941	Admiral Lutyens
05/27/1941	06/12/1941	Vice Admiral Siemens
06/12/1941	07/31/1944	Admiral General Schniewind
07/31/1944	05/23/1945	Vice Admiral Meendsen-Bölken Line

forces: Cruisers

Reconnaissance forces Destroyers Torpedo boats Minesweepers Escort forces Submarines **Naval station commands**

and admirals Adriatic Sea (10.9 .1943 -

12/07/1944) Atlantic coast (03/01/1943 - 05/09/1945) Baltic Sea (from the formation of the Kriegsmarine - 06/21/1943)

¹ Then it was transformed into the Ostsee group.

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Belgium/Netherlands (05/20/1940 - 06/09/1945)

East Asia (03/21/1940 - 05/08/1945)

Eastern Baltic (06/17/1944 - 06/22/1945)

Denmark (06/01/1940 -

05/08/1945) Helgoland

Strait

West Western Bal ticks

(29.11.1944-22.07.1945) Norway

Norwegian west coast Norwegian

north coast Norwegian polar coast

Norwegian south coast Channel

coast (26.07.1940-08.09.1940) Polar coast

of the North Sea coast

(06/26/1943-09/06/1944) Black

Sea (07/01/1941 -11/09/1944) Aegean Sea

(07/01/1941-11/28/1944)

¹ Then it was transformed into the Norsee group.

APPENDIX 4

Some information about

the fighter aviation of the era of the Battle of England¹

Germany History

The air forces of the Hitlerite Reich have been conducting their actual history since the denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles by Germany. Although in the interwar period Germany was actively engaged in both design training and training of pilots and glider pilots, the true birth date of the Luftwaffe should be considered the day when Hermann Goering headed the Aviation Ministry (RLM). It is this man who is responsible for all the successes and for all the failures of

the Luftwaffe. His political talent, charisma and experience helped create an aviation that almost brought the whole world to its knees, and whose legacy can be traced in the military aircraft industry until today. Despite the fact that the "traditional" types of troops (army and navy) had more experience and practical developments, it was the Air Force that became the most technically advanced link in Hitler's military machine. During the war years, the Luftwaffe not only did not lose technical superiority over the enemy, but even increased the gap from its closest competitors. In post-war sources (primarily American, to a lesser extent - Soviet) it was customary to critically evaluate the aircraft of Nazi Germany, comparing them with Mustangs, Spitfires, Yakovlevs and Lavochkins. The first thing that the Luftwaffe is reproached with is the short combat range of almost all the vehicles in service. Note, however, that any man-made weapon is somehow the result of a compromise between speed, range, destructive power, security, and (last, but not least) cost. As you know, the worst of the options will be a car in which all these qualities are equally developed. Such technical systems are called universal, implying that they can do everything, but badly. On the contrary, in the "ideal combat vehicle" some characteristics are always given clear preference, while the rest are mounted "according to the residual principle." ¹

A. Vasiliev. Articles and tables in the book. co-published by ACT and Terra Fantastical by K. Maxi

"Invasion". M., St. Petersburg, 2001.

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**Some information about the organizational structure of the
Luftwaffe**

"four fingers" (Schwamm) or a link, and three links, in turn, formed the lowest operational connection - a squadron (Staffel). There were no pairs in the regiments of horizontal and dive bombers, and the link (in this case, Kette) consisted of three aircraft. The squadron commander, as a rule, was appointed chief lieutenant or captain. The squadron was attended by both the repair service and the communications service, there were 12 aircraft, 20-25 pilots and up to 150 ground personnel. Three squadrons and headquarters (Stabsschwarm, including, as a rule, 3-4 aircraft) formed the lowest administrative unit - the "group" (Gruppe). The group usually occupied a separate airfield, although some squadrons could be detached from the group for re-equipment or operational necessity (which, for example, often happened in Norway with JG77). The group commander was a major or captain, he bore the title Commander (Kommandeur), and his staff consisted of an adjutant and two or three deputies (for example, for technical, administrative or medical parts). The group had 50-40 aircraft and up to 500 people in ground services. Three battle groups and headquarters, in turn, made up the "squadron" (Geschwader) - the main operational unit of the Luftwaffe. (Geschwader is often translated as "regiment".) It should be noted that in each squadron there was also a fourth (reserve) group (Erganzungsgruppe), in which the pilots practiced tactical interaction. These groups were sometimes involved in combat operations, and from 1941 some regiments transferred their reserve groups to the main battle line. A prefix was always added to the name of the regiment, indicating its specialization: for example, jagd (German Jagd - "against") - fighter, Kampf (German Kampf - "combat") - bomber, etc. It was assumed that all groups of the same squadron will operate from neighboring airfields, but in reality this was far from always the case. The commander of the squadron was appointed major, colonel or lieutenant colonel, who bore the title of Commander (Kommodore). His staff consisted of an adjutant, officers Ia (head of the operations department), Ic (head of the intelligence department), Id (head of the communications and control department), IIa and IIb (head of the personnel department and his deputy), IVa (head of the administrative department), head of the technical department (TO), head of the arsenal (Kfz-Offizier), navigator and staff major. The overall control of the squadron was carried out from the operational headquarters (Gefechtsstand), located at the airfield of the squadron headquarters. It should, however, be noted that the groups of one squadron could be located not only far from each other, but in general on different theaters. In such cases, of course, about any

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general operational management of the squadron from one center was out of the question. A few words about notation. The squadron number was designated in Arabic numerals, the squadron numbering was continuous within the framework of specialization, but not sequential (for example, there could not be two 27th fighter squadrons, but the 27th fighter and 27th bomber squadrons were; the presence of the 400th fighter squadron should not be understood as evidence that the Luftwaffe ever had four hundred fighter squadrons, that is, somewhere around 40,000 fighters). The group number was placed in front of the squadron number and was indicated by a Roman numeral, in turn, the squadron was indicated by a Latin numeral. Consider, as an example, the structure of the 2nd Fighter Squadron at the beginning of July 1940. JagdGeschwader 2 (2nd Fighter Squadron) was part of the 3rd Air Fleet, Field Marshal Hugo Sperrle, with headquarters in Munich. The squadron consisted of the following units: Stab / JG2 (Regimental Headquarters, Beaumont le Roger, nominally 4 aircraft, actually 3 Bf 109E-3, of which 3 are combat-ready); I./JG2 (1 group, Beaumont de Roger, nominally 36 aircraft, actually 34 Bf 109E-3s, 32 of them combat-ready); 1./JG2 (1 squadron, 12 aircraft); 2./JG2 (2nd Squadron, 12 aircraft); 3./JG2 (3rd Squadron, 12 aircraft); II./JG2 (Group 2, Beaumont le Roger, nominally 36 aircraft, actually 36 Bf 109E-3s, 28 of them combat-ready); 4./JG2 (4th squadron, 12 aircraft); 5./JG2 (5th squadron, 12 aircraft); 6./JG2 (6 Squadron, 12 aircraft); ni./JG2 (3rd group, Le Havre, nominally 36 aircraft, actually 32 Bf 109E-3s, 28 of them combat-ready); 7./JG2 (7th Squadron, 12 aircraft); 8./JG2 (8 Squadron, 12 aircraft); 9./JG2 (9th squadron, 12 aircraft); In total, there should be 112 aircraft in the state, in reality there are 105, of which 91 are combat-ready. "Air Fleet" (Luftflotte) was not only a command, but also an administrative unit. Within the air fleets, there were both smaller administrative structures (Luftgau) and operational units. Luftgau, or air districts are needed

were primarily to increase the mobility of the Air Force formations. Each district had its own supply service, workshops for repairing machines that could not be restored in the field, stationary reconnaissance and detection systems. The top leadership of the Luftwaffe sought, if possible, to unify the ground services of the districts, since this made it possible to reduce the ground staff

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squadron, which, in turn, reduced the time required to relocate the unit. Each district had a senior air defense officer who commanded most (and later all) of the fighter aviation of his district, but under the direction of the division or corps headquarters. In general, all combat aviation in the district was united either into an air corps or an air division, depending on the number and balance of the aviation fleet. The headquarters of the air fleet united all aviation structures - administrative and operational, operating in the territory entrusted to it. During the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe consisted of five fleets: **1st Air Fleet** - Northeast: East Prussia, Belostok region (**1st district**); Litzmanstadt, Northern Poland (**2nd district**); Brandenburg, Pomerania, North Saxony (**3rd district**), Thuringia Lower Schlesien, South Saxony (**4th district**). **2nd Air Fleet** - North-West: Rhine-Westphalian industrial region, zone Osnabrück-Minden-Salzgitter-Kassel-Bonn-Aachen (**6th district**), Belgium, Northern France (**district "Belgium-Northern France"**), Holland (**county "Holland"**), it was not possible to establish the territorial affiliation of the **11th district**. **3rd Air Fleet** - South-West: South Baern, Tyrol, Salzburg, Baden-Wutemberg (**7th, 12th and 13th districts**), Western and Southern France (**Western France district**). **4th Air Fleet** - South and South-East: Eastern Sudetes, Southern Poland (**8th district**), the designation of the **17th district** has not been established. **5th Air Fleet** - Denmark and Norway:. There were practically no aircraft in the 1st and 4th Air Fleets.

(Territorially, separate squadrons were located in the areas of their jurisdiction, which were subordinate to other Air Fleets.)

The High Command of the Luftwaffe (OKL) was formally subordinate to the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), which was supposed to coordinate the interaction between the army, navy and aviation. In fact, everything was "not quite right." In reality, under the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces (OKN), there was an inspector general who organized the interaction. As in any self-respecting headquarters, OKL had 9 departments, namely: 1. Operations department; 2. Organizational department; 3. Department of combat training; 4. Transport department; 5.

Intelligence department; 6. Department of supply; 7. Scientific and technical department; 8. Historical department; 9. Department of personnel. 379

In addition, there were 16 "inspectorates" in charge of both individual types of aircraft (for example, inspections of fighters, bombers, etc.) and their practical application (flight safety inspection). In peacetime, the inspectorates were part of the Ministry of Aviation. Distribution of German single-seat fighters to squadrons **in the summer of 1940**

	Location nie	Bf 109 E-3		bf 109 E-4	combat- ready
Jagdgeschwad er 2		93	79		
Stab/JG2	Beaumontl e Roger	3	3		
I./FG2	Beaumontl e Roger	thirty	28		
II./JG2	Beaumont 1e-Roger	32	24		
III./JG2	Le Havre	28	24		

Jagdgeschwader 3				82 74	
Stab/JG3	Brombos			3	3
I./JG3	grandvillers			29 28	
II./JG3	Brombos			25	18
III./JG3	Utrecht			25 25	
Jagdgeschwader 26				109 99	
Stab/JG26	Audemert			4	4
I./JG26	Bonningha rdt			34 30	
H./JG26	Dortmund			35 31	
111./JG26	Doberitz			36 34	
Jagdgeschwader S3		105	96		
Stab/JG53	Cherbourg (Rhea)	2	2		
I./JG53	Wren	35	33		
II./JG53	Dinan	34	30		
III./JG53	Wren	34	31		
Jagdgeschwader 54		104	86		
Stab/JG54	Amsterdam	4	2		
I./JG54	Eindhoven 30		20		
II./JG54	Vlissingen 32		28		
III./JG54	Soesterber 38 g		36		
TOTAL:		302	261	191 173	

Thus, in normally completed squadrons there were 493 aircraft, of which 434 were combat-ready. 380

Squadron	Location of Bf 109	E-3	Combat-proof x	Bf 109 E-4	combat-ready
Jagdgeschwader 27		74 60			
Stab/JG27	Cherbourg				
I./JG27	Plumentot	5 33	4 28		
II./JG27	Crepon	36 28			
Jagdgeschwader 51		61	61		
Stab/JG51	Guines	4	4		
I./JG51	Guines 28 28				
II./JG51	Marquise-West 29 29				
Jagdgeschwader 52				3	3
Stab/JG52	coquelles			3	3
I./JG52	Zerbst			0	0
II./JG52	Nordholz			0	0
II./JG52	Zerbst			0	0
Jagdgeschwader 77		39 34		0	0
Stab/JG77	Doberitz			0	0
I./JG77	Doberitz			0	0
II./JG77	Stavanger-	39 34			

	Sola				
TOTAL: 3 In partially completed squadrons - 207 fighters (186					3

combat-ready). Finally, another 63 aircraft (E-3 modifications) were in squadrons under reorganization (54 combat-ready). Summing up, we get: 572 E-3 (498 combat-ready) and 194 E-4 (176 combat-ready). A total of 674 combat-ready Bf-109s. This also includes aircraft located in Germany or in the East.

The performance characteristics of the main Luftwaffe fighters: Type: Bf 109E-1 / B single-seat fighter bomber

9.85mx8.65mx2.5mx16.4 sq.m	
Purpose:	
Dimensions	
(rhdhwhp): Engine:	
type	Daimler-Benz DB-601A-1 - 12-cylinder liquid-cooled 1x1050/1020 hp (3700m)
qty x power (at altitude)	
Weight:	
empty	1840 kg
runway 381	

Type:	Bf 109 E1/B
maximum	2500 kg
Speed:	
maximum	547 km/h at 4000
on high	m 460/0; 480/1000; 505/2000; 547/4500,
cruising	528/6000 480 km/
economical	h at 4000 m 330 km/h at 2000 m 378
Range: Ceiling:	km/h at 7000 m at economy speed
Climb	- 660 km 1050 m
t:	
climb Armament:	15.5/0 1.05/1000 3.5/3000 6.2/5000
wing	
	2X20 mm MGFF(60) 2x7.9
at the root of the wing	mm MG 17 (1000) bomb load 50
kg Type: Bf 109E-3 single-seat	
fighter 9.85m x 8.65m x 2.5m x16.4 sq.m	
Purpose:	
Dimensions	
(rhdhwhp): Engine:	
type	"Daimler-Benz" DB-601A - 12-cylinder liquid-cooled 1x1175/1100 hp With. (4500 m)
qty x power (at altitude)	
Weight:	1900 kg
empty takeoff	
Max Speed:	2670 kg
maximum	557 km/h at 4000 m
on high	470/0 490/1000 515/2000 557/4500 538/6000
cruising	480 km/h at 4000 m
economical	325 km/h at 2000 m 373 km/h at 7000 m

Range: Ceiling:	at economical speed - 660 km 1050 m
Climb	
t:	
climb Armament:	16.7/0 1.0/1000 3.1/3000 7.1/6000
in the camber of	
the cylinders	1X20mm MG FF(200)
at the wing	
root Notes: Type:	2x7.9mm MG 17 (500)
Purpose :	
	Bf 109E-4
	single-seat fighter 9.85 mx8.65
	mx2.5 mx16.4 sq.m
type	Daimler-Benz DB-601 Aa - 12- cylinder liquid cooling

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Type:	Bf 109ÿ-1/ÿ
qty x	1x1175/1100 l. With. (4500 m)
power (at altitude)	
Weight:	
empty	1900 kg
takeoff	
maximum speed:	2670 kg
maximum	557 km/h at 4000
on high	m 470/0 490/1000 515/2000 557/4500
cruising	538/6000 480 km/h
economical	at 4000 m 325 km/h at 2000 m 373 km/
Range: Ceiling:	h at 7000 m at economy speed -
	660 km 1050 m
rate of climb	
b:	
climb Armament:	16.7/0 1.0/1000 3.1/3000 7.1/6000
wing-mounted at	
the wing root	2x20mm MG FF (60)
Type:	2x7.9mm MG 17(1000)
	Bf 109E-4/N
Purpose:	single-seat fighter 9.85m x 8.65m
Dimensions (rxdhvhp):	x 2.5m x16.4 sq.m
Engine:	
type	Daimler-Benz DB-601N - 12- cylinder liquid cooling
qty x	2x 1200/1270 l. s.{5000m)
power (at altitude)	
Weight:	
empty	
takeoff	1900 kg
Max Speed:	2670 kg
maximum	565 km/h at 5000 m
on high	475/0 495/1000 520/2000 560/4500 544/6000
cruising	480 km/h at 4000 m
economical	325 km/h at 2000 m 373 km/h at 7000 m

Range:	at economical speed - 660 km 1050 m
Ceiling:	
Climb b:	
climb Armament:	16.7/0 1.0/1000 3.1/3000 7.1/6000
wing	
	2x20 mm MG FF (60)
at the root of the wing	2x7.9 mm MG 17(1000) ÿ-4
Bf 109E-4/B	with bomb rack (either 4x50 kg or 1ÿ250 kg) ÿ-4 with DB-601N
Bf 109E-4/N	engine (1200 hp, maximum at 5000 m - 1270 HP)

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Type:	Bf 109ÿ-1/ÿ
Bf 109E-5	Scout based on E-4 (camera Rb-50/30 instead of guns) Scout based on E-4/
Bf 109E-6	N (camera Rb-50/ÿÿ instead of guns) Deck variant E-3 Bf 110C-4 of two and
Bf 109T	triple hunter 6.2m x 12.1m x
Type:	4.1 x 38.4
Purpose:	sqm
Dimensions (rhdhwhp):	
Engine:	
type	Daimler-Benz OV-601A-1 - 12-cylinder liquid-cooled 2x1050/1020 hp s. (3700m)
qty power (at altitude)	
Weight:	4655 kg
empty takeoff	6265 kg
Max Speed:	6980 kg
maximum	560 km/h at 6000 m
on high	470/0 520/4000 560/6000
cruising	485 km/h at 5000 m 350
economical	km/h at 4200 m at
Range:	economical speed - 1090 km; cruising 850 km 9800 m
Ceiling:	
Climb b:	
climb Armament:	6000 m - 10 minutes
new battery 2X20	
mm MG FF(180) new battery	4x7.9 mm MG 17(1000)
movable rear 1x7.9 mm MG	15(625) Armored back +
side shields Notes :	
Type:	Bf 110C-4/B
Purpose:	two and three-seat hunter-bomber 6.2m x12.1m x 4.1 x
Dimensions (rhdhwhp):	38.4 sq.m
Engine:	
type	"Daimler-Benz" DB-601N - 12-cylinder liquid-cooled 2 x 1200/1270 l. s. (5000m)
qty x power (at height)	
Weight:	

empty	4670 kg
takeoff	6780 kg
maximum 384	7490 kg

Type:	Bf 110C-4
Speed:	
maximum	560 km/h at 6000 m
on high	470/0 520/4000 560/6000 485
cruising	km/h at 5000 m 350 km/
economical	h at 4200 m at economical
Range:	speed - 1090 km; cruising 850 km 9800 m
Ceiling:	
Climb t:	
climb Armament:	6000 m - 10 minutes
new battery 2x20	
mm MG FF(180) new battery	4x7.9 mm MG 17(1000)
movable rear 1x7.9 mm MG	81(625) bomb load 2x250
kg or 8x50 kg Armored back + side shields. Notes: Bf	
110 C-5 Scout based on C-4	(camera Rb-50/30
with DB-601N	instead of cannons) Same as C-5, but
engine. instead of 2xMG FF	- 1 x30 mm MK 101
Bf 110C-5/N	
Bf 110C-6	
Bf 110D/RL	C-4 with hanging tank; range - 1200 km
Bf 110D/R2	C-4 with hanging tanks; range - 1200 km
Bf 110D/UI	D/R2 with heat direction finder UK

History It is difficult to say whether

this was due to the general crisis of the Empire, delicately referred to in textbooks as the "decline of traditional industries", or the "ten years without war" program, or the general neglect of defense issues that characterized for the English interwar governments, but Britain approached the turning point of the mid-thirties with a completely uncompetitive aircraft. The army leadership of those times, with a sequence deserving better use, adopted only aircraft of a "traditional" (otherwise, archaic) layout. It was about bulky angular bombers (the language does not dare to call these machines bombers), about biplane fighters armed with two 7.62 mm machine guns. Although the total number of aircraft fleet was relatively small, dozens of types of aircraft were in service at the same time. At the beginning of the thirties, there was a certain turning point; in 1934, the issues of the construction of the air force were discussed in Parliament. W. Churchill, then a "backbencher", declared, 385

that at the current rate of production, German aviation by 1937 will be almost twice as strong as the British. Although the Baldwin government rejected these "unfounded allegations", MPs came to the conclusion that something must be done to change the state of affairs. In the summer of 1935, a secret government committee was organized on air defense issues, W. Churchill became an employee of this committee. Defense spending grew - £136.9 million in 1935, £254.4 million in 1935. In 1938. First, the Gladiator went into mass production, then the Hurricane, and finally the Spitfire. However, during the Munich Crisis, the country's fighter aviation was based on biplanes, and only two combat squadrons were equipped with Hurricanes. The situation was even worse with carrier-based aircraft: even in 1942, British aircraft carriers carried Swordfish and Fulmars. British Fighter Command was divided into six operational areas (zones), the defense of which was entrusted to "groups". The tenth group defended the southwest, the 11th group - the southeast, the 12th - central England, the 13th group - northern England and Scotland. The ninth and 14th groups, covering Wales and Scotland north of the river. The Tyne, were formed too late and too far away to take part in the early stages of the "battle for

Britain (although they were used in the final stage). The zones, in turn, were divided into Station sectors. Each sector had a senior officer who had full responsibility for the defense of the sector. The commanders of the squadrons stationed in this sector reported directly to him. After the French campaign, RAF tactics were somewhat revised and, although the British did not deviate from the usual scheme with three aircraft links (according to the English V-type), they still managed to somewhat improve the combat effectiveness of the squadrons. **Distribution of British single-seat fighters by groups 10 Group Formed from units 11 (limited combat readiness until 21.07) Sector Squadron No. Aircraft Filton**

			Spitfire
	92	Airfield I Pembury	Hurricane I
	87	Exeter Hurricane	Exeter
	213	Spitfire I St Eval	Spitfire I
	234	Middle Wallop	Hurricane I
Middle Wallop 609		Middle Wallop	
	238		

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11 Group

Sector Squadron	No. Aircraft	Biggin Hill Airfield	32 Hurricane I
Biggin Hill 141 Defiant	Biggin Hill 610	Spitfire I Gravesend	Blenheim
	600		Manston
Nord Wild 56 151	85	Hurricane I North Wild	Hurricane
		I North Wild	Hurricane I
		Martlesham	Blenheim
	25	Martlesham	Spitfire I Kinley
kinley	64	Hurricane I Kinley	
	615	Hurricane I Croydon	
	111	Hurricane I Croydon	Spitfire
	501	I Hornchurch	Spitfire I
hornchurch	65	Hornchurch	Spitfire I Rochford
	74	Hurricane I Tangmere	
	54	Hurricane I Tangmere	
Tangmir	43	Hurricane I Tangmere	
	145	Hurricane I Debden	Hurricane
	601	I Norfholc	Blenheim Norfholc
Debden	17	Hurricane I Norfholc	
Norfholc	1		
	604		
	257		

12 Group

Sector Squadron	No. Aircraft	Duxford Airfield	Defiant Duxford
Spitfire I Foulmery	264	Spitfire I Coltishall	Hurricane I Coltishall
	19	Kirton	Spitfire I
Coltishall	66		
	242		
Kirton-in-Lindsay	222		
Digby	46	Hurricane I Digby	Spitfire
	611	I Digby	Blenheim Digby
	29	Hurricane I Wittering	
wittering	229	Spitfire I Wittering	Blenheim
	266	Collyweston	Hurricane I Church
	23	Facton	Spitfire I Church Fenton
Church Fenton 73	616	Hurricane I Leconfield	
	249		

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Sector Squadron No. Aircraft	Catterick	Airfield Spitfire I	Catterick
Blenheim Catgeric Hurricane I	Usworth	Spitfire I	Acklington Spitfire I
	219	Acklington Hurricane I	Turnhouse
Asworth	607	Hurricane I	Turnhouse
	72	Hurricane 1	Turnhouse Spitfire I
	152	Turnhouse Spitfire I	Dream
Turnhouse	79	Hurricane I	Dream Hurricane I
	253	Grangemouth Hurricane 1	Vic
	245	Hurricane 1	Castletown
	603		
	602		
	605		
Dice	263		
Vic	3		
	504		

Total: 516 combat aircraft. The

performance characteristics of the main British Air Force fighters Type: Purpose: Dimensions (rxdhvhp):

	Defiant I
Engine: TYPE	two-seat fighter 12mx10.75mx3.7m
	Rolls-Royce Merlin 111.12-cylinder in-line liquid-cooled type V 1x1030 hp With.
number of power (at altitude)	
Weight:	2722 kg
empty	3787 kg
takeoff maximum	
Speed:	
maximum	488 km/h
on high	
cruising	
economical	
Range: Ceiling:	805 km
Rate of	9300 m
climb: Climb Armament:	579 m/min
4x7.69 mm	
hydraulic turret	
Browning (600) 388	

Type:	Hurricane Mk I
Purpose:	single-seat fighter 12.2 m x 9.73
Dimensions (rxdxvn):	m x 2.7 m x 23.95 sq.m.
Engine:	
type	Rolls-Royce Merlin II, 12-cylinder in-line liquid-cooled type V 1x1030 hp
qty x power(at height) Weight:	
empty	2120 kg
takeoff	2996 kg
maximum speed:	
maximum	521 km/h at 4900 m
on high	

cruising	
economical	
Range:	583 km with additional tanks 2x200 l -1448 km
Ceiling:	10430
Rate of climb: climb	m 11.7 m/
Armament:	s 4575 m - 6.5 min
wing Type:	8x7.69mm Browning (300)
	Beaufighter MkI two-
Purpose:	seat night fighter 17.63mx 12.6mx4.84m
Dimensions (rxdhvh):	
Engine:	
type	Bristol Hercules III, 14-cylinder radial 2x1650 hp With.
qty power(at height) Weight:	
empty	6265 kg
takeoff	9525 kg
maximum	
Speed:	
maximum	502 km/h
on high	
cruising	
economical	
Range: Ceiling:	2478 km
Rate of	9144
climb: climb Armament:	m 564 m/min
wing-mounted 389	
	6x7.69mm Browning

Type:	Spitfire Ia
Purpose:	single-seat fighter interceptor 11.2 mx9.1 mx2.7
Dimensions (rhdhwhp):	mx22.5 sq.m.
Engine:	
type	Rolls-Royce Merlin III, 12-cylinder in-line liquid-cooled type V 1x1030 hp With.
number x power (at altitude)	
Weight:	
empty	
takeoff	
	2812 kg
Max Speed:	
maximum	582 km/h
on high	
cruising	
economical	
Range: Ceiling:	Combat radius - 636 km
Rate of	9723 m
climb: climb Armament:	12.85 m/s
winged	8x7.69mm Browning (300)
Notes:	

Type:	Spitfire Single
Purpose:	seat fighter interceptor
Dimensions (rhdhwhp):	11.2m x 9.1m x 2.7m x 22.5 sq.m.
Engine:	
type	Rolls-Royce Merlin HP, 12-cylinder in-line liquid-cooled type V 1x1175 hp
qty x power(at height) Weight:	
empty	
takeoff	2846 kg
maximum speed:	
maximum	595 m/h
on high	
cruising	
economical	
Range: Ceiling:	Combat radius - 636 km
Rate of	9997m
climb: Climb Armament:	13.21m / s
Wing APP 5	
	8*7.69mm Browning (*350)

Chronology of World War II

November 11, 1918 The signing of the Compiègne truce between Germany and the Entente countries. **1919**

5 January. The German Workers' Party (since 1920 - the German National Socialist Party - NSDAP) was founded in Munich.

January 18 - June 28. Paris Peace

Conference of 27 countries dedicated to the creation of a new, post-war world order. **March 23.** Creation of a fascist organization in Milan - Mussolini's "Union of

Struggle". **November 19th.** US refusal to participate in the League of Nations. **1919** US adoption of a new shipbuilding program, according to which the US Navy was to become the

strongest in the world. **1920 March 1** Admiral Horthy proclaimed dictator of Hungary. **29th of November.** Establishment of a mandate commission under the League of

Nations. Repartition of the German colonies between the winners. **February 19,**

1921 An agreement on a military alliance between Poland and France was signed. **November 12 - February 6, 1922.**

Washington Naval

Conference of the 9 Powers. **1922**

16 April. The signing of the Treaty of Rapal between Germany and Soviet Russia. **28 of October.** Mussolini became the head of the Italian government. December 30th . Education of the USSR.

June 9, 1923 Fascist coup in Bulgaria.

September 13th . Revolution in Spain. Primo de Rivera became dictator. **8-9 November.** Beer Putsch in Germany.

¹ R. Ismailov. In the book: Liddell Hart "The Second World War". M., St. Petersburg. ACT, Terra fantastica, 2001. 391 **1924 July 16-**

August

16. London conference. The adoption of the "Dawes Plan" - a plan for the development of Germany and reparations policy.

September 29th. Germany's appeal to the League

of Nations with demands for equality in matters of armaments, the return of former colonies.

1925

October 5-16. Locarno Conference of seven countries (Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia). Germany's Western Frontier Guarantees. **1926**

July 9th In Portugal, General Carmon came to power. **November**

27th. The Italo-Albanian treaty "On Friendship and Security" was signed, which actually secured the protectorate of Italy over Albania. **12 December.** Removal of German arms control. **1926-33.** The US war against Nicaragua ended with the capture of this country. **1927**

May 31. Japanese capture of Qingdao.

June 20th. Geneva Conference on Naval Armaments (Great Britain, USA, Japan). **1928 January 16-February 20.** VI Pan

American Conference in Havana. **20 April.** Japanese troops entered the Chinese province of Shandong. **August 10th .** The German government decided to build battleships (the so-called "pocket battleships"). **August 27th. In** Paris, an agreement was signed by 15 countries on the prohibition of war as an instrument of national policy (the Kellogg-Briand pact).

1929

6th January. Military coup in Yugoslavia. **11 February.**

A concordat was signed between the Vatican and Italy. **July-December.** Sino-Soviet conflict on the CER. Rupture of Soviet-Chinese relations. **October 24th.** Exchange conflict in the USA. The beginning of the crisis of 1929-33. **January 20, 1930** Adoption of a new reparation plan

(the Young Plan) for Germany. 392

January 21-April 22. London Conference on Naval Armaments. **May 17th .** Proposal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France Briand on the unification of Europe ("pan Europe"). **April 14, 1931** The overthrow of the

monarchy in Spain. **July 20.** Hoover memorandum

suspending reparation payments by Germany for one year. **September 21.** The refusal of the liberal government of Britain from the "gold standard" of the pound sterling, which caused a new round of the global economic crisis. 9th December. Adoption of a republican constitution in Spain. The end of the year. Japanese troops completely occupied Manchuria. **January 27, 1932** Hitler's report on the NSDAP program at a meeting of financiers and industrialists in Düsseldorf.

February

2. Opening of the international conference on disarmament. **9th of March.** Proclamation of the puppet pro-Japanese state of Manchukuo.

July. The beginning of the Chaco War between pro-English Paraguay and pro-American Bolivia for the possession of the so-called. Chaco natural area, in which oil was found in the 20s. Continued until June 1934.

December 11th. Declaration of England, France, Italy and the United States on the recognition of the equality of Germany in questions about weapons.

January

30, 1933 Appointment of Hitler Chancellor of Germany. **Night of January**

28th. The Nazis set fire to the Reichstag in Berlin. **March 7th.** Establishment of the dictatorship of Dollfuss in Austria. **March 27th.** Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. **July 15.**

The signing by England, France, Germany and Italy of the "Pact of Accord and Cooperation of the 'Four Powers'" in Rome. **2 September.** The signing of the Soviet-Italian Treaty of Friendship. **14-19 October.** Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the departure of her delegation from the conference on disarmament.

January

26, 1934 The signing of the German-Polish non-aggression pact. **August 2.** Hitler's announcement as "Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of the German people". 393

September 18th. The entry of the USSR into the League of Nations. **December 19th.** Denunciation by Japan of the Washington Accords of 1922

January

13, 1935 Plebiscite in the Saar to return to Germany. **February 26th.** Germany's rejection of the articles of the Treaty of Versailles, limiting the armament of Germany. **June 18th.** Signing of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty.

October 3rd. Italian invasion of Ethiopia. Beginning of the Italo-Ethiopian War.

October 7th. The League of Nations declared Italy the aggressor. **December 9, 1935 - March 25, 1936.**

London Maritime Conference. **January 15, 1936** Japan's withdrawal

from the London Maritime Conference. **February 16th.** The victory of the Popular Front in the

elections in Spain. **March 7th.** The occupation of the Rhine zone by Germany and the denunciation of the Locarno agreements. **March 12th.** The signing of the Soviet-Mongolian protocol on mutual assistance, which actually secured the protectorate of the USSR over Mongolia.

March 19 Italo-Albanian agreements. In fact, the accession of Albania to Italy. **April 30.** The British government has adopted a fleet building program, the largest from 1921 to the

present. **May 5th** Capture of the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa by Italy. **5th of July.** Lifting by the League of Nations of sanctions against Italy. **17-18 July.** The beginning of the fascist revolt in Spain. **October 1st.** General Franco is proclaimed the head of the "national government". **October 23.** Italo-German agreements on the delimitation of the spheres of economic expansion in the Balkans, in the Danube basin, on the struggle against the

Spanish Republic and the recognition of the capture of Ethiopia. Formation

of the axis Berlin-Rome. **January 2, 1937** Italian-English "Mediterranean Agreement". **January.** An Italian expeditionary

force arrived in Spain. **June 24.** Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht "On the unified preparation of the

Wehrmacht for war." **July 7th** Beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. **November 6:** Registration of the "anti-Comintern Pact" as part of Germany, Japan and Italy. **November 12th.**

Japanese

capture of Shanghai. **December 11th.** Italy's withdrawal from the League of Nations.

December 13th. Japanese capture of Nanjing.

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January

28, 1938 US adoption of a new weapons program. **February 10th.** Establishment

of a fascist dictatorship in Romania. **March 12th.** Anschluss (accession) of Austria

to Germany. **2 April.** The British government recognized the Anschluss of

Austria. **April 6th.** The US government recognized the Anschluss of Austria. **May 5th** In Japan,

an imperial decree "On the general mobilization of the nation" was issued. **May**

17th . US adoption of the naval weapons program. **May 30.** The adoption in Germany of the plan

"Grun" (attack on Czechoslovakia). **July 29-August 11.** Provocation of

Japanese troops at Lake Khasan and their defeat by the Soviet army. **September 19th.** Anglo-French

ultimatum to the government of Czechoslovakia demanding self-government of the Sudetenland. **23 September.** Announcement of

general mobilization in Czechoslovakia. **September 28th.** The beginning of mobilization in Germany. **September 29-30.**

"Munich agreement". Dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. **October**

1-10. The occupation by German troops of the border regions of Czechoslovakia. **January**

26, 1939 Capture of Barcelona by the Spanish fascists. **24**

February. Accession of Hungary to the Anti-Comintern Pact. **February 27.** England and

France recognized the Franco government. **March 15th.** German troops occupied the whole of the Czech Republic.

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March. German ultimatum to Poland about the return of Danzig (Gdansk).

March 22. Accession to Germany Memel (Klaipeda). **March 22.** Statement by France and

England on assistance to Holland, Belgium and Switzerland in

case of aggression.

March 28th. The entry into Madrid of Franco's troops. **April**

1st . Francoist troops occupied the entire territory of Spain. **April 3rd.** Hitler approved

the Weiss plan (attack on Poland). **April 27th.** England passed a law on universal

conscription.

April 28th . Germany denounced the non-aggression pact with Poland and the naval treaty with England.

May 8

Spain's withdrawal from the League of

Nations. **May 11-August 31.** The Japanese attack on Mongolia and their defeat by Soviet troops and troops of the Mongolian People's Republic near the Khalkhin-Gol River. **May 19.** The signing of the Franco-Polish treaty of military alliance. 395

July 26th . Denunciation of the 1911 US trade treaty with Japan. August

23. The signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact (the so-called "Molotov-Ribbentrop pact"). **24**

August. Granting

emergency powers to the government by the Parliament of England. **25-th of August.** The signing of the Anglo-Polish treaty on mutual assistance in case of aggression. August 31. Mobilization has been announced in Poland. **September 1.** German attack

on Poland. The official date for the start of World War II. **September 3rd.** Declaration by England and France (as well as Australia, New Zealand and India) of war on Germany. **September 5th.** US government declaration of neutrality. 6

September. Germany declares war on South Africa. **10 September.**

Canada's declaration of war on Germany. **September**

15th. The signing by Japan, the USSR and the MPR of an

agreement on the cessation of hostilities in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River. **September 17th.** The entry of Soviet troops into Poland.

September 28th. Fall of Warsaw. **September 28th.** Signing of an agreement on mutual assistance between the

USSR and Estonia. **October 3rd.** Decision of the Pan-American Conference on a 300-mile security zone along the coast of the American continent south of Canada. **October 8-12.** Hitler's decrees on

the liquidation of Poland. **10 October.** Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty

of Mutual Assistance. **October 14.** The sinking of the English

battleship Royal Oak at Scapa Flow. **19 October.** Directive of the

OKH on the deployment and concentration of forces under the plan "Gelb" (against France).

November 4th. U.S. passage of an amendment to the Neutrality Act allowing sale to belligerents

sides of weapons and materials.

November 17th. Approval by the Allied Supreme Council of the Dil plan. **November**

30, 1939 - March 12, 1940. Soviet-Finnish war. **December 2nd.**

Announcement by the US government of a moratorium on trade with the USSR. **December**

13th. The Battle of La Plata ended with the sinking of the heavy cruiser Admiral Count Spee. **February 5, 1940**

The

decision to send the Allied Expeditionary Force to Finland. **February 11-29.** February offensive of the Soviet troops. **24 February.** Acceptance of the final version of the directive of the OKH to conduct Operation Gelb.

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March 20-21. The resignation of the Daladier government, the formation of the Reynaud government in France.

March 28th. Decision of the Supreme Council of the Allies on the mining of Norwegian waters.

April 9th. The beginning of the German operation against Denmark and

Norway. **14th of April.** The beginning of the landing of the Anglo-French

troops in Norway. **May 10.** Beginning of Operation Gelb (French

Campaign). **May 10.** The resignation of the Chamberlain government and the formation of the Churchill government in the

UK. **may 13.** Breakthrough of the German troops of the allied front on the

river Meuse. **May 14.** Surrender of the Dutch

army. **May 17th** . The occupation of Brussels by German

troops. **May 19** Appointment of General Weygand as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in France.

May 24th. Stop of German tank formations near Dunkirk. **May 27-June 4.**

Evacuation of Anglo-French troops from Dunkirk. **May 28** Surrender of the Belgian

army. **June 10th.** The end of the occupation of

Norway. **June 10th.** Italy's entry into the war. **June**

14th. German capture of Paris. **June 14.16.**

An ultimatum from the USSR to Estonia,

Latvia and Lithuania about their violation of the terms of the 1939 treaties.

June 16th. The resignation of Reynaud and the rise to power of Petain. **22nd of June.** Capitulation of France to Germany. **June 24.** Capitulation of France to Italy. **July 28th.** The British government recognized De Gaulle as the head of the Free French movement. **July 28-30.** The rejection of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in favor of the USSR. **July 1.** Relocation of the French government to Vichy. **July 1-August 19.** The offensive of the Italian troops in North Africa. **July 16.** Directive on the preparation of the operation "Zeeleve" (against England). **July 21-22.** The entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 3-6 **August.** Accession of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Moldova to the USSR. **4-18 August.** Capture of British Somalia by Italian troops. **10th of August.** The beginning of the air "Battle over England". **2 September.** British provision of bases in the Atlantic Ocean to the United States in exchange for 50 destroyers and logistical assistance. 397

4 September. Antonescu comes to power in Romania. **September 13-16.** The offensive of the British troops in Egypt. **16 of September.** The adoption of the law on military service in the United States. **23 September.** The introduction of Japanese troops into the territory of Indochina. **September 27.** The conclusion of the tripartite pact of Germany, Japan and Italy. **12 October.** The entry of German troops into Romania. **28 of October.** Italian invasion of Greece. **Nov. 1.** The landing of British troops on Crete. **November 5.** Election of President Roosevelt for a third term. **11th of November.** British naval aircraft raid Italian ships at Taranto. **November 20-24.** Accession of Hungary, Romania and Slovakia to the tripartite pact. **December 9, 1940 - February 10, 1941.** The offensive of the British troops in North Africa. **December 13th.** Directive for the attack on Greece (Plan Marita). **December 18th.** Directive on war against the USSR (plan "Barbarossa"). **1941 January 15-May 18.** British offensive in East Africa. **January 22.** Capture of Tobruk by the British. **March 1.** The entry of German troops into Bulgaria, its accession to the Tripartite Pact. **March 7th.** The beginning of the landing of British troops in Greece. **March 9-16.** The offensive of the Italian troops in Greece. **11th of March.** Lend-Lease Act in the USA. **March 27th.** The coup d'état in Yugoslavia. **March 28th.** The battle at Cape Matapan between the Italian and English squadrons. **March 31-April 15.** Rommel's offensive in Cyrenaica. **April 1-May 31.** Anti-English uprising in Iran. **April 6th.** Capture of Addis Ababa by the British and Ethiopian guerrillas. **6-17 April.** Capture of Yugoslavia. **6-29 April.** Capture of Greece. **24-29 April.** Evacuation of British troops from Greece. **25th of April.** OKB directive on the capture of the island of Crete (Operation Mercury). **April 30.** Hitler's postponement of the date of the attack on the USSR from May 15 to June 22, 1941 **April.** The beginning of the construction of American bases on the territory of Greenland. **May 10.** Flight of Hess to England ("Hess Mission"). The cessation of mass accusations against England. 398

may 13. The transfer of Soviet troops to the border districts. **May 19.** Capitulation of Italian troops in Ethiopia. **May 20-June 1.** The capture of the island of Crete by German troops. **May 27th.** The sinking of the German battleship Bismarck by the English fleet. **June 6th** Instructions of the German command on political commissars. **June 8.** Occupation of Syria by British and Free French troops. **June 10-21.** Deployment according to the plan "Barbarossa". **June 18th.** German-Turkish treaty of friendship and non-aggression. **22nd of June.** The attack of Germany and the allies on the USSR. **June 22-29.** Border battle. **June 22-27.** Defense of Liepaja. **June 22-July 20.** Defense of Brest. **June 26-28.** Defense of Minsk. **June 26-December 2.** Defense of Hanko.

30 June. Capture of Lvov by the Germans. **3-5 July.** Fighting on the Berezina River from Borisov to Bobruisk. **July 8-9.** Fighting in the areas of Zhytomyr and Berdichev. **July 10-September 10.** Smolensk battle. **July 11-September 19.** Kiev battle. **16-27 July.** Defense of Mogilev. **22 July.** The beginning of the raids on Moscow. **24-27 July.** Stop of the Army Group "Center" in the Velikoluksky direction and near Yelnya. **July 24th.** Japanese occupation of Indochina. **August 5-October 16.** Defense of Odessa. **August 7-28.** Defense of Tallinn. **August 14th.** Atlantic Charter of Roosevelt and Churchill on the post-war order of the world. **August 31.** Arrival in Arkhangelsk of the first British convoy. **September 7-October 19.** Defense of the Moosund Archipelago by Soviet troops. **8 September.** Capture of Shlisselburg. The beginning of the blockade of Leningrad. **16 of September.** Directive of the command of the army group "Center" on the attack on Moscow (Operation "Typhoon"). **September 19th.** Soviet troops left Kyiv. **September 30, 1941 - April 20, 1942.** Battle of Moscow. **2 October.** Soviet troops left Petrozavodsk. **October 3rd.** Soviet troops left Orel. **October 6th.** Soviet troops left Bryansk. **16-18 October.** The resignation of the Yeonoe government in Japan and the formation of the Tojo cabinet. **the 25th of October.** Soviet troops left Kharkov. **October 30.** Interest-free loan from the USA to the USSR in the amount of 1 billion dollars.
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November 4, 1941 - July 4, 1942. Defense of Sevastopol. **November 7th.** Parade on Red Square. **November 12-December 28.** Soviet counteroffensive near Tikhvin. **November 17-December 7.** The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Rostov-on-Don. **November 18, 1941-January 1942.** The offensive of the British troops in North Africa. **December 5, 1941-January 7, 1942.** Counteroffensive near Moscow. **December 7, 1941.** Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. **December 7, 1941-April 1942.** Japanese offensive in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. **December 8, 1941.** US and UK declaration of war on Japan. **December 16-17, 1941.** Soviet-British negotiations in Moscow ("The Eden Mission"). **December 25th.**

Capitulation of Hong Kong. **1942 January 1st.** Declaration of 26 states (UN declaration). **January 8-April 20.** Winter offensive of the Soviet army. **January 15.** British troops occupied Bardia in North Africa. **January 21-February 7.** Rommel's offensive in North Africa. **February 27-28.** Battle in the Java Sea. **March 31-April 10.** Operation of the Japanese fleet in the Indian Ocean. **April 2-May 10.** German raids on Malta. **20 April.** American planes raid Tokyo. **25th of April.** The landing of the Americans on about. New Caledonia. **May 5-7.** The landing of British troops on the island of Madagascar. **May 7-8.** Battle between the Japanese and American fleets in the Coral Sea. **12-19 May.** Kharkov offensive of the Soviet troops. **May 17-July 27.** Izyum counteroffensive of the German troops. **May 8-20.** Kerch operation. **26 of May.** The signing in London of a union treaty between the USSR and Great Britain. **May 27-July 3.** Rommel's offensive in Libya. **4-6 July.** Battle of Midway Atoll between the American and Japanese fleets. **the 9th of June.** The surrender of the Philippines, the completion of the occupation by the Japanese troops of the Philippine islands. **12 June.** American air raid on the oil fields in Ploiesti. 400

21st of June. Capitulation of the English garrison of Tobruk. **June 27-July 24.** Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad operation. German offensive in the south.

July 25-December 31. Defense of the Caucasus. **July 24-November 18.** Defense of Stalingrad. August **3-17** . The operation of the British fleet to escort the Pedestal convoy to Malta. **August 7.** American landing on Guadalcanal. **22** August. Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy. September 24th. The resignation of the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder. **October 14.** Order of the Wehrmacht Headquarters on the transition to strategic defense on the Eastern Front. **October 23.** The beginning of the offensive by the British 8th Army near El Alamein (North Africa). **November 8-11.** The landing of British and American troops on the coast of Northwest Africa in the areas of Algiers, Oran and Casablanca. **11th of November.** Occupation by German-Italian troops of the southern zone of France and the island of Corsica. **November 23-25.** Battle of Guadalcanal. **November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943.** The offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad. **November 21.** A massive raid of the Anglo-American strategic aviation on the cities of Italy. **November 27th.** The sinking of French ships in Toulon. **December 2nd.** E. Fermi was the first to carry out a nuclear chain reaction in a reactor (USA). **1943**
January 12-18. The offensive of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. Breaking the blockade of Leningrad.
13th of January. Hitler's order for total mobilization.
January 14-24. Roosevelt and Churchill Conference in Casablanca.
January 21. The directive of the Anglo-American command to launch an "air offensive" against the industrial centers of Germany. **January 31st.** Surrender of the Southern group of German troops together with Field Marshal Paulus.
February 4-April 6. Novorossiysk landing operation of the Soviet troops. **March 2-22.** Rzhev-Vyazemskaya offensive operation of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts. **March 17-20.**
The beginning of the Allied offensive in Tunisia. **may 13.** The surrender of German troops in Tunisia. End of hostilities in North Africa. 401

July 5-August 23. Battle of Kursk. **July 10-August 17.** Sicilian operation of the Anglo-American troops. **July, 12.** Tank battle near Prokhorovskaya. **July 25th.** The fall of Mussolini's government, his arrest. Formation of a new government headed by Marshal Badoglio. Occupation of Italy by Germany. **September 3rd.** The beginning of the landing of the Anglo-American troops in the south of the Apennine Peninsula. **October 9th.** The end of the battle for the Caucasus. **October 12-December 23.** Kiev operation of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. **Nov. 1.** Battle of Bougainville Island. **November 22-26.** Conference of the heads of government of the United States, Britain and China in Cairo. **November 28-December 1.** Tehran conference. **December 26th.** The sinking of the German battleship Scharnhorst by an English squadron. **1944 January 24-February 17.** Korsun-Shevchenkovsky offensive operation of the troops of the 2nd and 1st Ukrainian fronts. **January 27th.** The final liberation of Leningrad from the enemy blockade. **March 15-April 4.** Polessye offensive operation of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. **March 26-April 14.** Odessa offensive operation of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. **April 10th.** Liberation of Odessa. **9th May.** Liberation of Sevastopol. **May 11th.** The beginning of the fourth Anglo-American offensive on Rome. **June 4th.** Allied troops entered Rome. **June 6th** Beginning of the landing in Normandy. **June 13th.** The first bombardment of London with V-1 rockets. **June 19-20.** Battle of the Mariana Islands between the fleets of the United States and Japan. **3 July.** Liberation of Minsk. **July 13-August 29.** Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operation of the Soviet troops. **July 20.** The entry of Soviet troops into Poland. **July 20.** Assassination attempt on Hitler. **July 21-24.** The landing of American

August 1-October 2. Warsaw uprising. **August 15.** Allied landings in southern France. **25-th of August.** French troops (Leclerc's division) entered the liberated Paris.

402

September 3rd. Liberation of Brussels. **8 September.** Soviet troops entered Bulgaria. Bulgaria declared war on Germany. **September 27-November 24.** Moosund landing operation of the Leningrad Front and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. **September 28-October 20.** Belgrade operation of the Soviet troops and Yugoslav partisans **on October 4.** The landing of British troops in Greece. **October 23-26.** The battle between the American and Japanese fleets off the Philippines. **November 7th.** The election of F. Roosevelt for the fourth term as President of the United States. **November 12th.** The sinking of the battleship Tirpitz by British aircraft. **1945**

January 1st. The beginning of the offensive of German troops in Alsace ("Snow Waltz"). **4 January.** Arden offensive of German troops. **January 9-July 1.** Capture of the island of Luzon. **January 26th.** The encirclement of German troops in East Prussia. **4-11 February.** Crimean Conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain. **February 8-March 10.** Allied Rhine offensive. **January 17.** Soviet troops liberated Warsaw. **March 4th.** Finland on the state of war with Germany (since September 15, 1944). **March 29.** The final defeat of German troops in East Prussia. **April 1-June 21.** Capture of Okinawa. **April 7th.** The sinking of the Japanese battleship Yamato. **12th of April.** Death of President Roosevelt. Truman's accession to the presidency. **April 13th.** Soviet troops occupied Vienna. **April 30.** Soviet soldiers hoisted the banner of Victory over the Reichstag in Berlin. **6-11 May.** Prague operation. **May 8** The signing in Karlshorst (a suburb of Berlin) of the unconditional surrender of Germany. **9th May.** Victory Day. **May 15.** Completion of the liberation of Yugoslavia. **May, 23rd.** The Americans occupied Flensburg. **July 17-August 2.** Potsdam conference. **July 27th.** The resignation of the Churchill government, the formation of the Attlee government. **August 6th** The US dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. **August 8th** The USSR declared war on Japan. **August 8th** The US dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki.

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August 9-September 2. Manchurian operation of the Soviet army. **August 28.** The landing of American troops on the territory of Japan. **2 September.** The signing of the act of surrender of Japan. **November 20, 1945-October 1, 1946.** Nuremberg trials. **1946 May 2, 1946-November 12, 1948.** Tokyo Trial.

APPENDIX 6 Armored

forces of the Red Army and Germany (together with its allies) on June 22, 1941

1. Red Army Armored forces of the Red

Army (part of the data is calculated): Doc. 2**

	Doc. 1*		
Type	General quantity	Serviceable	
Heavy tanks			
KV-1	504 501		540
KV-2	Not mentioned		100
T-35	59	48	56
Total heavy 563		549	696
Medium tanks			
T-34	892	891	1225
T-28	481	292	411

Total medium 1373 Light		1183	1636
tanks BT-7M			
BT-7	704	688	7463
	4563	3791	
BT-5	1688	1261	
BT-2	594	492	
T-26 (all models) 9998		8423	9665
T-18 Not mentioned 132			160
T-40		131	233
Total Light	17679	14786	17521
Tankettes			
T-38	1129	733	1090
T-37	2331	1483	2225
T-27 2376 Total tankettes		1060	2000
5836 Su-5 self-propelled guns		3276	5315
Total:			
	28	16	
	25479	19810	25168

* Document 1: M. Meltyukhov "Stalin's Lost Chance", M., "Veche", 2000. (Based on materials from RGASPI).

** Document 2: I. and M. Pavlov "Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns, 1939-45." M., 1996 (RGVA and others).

¹ V. Goncharov. Articles and tables in the book. joint publication of ACT and Terra Fantastical by K. Maxi "Invasion". M., St. Petersburg, 1998-2002. B. Liddell Hart. "Second World War", K. Maxi "Invasion". N. Poppel "Tank battles 1941-1945" (in 2 volumes). M..SP6., 1998-2002. 405

The staff strength of the mechanized corps of the Red Army on June 22, 1941 Personnel - about 36,000 people Tanks - 1,031 Of which:

KB -126 T-34 - 420

BT-316

Flamethrowers (OT-26 and OT-133) - 152

Others - 17

Armored vehicles : BA-10-268 BA-20 - 116 Guns

- 172 Of which: 76-mm

guns - 24 45-mm guns

- 36; 37-mm anti-aircraft

guns - 32 76-mm anti-aircraft guns - 4

122-mm howitzers - 40 152-mm

howitzers - 36 Mortars -

186 Of which: 50-mm -

138 82-mm - 48 Tractors - ?

Refuelers - ?

Cars - 5,161

Motorcycles - 1,679 **Staff strength of the Red Army tank division June 22, 1941**

Personnel - 10,940 people Tanks: KB-63 T-34 - 210 BT and T-26 - 48 OT-26 and

OT-133-54 406

Armored vehicles:

medium (BA-10, etc.) - 56 light (BA-20, etc.) - 39 Artillery: 152-

mm howitzers

- 12 122-mm howitzers

- 12 76-mm cannons -

4 37-mm anti-aircraft

guns - 12 82-mm mortars - 18 50-mm

mortars - 27 Machine guns:

light - 340 easel - 35 Cars -

1696 Tractors

and tractors - 83 Motorcycles - **375**

Personnel - 11,650 people Tanks: BT-7 - 258

T-38 and T-40 - 17 Armored

vehicles: medium

(BA-10) - 31 light (BA-20) - 18 Guns and mortars: 152-

mm howitzers - 12 122

mm howitzers - 16 76

mm guns - 20 45 mm

anti-tank guns - 30 37

mm anti-aircraft guns - 8 82 mm mortars - 12

50 mm mortars - 60 Machine guns:

manual - 367 easel - 80

quadruple anti-aircraft guns -

12

407

Cars - 1,138 Tractors - 134 Motorcycles - 30 **Staff strength of the motorcycle regiment of the Red Army on June 22, 1941** Personnel - 1417 people Armored cars - 17 Motorcycles: with a sidecar -

389 without a sidecar - 45

Artillery: 45-mm anti-tank guns - 6 50-mm mortars — 24

Structure of the mechanized corps in 1941 Corps headquarters. Separate communications

battalion. 2 tank divisions consisting of: 2 tank regiments (3 tank

battalions each); 1 motorized rifle regiment (3

motorized rifle battalions each); 1

howitzer artillery regiment; 1 separate anti-aircraft artillery

division; 1 reconnaissance battalion; pontoon battalion; separate

communications battalion; motor transport

battalion; repair and restoration battalion; medical battalion;

company of regulation; field bakery; field post station; field cash desk of the State Bank. Motorized division consisting of: 2

motorized rifle regiments (3 battalions each): 1 tank regiment (3 battalions); 1 artillery regiment;

separate anti-tank battalion; a separate anti-aircraft artillery division;

408

reconnaissance battalion; light engineering battalion; separate communications battalion; artillery park

division; medical battalion; motor transport battalion; repair and restoration battalion; company of regulation; field bakery;

field post station; field cash desk of the State Bank. Motorcycle Regiment (3 motorcycle battalions). Separate

motorized engineering battalion. Separate

reconnaissance squadron. *It should be noted that in reality there was no aviation in any mechanized corps. 1.*

Wehrmacht (Document 3)1 Issued in the Army of the Serviceable

East. front

	o			
Medium tanks				
Pz.IV (A-F1) 750 Pz.III	Pz.III	613	572	439
(50th) 1900 Pz.III (37th)		1113	1090	965
Total		316	235	
	2650	2042	1897	1404
medium				
light tanks				
35(t)	218	198	187	160
38(0)	1000	779	754	623
Pz.II	1487	1204	1159	746
Pz.I	1563	1122	877	74
Pz.I (commander's)		341	330	230

Total lungs 4268		3644	3307	1833
ACS				
Slug II 400 15 sm s G		377	377	246?
33 38		38	38	
Panzerjager I 202	Total	202	202	?
self-propelled guns	640	617	617	246
Total: 1	7558	6303	5821	3483

Document 3. M. Baryatinsky. Armored vehicles of Germany, 1939-45. ("Armored collection", issue 2 - 96) 409

	Total Tank ov	tankette OK	Machine types
Finland I	117 73	44	Of these, 27 T-26E 40T-26, as well as 39 tankettes T-37.A and T-38)
Romania 428 250 178	Including about 50 Renault FT. 75 R-35. 126 R-2 (LT-35, aka 35ft), 126 tankettes Renault UE and 35 RI (CKD AH- IVR)		
Hungary 270 100 170	Including 84 light 38. M Toldi. 150 wedges CV3/33. CV3 / 35 and 20 TKS 52		
Slovakia 135 105 30	LT-35, 32 LT-38, aka 38 (t) and 21 LT-40, as well as 30 tankettes vz. 33		
Total:	950 455 378		

Armored forces of the Wehrmacht (part of the data is calculated) Armored forces of German satellites Armored forces of Germany

and its allies on the Eastern Front Germany Formation 1st TGr (Kleist) 2nd TGr (Guderian)

3rd TGr		
(Goth) 4th TGr	No. Machine type	799
(Gepner) 40th and	953	
211th TB (in Finland)		
	1014	
	631	
	116 French H35. H39 and S35 (the last - platoon commanders' vehicles) 106 Including 60 (or 7?)	
100,101 (or 102nd?) and 300th TB (flamethrower)	heavy B2 (French B1 bis)	
Assault guns	246 Stug. II - 12 battalions (2 in the "North" grA. 7 in the "Center" grA and 3 in the "South" grA + 5 separate batteries in the "North" grA)	
Command vehicles 230 OKN reserve		
(two divisions) 350 Total: 4445		
Germany's allies on the Eastern Front: In total,	950	
Germany has allies:	5395	

The

410th **Wehrmacht Panzer Division regularly included:** Personnel - 16,000

Tanks - 147-209 Armored vehicles - 27 Guns and mortars - 177-192, including: 20-mm - 10 (of which 2 "firings") 37- mm -

42

50mm -
9 75mm -
20 105mm howitzers
- 28 150mm
howitzers - 8 150mm
guns - 4 50mm mortars
- 24 81mm mortars - 32 .

Tank brigade: headquarters of the tank brigade;
Tank regiment: headquarters and staff formations (tank platoon,
communications platoon, orchestra); a
company of repair shops; 2 tank battalions consisting of: headquarters
company; 2 companies of light tanks; 1 company of medium tanks; repair squad. Motorized brigade:
brigade headquarters; motorcycle battalion
(5 companies, 2 field 75-mm and 3 anti-
tank guns, 8 mortars, 10 heavy and 18 light machine guns)¹; 2 motorized rifle regiments consisting of:
regimental headquarters; headquarters company (communications platoon, motorcycle
communications platoon, engineer platoon); orchestra; company of infantry guns (2 heavy 150-mm
infantry guns² and

¹ Approximately the same composition as that of a motorized rifle battalion. ² Not to be confused with 150mm
howitzers!
411

4 field 75-mm guns); 2
motorized rifle battalions consisting of: 3
companies (2 50-mm mortars, 2 easel and 18 light machine guns); 1
reinforced company (6 81-mm mortars, 8 heavy machine guns); 1
reinforced company (2 field 75 mm guns, 3 anti-tank 37 mm guns). Reconnaissance
battalion:
headquarters, communications platoon¹ ; a company of armored vehicles;
motorcycle company; a company of heavy weapons (2 field 75-mm guns, 3 anti-tank guns, a sapper
platoon); armored car platoon; repair squad.
Artillery regiment:
regimental headquarters,
communications platoon, orchestra; 2 light artillery battalions (three batteries
of light field 105-mm howitzers each); 1 heavy mixed artillery battalion (2 batteries of heavy field 150-mm
howitzers, 1 battery of 105-mm howitzers); 1 artillery instrumental
reconnaissance battery. Anti-tank battalion: headquarters,
communications platoon; 3 anti-tank companies (8 37-mm anti-tank guns and 3 50-mm
guns); 1 company of mobile anti-aircraft guns (8 anti-aircraft guns 20 mm and 2 quadruple 20
mm firing machine guns, all mounted on trucks). Sapper
battalion: 3 sapper
companies (one of them on armored personnel carriers);
2 pontoon-bridge parks; 1 light engineering park.
Communications battalion:
radio company; telephone and cable company;
¹ easy communication park. The
reconnaissance battalion

walks without an orchestra. 412 Field reserve
battalion. **Logistic**

services and subdivisions of the division Supply service: headquarters of the head of
the long-range

supply service of the division; 3
companies of repair shops; 1 supply company; about 15 supply columns. Administrative and
economic service; field bakery service company; field slaughterhouse service company;
division food supply
department. Sanitary
service: 2 sanitary companies; 3
platoons of ambulances. Order maintenance service (field gendarmerie platoon). Military field mail
service (field post office).
APPENDIX 7

Tank battle in the Dubno region, Statistics
1. Tank formations
of the parties that took part in the battle in the Dubno region: Wehrmacht: 9th Panzer
Division

Transformed in early 1940 from the 4th Light Division. In June 1940 she was in the West, since March 1941 - in Bulgaria, took part in the Balkan campaign, after which she was withdrawn to Germany, and then sent to the East. From April 1944 - in the West. Commander - Lieutenant General Alfred Hubiki (since September 1, 1939). Units: 9th motorized

rifle brigade 10th

motorized rifle regiment 11th

motorized rifle regiment

706th company of heavy

self-propelled guns 33rd tank regiment 1st

battalion 2nd battalion

102nd

artillery

regiment 1st battery 2nd battery 3rd battery 59 -th

motorcycle battalion 9th

reconnaissance

battalion 86th engineer

battalion 50th anti-tank division

85th communications

battalion 60th support battalion

¹ V. Goncharov. Articles and tables in the book. joint publication of ACT and Terra Fantastica: H. Poppel "Tank Battles". 1941-1945) (in 2 volumes). M., St. Petersburg, 1998-2002.

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11th Panzer Division In

June 1940 - in the West, in February 1941 transferred to Romania, and then to Bulgaria. Participated in the Balkan campaign. In 1941-43 she acted on the Eastern Front, from June 1944 - in the West. The commander is Major

General Ludwig Krügel. Units: 11th motorized rifle

brigade 110th

motorized rifle regiment 111th motorized rifle regiment 15th tank regiment 1st battalion 2nd

battalion 119th

artillery

regiment

1st battery 2nd battery 3rd battery 61st motorcycle

battalion 231st reconnaissance

battalion 209th

engineer battalion 61st

anti-tank division 341st

communications

battalion 61st support

battalion **13th tank**

division Transformed from the 13th motorized division on October 11, 1940. On June 22, 1941, it was in the reserve of the 1st Panzer Group, crossed the Bug River on the Polish-Soviet border only on June 23, 1941, following behind the 44th Infantry Division. Later she captured Kremenchug, one of the first crossed the Dnieper in the Dnepropetrovsk region, fought in Rostov-on-Don and on the Mius Front. In 1942, she received the Marder tank destroyers on the Pz.II chassis, participated in the attack on the Caucasus, captured Armavir and Maikop and reached the outskirts of Ordzhonikidze. During the retreat from the Caucasus in 1943, it was withdrawn through the Kerch Strait to the Crimea, from there it was again transferred by rail to the Mius Front. She retreated through Ukraine to Romania, from there part of the forces, together with the division commander, retreated to Bulgaria, where she was interned. Another part of the division withdrew to Hungary and was reorganized there. Surrounded and destroyed in Budapest in March 415

1945. Parts of the division that left the boiler in February 1945 became part of the newly formed division "Feldherrnhalle II". Commander - Major

General Walter Divert. (since June 14, 1941). Units: 13th motorized rifle

brigade 1 66th

motorized rifle regiment 93rd motorized rifle regiment 4th tank regiment 2 1st battalion

2nd battalion 3rd

battalion

13th

artillery

regiment 1st battery 2nd battery 3rd battery 43rd

motorcycle battalion

13th reconnaissance
battalion 4th engineer
battalion 13th anti-tank division
13th communications
battalion 13th support
battalion **14th tank**

division Formed in August 1940 from the 4th infantry division with the addition of the 36th tank regiment from the 4th th Panzer Division. In April 1941, she participated in the Balkan campaign (Operation Marita). In 1941 she took part in the battles for Kyiv and Rostov. In 1942, she led the offensive in the bend of the Don. Surrounded and destroyed in Stalingrad. The second time it was formed in France in April 1943, in October it was again sent to the Eastern Front and capitulated in the Courland pocket in May 1945.

¹ Both regiments of the division additionally had one anti-tank company (12 50-mm caliber guns) and one motorcycle platoon.

² According to Müller-Gilebrant, the 4th Panzer Regiment consisted of only two battalions, but this does not match the information from other sources. 416

Commander - Major General Friedrich Kühn (since March 22, 1941, killed on June 30, 1941).

Units: 14th

motorized rifle brigade¹ 103rd motorized rifle regiment 108th motorized rifle regiment

36th Tank Regiment

1st battalion

2nd

battalion

3rd battalion 4th artillery regiment 1st battery 2nd

battery 3rd battery 64th

motorcycle battalion

40th reconnaissance

battalion 13th engineer battalion

4th anti-tank

battalion 4th communications battalion 4th battalion ensure

separate support units **16th**

Panzer Division Formed

from units of the 16th Infantry Division in August 1940, simultaneously with the 16th Motorized Division, and sent to Romania. During the Balkan campaign was in reserve. In the summer of 1941, she led an offensive in southern Ukraine through Zaporozhye and Taganrog to the Donbass. Destroyed at Stalingrad in January 1943. In March 1943, she was re-formed in France and sent to Italy. In November 1943, she was transferred to the Eastern Front, participated in the counteroffensive in the Zhitomir region, then retreated through Czechoslovakia, without taking an active part in the battles. Capitulated in May 1945 in the Brno region. Commander - Major General Gotthard Heinrici.

¹ Unlike other tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, the 13th division in motorized rifle regiments had 4, not 5 companies in each of the two battalions. But on the other hand, both regiments had an additional anti-tank company (twelve 50-mm guns) and a motorcycle platoon. 417

Units: 16th

motorized rifle brigade 64th motorized rifle regiment 79th motorized rifle regiment 2nd tank
regiment 1st

battalion

2nd

battalion

3rd battalion 16th artillery regiment 1st battery 2nd

battery 3rd battery 16th

motorcycle battalion

16 -th reconnaissance

battalion 16th engineer battalion

16th anti-tank division

16th communications battalion 16th support battalion

separate parts of support. **Red**

Army:

4th mechanized corps

Headquarters -

Lvov. Commander - Major General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov.

Chief of Staff - Major General A. A. Martyanov. (In 1940, the corps was commanded by Major General of Tank Forces M.I. Potapov, later commander of the 5th Army.) The number of personnel on

06/22/1941: 28,097 people (57% of the regular). Number of tanks: T-27 T-26 BT-7 T-28 T-34

KB Total

Total ? 8th		?	?	?	359 99	892	
	-	36	31	68	140 50	325	
32nd 38 8th		70 24 7	?	?	173 49	about	380 46
honey?				-		-	about 170?

Composition of the 4th

Mechanized Corps: 8th Tank Division (Colonel P. S. Fotchenkov) 15th Tank Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Sleptsov)

16th Tank Regiment

418

8th Motorized Rifle Regiment

8th Howitzer Artillery Regiment 32nd Tank

Division (Colonel Efim Grigoryevich Pushkin, Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel S.V. Zimin, Political Officer Senior

Battalion Commissar D.G. Chepiga) 63rd Tank Regiment (M.I. Zheglov,

Chief of Staff Captain A.V. Egorov) 64th Tank Regiment

32nd Motorized Rifle Regiment

32nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment 81st

Motorized Division 202nd Motorized

Rifle Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Makeev) 323rd Motorized

Rifle Regiment 53rd Tank

Regiment 125th Artillery

Regiment 3rd Motorcycle

Regiment 441 4th Corps

Artillery Regiment 445th Corps Artillery Regiment **8th Mechanized Corps** Headquarters -

Drohobych. Commander - Lieutenant

General Dmitry

Ivanovich Ryabyshev. Chief of Staff - Colonel I.S. Varennikov (later Colonel

F. G. Katkov). The number of personnel on 06/22/1941: 31.927 people (78% of the staff). Number of

tanks:

	T-40 T-26 BT-2 BT-5 BT-7 T-34 T-35 KB Total						
Total		?	14	109?		1 100 48 71 858	
12 td - ?	—	2 50 - 18 - 34 td - 50 48 53 - 7	honey?	—	—	—	—
Composition of the 8th Mechanized Corps: 12th Tank Division							
(Major General of the Tank Forces Timofey Andreevich							
							-

Mishanin, died 06/30/41) 23rd

Tank Regiment According to other sources (D. I. Ryabyshev) - 932 419 _

1

24th Tank Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel P.I. Volkov) 12th

Motorized Rifle Regiment 12th

Howitzer Artillery Regiment (Major I.I. Tseshkovsky) 34th Tank Division (Colonel I.V. Vasiliev, died at the

end of June 1941 M. M. Nemtsev) 67th Tank Regiment 68th Tank Regiment 34th Motorized Rifle Regiment 34th

Howitzer

Artillery Regiment 7th

Motorized Division

(Colonel A.V. Gerasimov) 12th

Motorized Rifle Regiment 27th Motorized

Rifle Regiment (Colonel Chetnyaev) 300th Motorized Rifle Regiment 405th Tank Regiment 23rd Artillery

Regiment 2nd Motorcycle Regiment (Colonel T. I. Tributsky) 9th Mechanized Corps Headquarters - Novograd-

Volynsky Commander -

General Major Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky. Chief

of Staff - Major General A.G. Maslov.

Number of personnel on 06/22/1941: 26,833 people (89% of the staff) Number of tanks:

	T-27	T-38 O	T-26 BT-2	BT-5 BT-	7 Total		
Total 9		18 14		21	about 40	near thirty	258
20 td 8 — — 2					thirty	near 20	near 75
35 td 1 , 141							142
131 honey	— 18 — — about				10	near 10	to 40

Composition of the 9th

Mechanized Corps: 20th Panzer Division (Colonel M. E. Katukov). 39th Tank Regiment 40th Tank Regiment (Major L.G. Tretyakov) 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel P.V. Pererva)

20th Howitzer Artillery Regiment (Major S.I. Yuryev) 35th Tank Division (Major General N.A. Novikov). 69th Tank Regiment 70th Tank Regiment 35th Motorized Rifle Regiment 35th Howitzer Artillery Regiment 131st Motorized Division (Colonels V. Kalinin, Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Chernov) 489th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel N. D. Sokolov) 743rd motorized rifle regiment (Major I. M. Ugorich) 58th tank regiment (lieutenant colonel Kanshin, died 07/26/41) 409th artillery

regiment

32nd Motorcycle Regiment

15th Mechanized Corps Headquarters

- Brody.

Commander - Major General Ignat Ivanovich Karpezo.

Deputy commander - Colonel G. I. Ermolaev. Chief of Staff

- Major General Nozdrunov. Deputy for political

affairs - regimental commissar I. V. Lutai. The number of personnel on

06/22/1941: 33,935 people (94% of the staff). Number of tanks: T T-26 BT Total 40 7

- o BA 418 44 69 64

	733 106 512 152 162 173 342 15 (74)	147 413 7 613 65 53 19
	72 (42) 239	th 10 20
	1	
10 td		
37 td		32 1 314 35 10 45
212 msd	17 5 32	54 18 17 35

¹ According to combat reports, by the time the hostilities began, only 45 T-26 tanks were in the corps.

Perhaps the rest were out of order and remained in Brody. But it is also possible that there were tanks of other brands in the hull, not listed in the table and not mentioned.

in the report. 2

Counting 5 armored vehicles in a motorcycle regiment. 421

Composition of the 15th

Mechanized Corps: 10th Tank Division (Major General Sergey Yakovlevich

Ogurtsov) 19th Tank Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Proleev, Chief of Staff

Major Sterpul) 20th Tank Regiment (Colonel Terlyansky) 10th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Colonel Pshenitsyn)
10th Howitzer Artillery Regiment (Major Bokovnev) 37th Tank
Division (Colonel F. G. Anikushkin) 73rd Tank Regiment 74th Tank Regiment 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment
37th Howitzer Artillery Regiment 212th Motorized Division, (Major
General S.V. Baranov, Chief of Staff Colonel Pershakov) 669th Motorized Rifle Regiment 692nd Motorized
Rifle Regiment 131st Tank Regiment 655th Artillery Regiment 25th Motorcycle Regiment
Corps Artillery Regiment
(number unknown) 19th

Mechanized Corps Headquarters - Berdichev. Commander

- Major General Nikolai Vladimirovich Feklenko.

Chief of Staff - Colonel K. D. Devyatov. Chief of the Operations Department of the Headquarters - Major A.I. Kazakov. The number of personnel on 06/22/1941: 22,654 people (63% of the staff). Number of tanks¹

	T-38 (T-27) T-26	T-34 KB	Total Mech	korlus	152 6
40 TD 139 1 43 TD	5 213 MRD	291	9		458
		19	4		163
		230	5		240
	13	42			55

¹ According to some reports, the 40th Panzer Division had several T-28 tanks.
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Composition of the 19th

Mechanized Corps: 40th Tank Division (Colonel M.V. Shirobokov, Chief of Staff Major G.Travin) 79th Tank Regiment (Colonel V.I. Zhivlyuk) 80th Tank Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel N.S. Zybin) 40th motorized rifle regiment (lieutenant colonel T. Teslya) 40th howitzer artillery regiment (lieutenant colonel V.

Ponomarev) 43rd tank division

(colonel I. G. Tsibin, head of the political department, regimental commissar A. V. Pogosov) 85th Tank Regiment (Major

N.M. Alabushev) 86th Tank Regiment (Major M.A.

Vorotnikov) 43rd Motorized Rifle Regiment 43rd

Howitzer Artillery Regiment

(Major V. Teslenko) 213th Motorized Division (Colonel V.M.

Osminsky) 702nd Motor Rifle Regiment 739th Motorized Rifle Regiment 132nd Tank Regiment 671st Artillery

Regiment 21st Motorcycle Regiment 22nd **Mechanized Corps** Headquarters -

Rivne. Commander - Major

General S. M. Kondrusev. On the first

day he was

mortally wounded. Chief of Staff - Major General V.S. Tamruchi. After the death of General Kondrusev,

he was appointed

new corps commander.

The number of personnel on 06/22/1941: 24087 people (67% of the staff) Number of tanks:

	T-26	OT-26 BT	7 KB Total	
mechanized corps about 100?			? 647 1221 about	²
19 and about 95 7 41 td 215 mrd			225	
		41	301	31 373
		7	7 - about	50

¹ Presumably KV-2. According

² to other sources - 707 tanks.

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Composition of the 22nd

Mechanized Corps: 19th Tank Division (Major General K. A. Semenchenko) 37th Tank Regiment 38th Tank Regiment 19th Motorized Rifle

Regiment 19th Howitzer Artillery Regiment

41st Tank Division (Colonel P P. Pavlov) 81st Tank Regiment 82nd Tank Regiment 41st Motor Rifle Regiment

41st Howitzer Artillery Regiment 215th Motorized Division (Colonel P.

A. Barabanov) 707th Motorized Rifle Regiment 711th Motorized Rifle Regiment 133 1st Tank Regiment 667th

Artillery Regiment 23rd Motorcycle Regiment Total in six corps: 167,533 people,

3,846 tanks, of which 271 KB

and 537 T-34s. Corps that did not take part in the battle: 24th mechanized corps - 222 tanks, no new

ones. Personnel - 21,556 (60% of the staff). 16

mechanized corps - 608 tanks, no new ones (there are 75 T-28s). Personnel - 26,380 (73% of the

staff). A total of

4,676 tanks in eight mechanized corps, including 271 KB and 537 T-34s. According to the lists, in the tank

units of the district there

were 5465 vehicles, of which 677 (12.4%), according to the documents, required repairs - medium or major.

2. **The balance of forces of the parties** Here only the troops of two opposing mobile formations are taken

into account: the 1st tank group von Kleist and the improvised tank group

of the Southwestern Front,

consisting of the 4th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th th, 22nd mechanized corps. The infantry divisions of both sides are

extremely unsuccessful

proved themselves in battle and are not taken into account here. Similarly, the 16th and 24th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army, the 2nd German Panzer Division, directly subordinate to the command of Army Group South and not taking part in the operation in the Dubno region, as well as Hungarian, Romanian and Slovak tank divisions, were not taken into account. parts. 424

	4th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd MK Red Army	1st tank I group	
personnel (actual)	167533 1361	16 personnel	(standard)
(standard) including: 152 mm	2148 guns and mortars	1980 guns and mortars (standard)	124 W,
howitzers 122-mm howitzers	216	hours:] 52-mm guns and 105-mm howitzers	
76-mm	240	236	
	144	323	75 mm
45 mm	216	97	50 mm PTO
76 mm anti-aircraft guns 24			
37 mm anti-aircraft	192	402	37 mm PTO
		98	20 mm anti-aircraft
50 mm mortars 828		372	50 mm mortars
82 mm mortars 288		328	81 mm mortars
tanks (real)	3846	799	tanks (real)
Including new (real) (estimated) The personnel of the Kleist group are shown	808	400 including new	

without corps units, accounting for which gives an inhabited number of troops of about 170,000 people. **3. The results of the battle** The number and deployment of the corps

on July 7, 1941: The loss
of mechanized corps in personnel by July 7 was 25-30% (killed and wounded). mechanized corps

	Total tanks	Dislocation
4	126	Ivnitsa, 25 km southeast of Zhytomyr Kazatin
	43	Korosten
8 9	164	Berezovka.
15	66	25 km southeast of Lyubar Korchevka Korosten
19	66	Departs
22	340	from Volochisk
24	100	Proskurovsky UR
. Total in 7 mechanized	905	

corps **APPENDIX 8**

Organization of the Japanese Fleet during the Battle of Midway Atoll**I COMBINED FLEET** Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, flagship Yamato Chief of
Staff Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki

MAIN FORCE (1st Fleet), Admiral Yamamoto **FORCE CORE**,
Admiral Yamamoto **Battleship Group**
(1st Battleship Division), Admiral Yamamoto "Yamato", Captain 1st Rank Gihachi
Takayanagi "Nagato",
Captain 1st Rank Hideo Yano "Mutsu" ", Captain 1st
Rank Teijiro Yamazumi Carrier Group, Captain
1st Rank Kaoru Umetani

"Hosho" (light aircraft carrier), captain 1st rank
Umetani **Aviation group** (8 bombers), senior lieutenant Yoshiaki Irikin "Yukadze" (destroyer),
captain 3rd rank Shizuka Kajimoto **Special formation** captain
1st rank Kaku Harada "Tieda" (hydroair transport), Captain 1st Rank Harada "Nissin" (hydroair
transport), Captain 1st Rank Katsumi Komazawa **Security (3rd Destroyer Squadron)**,
Rear Admiral Siyataro Haoimoto "Sendai" (light cruiser, flagship), Captain 1st Rank Nobue
Morishita 1st destroyer squadron, *captain 1st rank Kiichiro Soji* "Fubuki", captain 2nd
rank Shizuo Yamashita "Shirayuki", capital 2nd rank Taro Sugahara
"Hatsuyuki", captain 3rd rank Junnari
Kamiura "Murakumo", captain 2nd rank
Hideo Higashi

¹ M. Futida, M. Okumiya "The Battle of Midway Atoll". ACT, Terra Fantastica, M..SP6., 2001.

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19th destroyer division, *captain 1st rank Rayaji Oe* "Isonami", captain
2nd rank Ryokiti Sugama "Uranami", captain 2nd rank Tsutomu Hagyo "Sikimami",
captain 2nd rank Akifumi Kawahashi "Annami", captain 2nd rank Eiji Sakuma 1- 1st Supply
Detachment, *Captain 1st Rank Oigeyasu Nishioka* "Naruto" (tanker), Captain 1st Rank Nishioka
"Toei Maru" (tanker)

COVER FORMATION (Aleut Region) Vice Admiral Shiro Takasu, flagship Hyuga Chief of
Staff - Admiral Kengo Kobayashi Group of battleships (2nd
division of battleships), Vice Admiral Takasu "Hyuga", captain 1st rank Chiaki Matsuda
"Ise", captain 1st rank Isamu Takeda "Fuso", captain 1st rank Mitsuo Kinoshita "Yamashiro",
captain 1st rank Gunji Kogure Security, Rear Admiral Fukuji Kishi
9th Cruiser Division, *Rear Admiral Kishi*
"Kitakami" (light cruiser, flagship), Captain
1st Rank Saiji Norimitsu "Oi" (light cruiser), Captain 1st Rank
Shigeru Narita 20- 1st
Destroyer Division, *Captain 1st Rank Yuji Yamada*
"Asagiri", Captain 2nd Rank Nisaburo Maekawa "Yugiri", Captain
1st

Rank Masayoshi Motokura "Shirakumo",
Captain 2nd Rank Toyoji Hitomi "Amagiri",
Captain 1st Rank Buichi Ashida 24th Division
destroyers, *captain 1st rank Yasuji Hirai*
"Umikaze", captain 2nd rank Nagahide Sugitani "Yamakaze", captain 2nd
rank Shuichi Hamanaka "Kawakaze", captain 2nd rank Kazuo Wakabayashi "Suzukadze",
captain 2nd rank Kazuo Shibayama 27th destroyer division, *captain 1st rank Matake Lsimura*
"Ariake", captain 2nd rank Soichi Yoshida "Yugure", captain 2nd rank Kiyoshi
Kamo "Shigure", captain 2nd rank Noboru Seo "Shiratsuyu", captain 3rd rank Kimmatsu Hashimoto
2nd supply detachment, *captain 1 rank Mapuo Eguchi* "San Clemente Maru" (tanker),
captain 1st rank Eguchi "Toa Maru" (tanker)

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1st STRIK AIR CONNECTION (1st Air Fleet) Vice Admiral Chuichi
Nagumo, Flagship Akagi Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, Vice Admiral *Nagumo*

AIR CARRIER

GROUP, Vice Admiral Nagumo, captain 2nd rank Mitsuo Fuchida
captain 1st rank Kaku Harada "Tieda" (hydroair transport), Captain 1st Rank Harada "Nissin" (hydroair
transport), Captain 1st Rank Katsumi Komazawa **Security (3rd Destroyer Squadron)**,
Rear Admiral Siyataro Haoimoto "Sendai" (light cruiser, flagship), Captain 1st Rank Nobue
Morishita 1st destroyer squadron, *captain 1st rank Kiichiro Soji* "Fubuki", captain 2nd
rank Shizuo Yamashita "Shirayuki", capital 2nd rank Taro Sugahara
"Hatsuyuki", captain 3rd rank Junnari
Kamiura "Murakumo", captain 2nd rank
Hideo Higashi

"Kara" (aircraft carrier), captain 1st rank Jisaku Okada Aviation group, captain 3rd rank Tadashi
Kusumi 21 O-type fighters, senior lieutenant Macao Sato 21 dive bombers, senior
lieutenant Soichi Ogawa 30 torpedo bombers,
senior lieutenant Ichiro Kitajima 2- I Aircraft Carrier Division, *Rear Admiral*
Tamon Yamaguchi, flagship *Hiryu Hiryu* (aircraft carrier), Captain 1st Rank Tomeo Kaku
Aviation Group, First Lieutenant Lichi Tomonaga 21 Type 0 fighters, Senior Lieutenant Shigeru
Mori 21 dive bombers, Senior Lieutenant Michio Kobayashi 21 torpedo bombers,
Senior Lieutenant Rokuro Kikuchi "Soryu" (aircraft
carrier), Captain 1st Rank Ryusaku Yanagimoto Aviation Group, Captain
3rd Rank Takashige Egusa, 21 Type 0 fighters, Senior Lieutenant Masaharu Sutanami

21 Dive Bombers, First Lieutenant Masahiro Ikeda 21 Torpedo Bombers,
First Lieutenant Heijiro Abe SUPPORT GROUP, Rear Admiral Hiroaki
Abe, Flagship Tone 8th Cruiser Division, Rear Admiral Abe "Tone" (Heavy Cruiser) ,
Captain 1st rank Tametsugu Okada "Tikuma" (heavy cruiser), captain 1st rank Keizo Komura 2nd
detachment of the 3rd division of battleships, captain *1st rank Tamoio Koma* "Haruna",
captain 1st rank Koma

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"Kirishima", Captain 1st Rank Sandei Iwabuchi
SECURITY

10th Destroyer Squadron, *Rear Admiral Susumu Kimura* "Nagara" (light
cruiser, flagship), Captain 1st Rank Toshio Naoi 4th Destroyer Division,
Captain 1st Rank Kosaku Origami "Nowaki", Captain 2nd Rank Magotaro
Koga "Arashi", Captain 2nd Rank
Yasumasa Watanabe "Hagikaze", Captain
2nd Rank Yuichi Iwagami "Maikaze", Captain
2nd Rank Seiji Nakasugi 10th Destroyer
Division, Captain 1st Rank Toshio Abe "Kazagumo" , captain 2nd
rank Masalsi Lsida "Yugumo", captain 2nd
rank Shigeo Senba "Makyagumo",
captain 2nd rank Isamu Fujita 17th destroyer
division, captain 1st rank Masayuki Kitamura "Urakadze", captain 2nd rank
Nagalsi Shiraishi "Isokaze" , captain 2nd rank
Sunichi Toshima "Tanikaze", Captain 2nd
rank Motoi Katsumi "Hamakaze", Captain
2nd rank Tsuneo Orita SUPPLY GROUP,
Captain 1st rank Masanao Oto "Kyokuto Maru" (tanker), Captain 1st rank Oto "Shinkoku
Maru" (tanker) " Tono Maru (tanker) Nippon Maru (tanker) Kokuyo Maru (tanker) Akigumo

(destroyer), Captain 2nd Rank Sohei Soma MIDWAY (2nd Fleet)
Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo, Flagship Atago Chief of
Staff Rear Admiral Kazutaka Shiraishi MAIN FORCE, Vice Admiral Kondo 1st Troop, 4th Cruiser
Division, Vice
Admiral Kondo Atago (*Heavy cruiser*), captain 1st rank Matsui Izudn "Tekai" (cruiser), captain
1st rank Mike Hayakawa 5th cruiser division, Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi " *Myeko* " (heavy cruiser),
captain 1st rank Teruhiko Miyoshi "Haguro" (heavy cruiser) , Captain 1st Rank Tomoichi Mori,
1st Detachment of the 3rd Division of Battleships, *Rear Admiral Gunichi Mikawa* 429

"Kongo", Captain 1st Rank Tomiji Koyanagi "Hiei", Captain 1st Rank Macao Nishida
SECURITY (4th Destroyer Squadron), Rear Admiral Soji Nishimura "Yura" (light cruiser),
Captain 1st Rank Shiro Sato 2nd Division destroyer squadron *captain 1st rank Macao* ,
Tachibana "Murasame", captain
2nd rank Naoji Suenaga "Samidare", captain 2nd rank Takisaburo Matsubara "Harusame", captain
2nd rank Macao Kamiyama "Yudachi", captain 2nd rank Kiyoshi Kikkawa 9th captain 1st
Asagumo Division, Captain 2nd , rank *Yasuo Sato* Destroyer
Rank Toru Iwahashi "Minegumo", Captain 2nd Rank Yasuatsu Suzuki "Natsugumo",
Captain 2nd Rank Moritaro Tsukamoto AIR
CARRIER GROUP, Captain 1st Rank Sueo Obayashi "Zuiho" (light aircraft carrier), Captain 1st
Rank Obayashi Aviation Group 12
O-type fighters, First Lieutenant Moriyasu Hidaka 12 torpedo bombers, First Lieutenant
Kdji Matsuo "Mikazuki" (destroyer), Captain 3rd
Rank Saneho Maeda SUPPLY GROUP, Captain 1st Rank Jiro Murao
"Sata" (tanker), Captain 1st Rank Murao "Tsurumi" (tanker), Captain 1st Rank Toshizo Fujita
"Genl Maru" (tanker) "Kenyo Maru" (tanker) "Akashi" (floating workshop), Captain 1st Rank
Tsunekichi Fukuzawa DIRECT SUPPORT GROUP, Rear Admiral
Takeo Kurita 7th cruiser division, *Rear Admiral Kurita* "Kumano" (heavy cruiser,
flagship), captain 1st rank Kikumatsu Tanaka "Suzuya" (heavy cruiser), captain 1st rank
Masatomi Kimura "Mikuma" (heavy cruiser),
captain 1st rank Sakao Sakiyama "Mogami" (heavy cruiser),
captain 1st rank Akira Soji 8th destroyer division, *captain 2nd rank Nobuki Ogawa*

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"Asashio", Captain 2nd Rank Goro Isii "Arashio", Captain 2nd Rank Hideo Kuboki "Nitiei

Maru" (tanker) TRANSPORT GROUP, Rear Admiral Raizo

Tanaka for landing on the Midway (5,000 people). The landing force consisted of the 2nd Combined Marine Special Airborne Detachment under the direct command of Ota and an army detachment under the command of Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki. Kildzumi Maru Zeni Maru Toa

Maru No. 2 Argentina Maru Brazilian Maru Azuma Maru Keiyo Maru Goshu Maru Kano

Maru Hokuriku

Maru Kirishima

Maru Nankai

Maru Patrol boats

No. 1, 2, 34

(with

paratroopers

on board)

Akebono

Maru (tanker)

SECURITY (2nd

destroyer

squadron), Rear Admiral Tanaka, flagship Jintsu Jintsu

(light cruiser), Captain 1st

Rank Torazo

Kozai 15th Destroyer Division, *Captain / Rank Shiro Sato* "Kuroshio", Captain 2nd Rank Tamaki

Ugaki "Oyashio", Captain 2nd Rank Tokikichi Arima 16th

Destroyer Division, Captain *1st Rank Shiro Shibuya* "Yukikaze",

captain 2nd rank Kenjiro Tobita

"Amatsukaze", captain 2nd rank Tameichi

Hara "Tokitsukadze", captain 2nd rank Giichiro Nakahara "Hadukadze",

captain 2nd rank Kameshiro Takahashi 18th

destroyer division, captain 1st rank Ecuto

Miyasaka . "Shiranuhi", Captain 2nd rank Deisuo

Akasawa "Kasumi", Captain 2nd rank Hiyoshi

Tomura "Arare", Captain 2nd rank Tomoe Ogata "Kagero", Captain 2nd

rank Minoru Lkoi 431

HYDRO-AIR TRANSPORT GROUP, Rear Admiral Ruitaro Fujita 11th

Division of Hydro Air Transport, *Rear Admiral Fujita*

"Chitose" (hydro-air transport), Captain 1st Rank Tamotsu Furukawa

16 hydroaviation fighters 4

reconnaissance aircraft

"Kamikawa Maru" (floating base of hydroaviation), captain 1st rank Tarohachi Synod

8 hydroaviation fighters 4

reconnaissance aircraft

"Hayashio" (destroyer), captain 1st rank Kiyoshi Canada Patrol boat

No. 35 (with paratroopers on board) MINING

GROUP, captain 1st rank Sadatomo Miyamoto Minesweepers: "Tama Maru No. 3" "Tama Maru

No. 5 "Shonan Maru No. 7" "Shonan Maru No. 8" Sea Hunters No. 16, 17, 18

"Soya" (transport), Captain 2nd Rank Toshi Kubota "Meiyo Maru" (cargo ship) "Yamafuku

Maru" (cargo

ship) NORTHERN (ALEUTAN) CONNECTION (5th

Fleet) Vice Admiral Moshio Hosogaya, flagship "Nachi" Chief of Staff - Captain 1st Rank

Tasuku Nakazawa

MAIN FORCES, Vice Admiral Hosogaya "Nachi" (heavy cruiser), Captain 1st Rank Takahiko

Kiyota

Security, Captain 2nd rank Hajime Takeuchi "Inazuma" (destroyer), Captain 2nd rank Takeuchi

"Ikazuchi" (destroyer), Captain 3rd rank Sunsa-ku Kudo Supply group "Fujisan

Maru" (tanker)

"Nissan Maru" (tanker)) 3 cargo ships

Carrier Group (4th Carrier Division), *Rear Admiral Kakuta*

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"Ryujo" (light aircraft carrier), captain 1st rank Tadao Kato Aviation group, senior lieutenant Masayuki Yamagami 16 O-type fighters, senior lieutenant Minoru Kobayashi 21 torpedo bombers, senior lieutenant Yamagami "Zunyo" (aircraft carrier), captain 1st rank Shizue Ishii Aviation Group, First Lieutenant Lcio Shiga 24 O-type Fighters, First Lieutenant Shiga 21 Dive Bombers, First Lieutenant Zenji Abe Support Group (4th Cruiser Division), Captain 1st Rank Sunsaku Nabeshima "Maya" (Heavy Cruiser) , Captain 1st rank Nabeshima "Takao" (heavy cruiser), captain 1st rank Bunji Asakura SECURITY (7th destroyer division), captain 1st rank Kaname *Konishi* "Akebono",

captain 3rd rank Minoru Nakagawa "Ushio", captain 2nd rank Lsitake Uesugi " Sazanami, Captain 3rd Rank Jiroschi Uwai "Teiyo Maru" (tanker) ATTU, Rear Admiral Sentaro Omori, flagship "Abukuma" "Abukuma" (light cruiser), captain 1st rank Seiroku Murayama 21st division of destroyers "Wakaba", captain 3rd rank Masakichi Kuroki

"Nenohi", captain 3rd rank Saburo Terauchi "Hatsuharu", Captain 2nd Rank Hiroshi Makino "Hatsushimo", , *Captain 1st Rank Toshio Shimizu*

Captain 3rd Rank Satoru Migihama "Magane Maru" (minelayer) "Kinugasa Maru" (transport)

Attu consisting of 1200 people under the command of Major Matsutoshi Hozumi).

CONNECTION INVASION ON about.

KUSKA, Captain 1st Rank Takeji Ono, flagship "Kiso". 21st Cruiser Division , *Captain 1st Rank Ono "Kiso"* (Light Cruiser), Captain 1st Rank Ono "Tama" (Light Cruiser), Captain 1st Rank Masaharu

Kawabata "Asaka Maru" (Auxiliary Cruiser), Captain 1st Rank Jiro Ban (6th division of destroyers), *captain*

1st rank Yusuke Yamada

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"Hibiki", Captain 3rd rank Hagumu Ishii "Akatsuki", Captain 2nd rank Osamu Takasuka "Hokaze", Captain 3rd rank Tomoo

Tanaka

Transports

"Hakusan **Maru** "

"Kumagawa Maru" Kiska consisting of 550 people under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Hifumi Mukai. On board the Kumagawa Maru were construction equipment and a construction team of 700 people. (Note by an American publisher.) 13th Minesweeper Division , *Captain 1st Rank Toshio Mitsuka* "Kaiho Maru"

"Oyunkotsu Maru" "Hakuho Maru" SUBMARINE Squadron, Rear Admiral Shigeaki Yamazaki, flagship "1-9" At

the end of May "1-9" reconnoitered Fr. Kyska, "1-15" - Fr. Adah, "1-17" - Fr. Atgu, "1-19" - Dutch Harbor, "1-19" patrolled in the Unimak Strait off Dutch Harbor, and "1-9", "1-15" and "1-17" deployed to the curtain "C" between 49° north latitude, 166° west longitude and 51° north. latitude and 166 ° eap. longitude. After reconnaissance about. Chirikova, oh. Sizhinak and Kodiak harbors "1-25" and "1-26" patrolled in the Seattle area and, accordingly, "1-25" fired at Astoria, and "1-26" at Vancouver. 1st Submarine Squadron, Rear Admiral Yamazaki "1-9", Captain 2nd Rank Akiyoshi Fujii 2nd

Submarine Division, Captain 1st Rank Hiroshi

Inazato "1-15", Captain 2nd Rank

Nabuo Ishikawa "1-17" , Captain 2nd Rank Kozo Nishino "1-19",

Captain 2nd Rank Seigo Narahara 4th

Submarine Division, Captain *1st Rank*

Miuru Nagai "1-25", Captain 2nd Rank

Meiji Togami "1-26", Captain 2nd Rank Minoru Lkota **FORWARD**

CONNECTION (submarines, 6th Fleet)

Vice Admiral Teruhisa Komatsu, flagship

Katori

Kwajelein)

Chief of Staff - Rear Admiral Hisashi Mito "Katori" (light cruiser), Captain 1st Rank Noboru Owada of the **3rd**

SUBMARINE SQUAD, Rear Admiral Timaki Kono "1-168" patrolled off about. Midway. "1-174", "1-175", "1-169" and "1-171" were in curtain "A" on the line between 19° 30' N. latitude, 167° west longitude and 23° 30' N. latitude and 167° west. longitude. 434

"Rio de Janeiro Maru" (submarine floating base, flagship, was in the Kwajelein roadstead) 19th submarine division,

captain 1st rank *Rejiro Ono* "1-156", captain 3rd rank Katsuo

Ohashi "1-157", captain 3rd rank Sakae

Nakajima "1-158", captain 3rd rank Soshichi

Kitamura "1-159", captain 3rd rank Tamori

Yoshimatsu 30th submarine division, captain

1st rank *Macao Teraoka* "1-162", captain 3rd rank Takaichi Kinashi "

1-165", Captain 3rd rank Takae Harada

"1-166", Captain 2nd rank Make Tanaka

13th Submarine Division, Captain 1st

rank *Takeharu Mi-yad z ak and* "1-121", Captain 3rd rank Yasuo Fujimori "

1-122", Captain 3rd Rank Sadatoshi Norita

"1-123", Captain 3rd Rank Toshitake Ueno

BASE AVIATION CONNECTION (11th

Air Fleet) Viie Admiral Nishizo Tsukahara (was on Tinian Island), Chief of Staff Rear Admiral

Munetaka Sakamaki **EXPEDITIONAL BASIC AVIATION FORCE** (Midway Island), Captain

1st Rank Chisato Morita 36 fighters of the "O" type, Captain 3rd Rank

Mitsugu Kokufuda 10 bombers (from Island.

Wake) 6 flying boats (from Jaluit Island) **24th AIR FLOTILE**, Rear Admiral Minoru Maeda (located on Kwajelein Island) Air Group from

the Chitose hydro-air transport Captain 1st Rank Fujiro Ohoshi (located on Kwajelein Island) 36 type

fighters "O" 36 torpedo bombers 1st air group, captain 1st rank Samadzi Inouye (from Aur Island

and Votje atoll) 36 fighters of the "O" type 36 torpedo bombers 14th air group,

captain 1st rank Daideo Nakadeima 18 flying boats (from Jaluit Island and

Votje Atoll) APPENDIX 9

Battle of Midway Atoll. Chronology,

statistics, retrospective analysis1 1. Chronology

of strategic MI operation Deployment2 May 20

Executive order

for Operation MI issued. Departure of transport ships from the ports of the Metropolis to the Mariana Islands. The light aircraft carriers

"Ryudze" and

"Zunie"

arrived in Ominato Bay (the northern tip of Honshu Island).

The beginning of the concentration of ships of the 5th Expeditionary Fleet

Hosugaya in Ominato Bay. May 21-24 Great maneuvers of the Combined Fleet east of the

Bunga

Strait. May 24 Transport ships concentrated on the Saipan Islands. Kurita's heavy cruisers

(close

support group, 2nd Expeditionary Fleet) arrived in Guam: Mogami,

Mikuma, Kumano, Suzuya. Reporting meeting on board the Yamato. 25

May Japanese submarines of the advanced formation leave Kwajelein for the area between Midway and Pearl Harbor. Exit to the sea of the Kakuta strike

force: "Ryudze", "Dzuiho"

¹ S. and E. Pereslegina "Pacific Premiere". ACT, Terra Fantastica. M..SP6, 2001. S. Pereslegin. Articles, comments and tables in the book. M. Futida and M. Okumiya "The Battle of Midway Atoll". ACT, Terra Fantastica. M., St. Petersburg, 2001.

² Eastern Hemisphere date unless otherwise noted
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May 26

Entering the sea strike force Nagumo: "Akagi", "Kaga", "Hiryu", "Soryu" and cover ships.
May 27

Nagumo Compound passes through the straits and enters the Pacific Ocean. Departure of the landing forces of the 5th Fleet from Ominato in the direction of the Aleuts. The minesweeper force arrives on Wake. Transports of the 2nd Fleet are leaving

Saipan in the direction of Midway. May 28 Departure of the battleships of the Aleutian support

formation: "Ise", "Hyugo", "Fuso", "Yamashiro". Kurita's cruisers leave Guam for Midway. Departure of the main linear forces of the Combined Fleet: Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu. Departure of the main forces of the 2nd Fleet by N. Kondo: Kongo, Hiei, Atago, Tekai, Myoko, Haguro. On

May 29 (May 28, Western Hemisphere time), the 16th operational force (Enterprise, Hornet) leaves Pearl Harbor. June 1 (May 30, Western Hemisphere time) Yorktown leaves the drydock and, as part of the 17th task force, heads for

Midway Atoll. June 1 Japanese air forces on Dzhulait, Kwajelein, and Wake are put on high alert.

The failure of Operation K (reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor from a seaplane refueling from a

submarine). Early June (probably 1st Eastern Hemisphere time). The Saratoga leaves the US West Coast and heads for Pearl Harbor as part of the 11th Task Force. The 1st operational

formation of battleships leaves San Diego to the north-northwest: Maryland, Colorado, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Idaho. June 2 Decision point passed for the Ryudze

group: 2nd operational formation is oriented towards the Aleuts. 437 June 3 Admiral Yamamoto's main forces

passed

the turning point to the southwest. **Battle 1** June 3 (In the Aleutian direction - the arrival of the

2nd operational formation in the waters of the Aleutian archipelago. Reconnaissance of Dutch Harbor.) 9.40 (local time of

Midway, that is - the 12th belt west of Greenwich. On American ships - the time is 10- 11.40 a.m.

The Japanese fleet operates by the clock in Tokyo, the 9th zone east of Greenwich, 6.40 a.m. the next day, June 4). Contact: Catalina from Midway locates 2nd Fleet's transport connection N. Kondo. 17.00. - the first air strike

on the Japanese invasion forces (heavy bombers B 17). Around midnight - the second air strike on

the invasion forces ("*Catalina*" with radars, torpedoes suspended under the plane).

The tanker "Akebono Maru" was damaged. June 4 (In the Aleutian direction during the day - the

attack on Dutch Harbor by the Ryudze group.) (During the day: the first Japanese submarines of patrol "veils" take up their positions with a delay of two days.) 4.302 . - the beginning of the rise of the first wave of aircraft

from the aircraft carriers Nagumo. 4.32. - release of reconnaissance

seaplanes from cover ships. 4.45. - Completed the construction of

aircraft of the first wave (Tomonaga). 5.10. - Contact: fragmentary report from the Catalina about a single Japanese aircraft.

¹ From here to the end the dating is according to the

² time of Midway. Timing during the Battle of Midway Atoll is replete with inconsistencies and ambiguities. Only some "reference times" can apparently be considered quite reliable. So,

the plan of the operation provided that the first wave should take off half an hour before sunrise

the sun, which on June 4 at the latitude of Midway rises at 5 hours 3 minutes local time. (In addition, the moment of turning the ship against the wind is fixed on the navigation pad.)

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5.30. — Contact: American reconnaissance aircraft fixes aircraft moving in the direction of Midway. 5.34. -

Contact: American reconnaissance aircraft fix the "place" of Japanese aircraft carriers.

5.53. - Contact: Midway radar station detects enemy aircraft. 6.00-6.04. - Raised fighters from the airfield about Midway. 6.10.—6.16. - Bombers and torpedo bombers were raised from the Midway airfield. 6.15. - the beginning of the rise of aircraft from the AB "Enterprise" and "Hornet". 6.25-7.10 - dogfight and attack of Midway by Tomonaga planes¹. 7.00. — Tomonaga informs the Akagi of the need for a second strike on Midway. 7.28. - Contact: Seaplane from Tone detects the presence of American ships. 7.30. - The first raid on the Nagumo formation (4 B-26s and 6 Avengers from Midway)². 7.43. - Contact: Soryu scout detects American planes. 7.45. — Nagumo orders to start re-equipping aircraft of the second wave with bombs³. 7.55. - "Tone" transmits to "Akagi" a report from a reconnaissance aircraft with a time stamp of 7.28. 8.06. — The lifting of aircraft from the Hornet and the Enterprise has been completed. 8.08.—8.30. The second raid on the Nagumo formation (15 dive bombers from Midway.) 8.09. - Nagumo's radio conversations with the pilot of the reconnaissance aircraft. The pilot reports the presence of 5 KR and 5 EM in the US fleet. 8.13. — Nagumo orders a halt to the rearmament of second wave aircraft⁴. 8.14.—8.30. — The Nagumo unit is under attack by B-17 heavy bombers. 8.20. - Contact: Scout pilot reports that "the enemy formation is closing the ship, similar to an aircraft carrier." 8.30. "The Vindicators from Midway are attacking the Haruna. 8.31. - Rear Admiral Yamaguchi (2nd Aircraft Carrier Division) demands that aircraft be immediately raised to attack enemy ships. Estimated time. M. ¹ Fudida - 6.45. Estimated time. At M. ² Futida - 7.05. M. Futida has 7.43. ³ Estimated time. M. Futida has 7.20. ⁴ Estimated time. 8.37-9.00. - Japanese aircraft carriers receive the returned aircraft of the 1st wave. Aircraft of the 2nd wave are rearming from bombs to torpedoes. 8.45. - 9.00 - the rise of half the air group from the "Yorktown". 8.55. - Nagumo sends scouts from the Chikuma and experimental aircraft from the Soryu to additional reconnaissance of the enemy before delivering a decisive blow. 8.55. - Contact: the pilot-observer fixes enemy torpedo bombers in the air. 8:55 AM Nagumo informs Yamamoto and Kondo of the sighting of an enemy carrier formation. 9.17. — Nagumo's aircraft carriers sharply turn to a 30-degree executive heading and increase speed to 30 knots. (feint). 9.20. — the escort ships of the Nagumo formation report the detection of enemy aircraft. 9.20-9.36. - The first raid by torpedo-carrying aviation on the Nagumo formation (Valdron's squadron). 9.36-10.00. - The second raid by torpedo aircraft on the Nagumo compound (Lindsney's squadron). 10.02.—10.20. - The third raid by torpedo aircraft on the Nagumo formation (Massi squadron). 10.20. - Nagumo orders to "take off as soon as ready." 10.20. - Captain third rank McCulsky reports the "place" of the Japanese aircraft carriers. 10.20. - 10.25. Attack of dive bombers. Kaga and Soryu are out of action. 10.24. - Takeoff of the first aircraft carrier from the Akagi. 10.26. "Akagi is disabled. 10.30. — 10.34. The rise of aircraft from AB "Hiryu"¹. 10.46. Nagumo transfers the flag to the Nagara KRL. 11.52. - Yorktown radars detect enemy aircraft. 12.05.—12.16. "First attack on Yorktown, aircraft carrier damaged. 12.20. - I. Yamamoto's order to continue the MI operation. The Kakuta Force and the Main Forces are ordered to march towards Midway. around 12.40. - return of the remnants of the shock wave to Hiryu. 12.50. - A reconnaissance aircraft from the Soryu lands on the deck of the Hiryu. Yamaguchi finds out that the enemy has three aircraft carriers in the Midway area. ¹ M. Futida indicates the time at 10.40, which is consistent with the general timing. American sources indicate, however, that the Hiryu planes took off only at 10:54. 440 13.10. Combined Fleet command orders: landing on Midway atoll is postponed, the fleet is concentrating for a decisive battle, the Kondo cruisers (Kurita's formation) are ordered to bombard Midway. 13.24. Fletcher transfers the flag to the Astoria SRT. 13.30. - The rise of the second wave from AV "Hiryu". 14.40-14.52. -- AB "Yorktown" is again attacked and finally put out of action. 14.55. The team left Yorktown.

around 16.30 - Return of the remnants of the second shock wave to Hiryu. 17.03. - AV Hiryu was attacked by Lieutenant Gallagher's squadron and put out of action. 18.00. - AV "Akagi" was abandoned by the team. 18.30. - Nagumo refuses to fight at night and informs Yamamoto about the presence of five American aircraft carriers in the Midway area. 19.02. - Spruance turns east (temporary retreat). 19.13. - AV Soryu sank. 19.25. - AV "Kara" sank. 21.23. "The Hiryu AB vehicles stopped. 23.40. "Kondo's ships are lined up for nighttime search and combat. 23.58. - Internal explosion on AV "Hiryu". June 5 (On the Aleutian direction during the day - repeated attack on Dutch Harbor.) 0.20. - Kirita cruiser bombardment of Midway canceled 2.20. - Collision of SRT "Mogami" and "Mikuma".

2.30. - The team left AB Hiryu. 2.55. Yamamoto orders a general retreat. 3.50. "The order has been given to sink the Akagi. 4.55. - AB "Akagi" sank. around 8 am - AB "Hiryu" sank1 . 11.55. "The remnants of the Nagumo Compound are linking up with the Main Force. around 15.00. "Spruance sends out a shock wave to the area northwest of Midway. 16.36-18.45 - EM "Tanikadze" was attacked three times by enemy carrier-based aircraft.

¹ American data. M. Futida indicates that this happened at about 6 o'clock in the morning. 441

The final actions of the parties on June 6. 8.10. - Base aviation attacks Mikuma and Mogami, an American aircraft crashes into the Mikuma SRT and inflicts heavy damage on it. 9.50.-12.30. - three consecutive attacks of Japanese cruisers by carrier-based aircraft on the 16th operational connection. 13.58. - The explosion of the charging compartments of torpedoes on the KRT "Mikume". The ship is completely destroyed. 12.59. - The Aleutian operation was resumed: Kakuta's formation was again ordered to support the actions of the 5th Expeditionary Fleet. The 5th Fleet includes the Zuiho Aircraft, Hiei LCR, Kongo, Tone CRT, Tikuma, and the Kamikawa Maru hydro-aircraft carrier. Exit to the sea AVL "Dzuiho". 13.31.- A Japanese submarine sinks the Yorktown and the HMS Hamman. 15.00. - The Kondo Compound and I. Yamamoto's Main Forces make a demonstrative throw in a southerly direction. around 19.00. - The heavy cruiser Mikuma sank. June 7

Order for the return of the Combined Fleet to Japan. In the Aleutian direction, the islands of Attu and Kyska were captured. AB "Saratoga" joins the 16th operational connection. 5.01. - AV Yorktown sank. An American task force is deploying to Dutch Harbor. Nimitz orders the fleet to return to base. **2. Balance of forces of the parties** According to the official American historiography, the Japanese fleet had a huge superiority in forces during the battle at Midway Atoll. In order to prove this, a simple and effective methodology is applied: two operational formations (F. Fletcher and R. Spruance) are opposed to all Japanese ships, one way or another involved in the MI operation. In reality, as we shall see, the capabilities of the parties in the Central Pacific were

are comparable. 442

1. Naval Forces

Operati obviously connect nie	Linen s ships	Avianes sailing ships cruise	Heavy s cray ra	easy ie sulfur	esm inc s	P L	Helped atelier court
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Japanese I empire (106 ship th basic X classes, 31PL 54vsp vessels)	And	9=4+2+3	13	8	66 31 17	tanker v, 15 TR 8 TS 2 mother ships s, auxiliary cruiser, 11 cargo ships
Advanced OS						16
Shock Kirisim	OS A Haruma	Akagi Kata Hiryu Soryu	Tone Tikum A	Naga ra	12	5 tankers
Second Fleet Group covered and I	Congo Hiei		Tekai Atago Myoko Hagur O	Jura 8		4 tankers repair oh vessel
Second Fleet; Middle group support ki			Motam And Miku ma Suzu I Koeman O		2	tanker
Second Fleet: HydroAV Group		Chitose Kamika wa-maru			1	Escort ship
Second Fleet Transport group				Jin c wu	10	12 TR, Escort ship
Second Fleet. Tralna group						4 TSC, the ship is equipped with and I, Zgrueovs X vessels
Main strength	Yamato Nagato Mutsu	Jose			9	2 tankers, 2 mother ships s
Aleutsk oh connect nie Covered and I	Ise Hugo Fuso Yamashir O			Oi Kita To ami	12	2 tankers

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Operati obviously connect nie	linear s ships	Avianes Heavy sailing ships cruise	s ship cruise sulfur	easy ie ship	esm inc s	P L	Auxiliary body court
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North e connect nie			Nagas		2		2 tanker, Zsudna is equipped with and l
Second Operati obviously connect nie		Ryujo Zuiho	Maya Takao		3		1 tanker
connect nie Adau				Aba godfather	4		Transport t
Connect Kiska				Kisa 3 Tama			Auxiliary K R, 2TR, ZTShch
Compound PL						5	
Reserve PL						10	The ship is equipped and l
connect data States of the Americas and (71 ships basic X classes, 25 PL 32 auxiliary Vessels)	6	8 = 4+1+3	10	4	43 2 5		6 tanker, 19 boats, 7 other vessels
OS 16		Hornet New Enterprise Orlea eyes	n Minne up Olis, Vince NT, Northg empty n, Pence cola,	Atla 9 nta			4tankers
OSB		York town	Astor and l portle end		6		
OS1	Marilyn d Colorado O Tennessee				8		

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Operati obviously connect nie	Linemen Avia e ships	anes Heavy sailing ships cruise	s ship cruise sulfur	easy ie ship	esm inc s	P L	Helped atelier court
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OS1	Pencil vaniya missisi pi Idaho	Long Island			8		
OS 11		Saratoga A	San Frantz isco (?)		4(?)		
OS8		3 bases	India on the floor is, Louis ill	Gono lulu st louis , Nash villas	13	6 Kanlodka, 3 tanker, 5 boats, ship is equipped and I	
OS7						19	
Area Midway					3		2 tanker, ship is equipped ia, 14 boats, 2TShch. 2 tenders

Notes: 1. The

aircraft carrier "Zuiho" is not included in the Japanese forces'. 2. Heavy, light (escort) and auxiliary (hydro-) aircraft carriers are summed up: the formula $9=4+2+3$ should be understood in this sense. 3. The hydro-aircraft carriers Nisshin and Chiyoda, which do not carry aircraft and are used as submarine supply bases, are included in the "auxiliary vessels" column. There is a small mystery associated with this aircraft carrier. Most researchers (including M. Fuchida and M. Okumiya) ¹ include it in the 2nd Expeditionary Fleet (cover group), while others indicate that the Zuiho did not go to sea until early June 1942, and then transferred to Kakuta's Second Mobile Connection. The most plausible version is that the ship was excluded from the operation already at the deployment stage - after its name was included in all staffing tables. The reason for such an unexpected decision could be an investigation into the circumstances of the death of the same type of Seho in the Coral Sea, but, most likely, Kondo was not satisfied with the level of training of the air group. (When, ten days later, the Zuiho is called to participate in the Aleutian operation, it will turn out that its pilots can only take off and land in ideal weather.)

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4. Given the full composition of the Japanese forces. As far as the Americans are concerned, only the data on OS 16, 17, 8 and the Midway area seem to be exhaustive. 5. There is no data on supply vessels in the Pai operational unit (OS 1). 6. According to the Americans, OS 11 did not take part in the battle and should not be taken into account when determining the balance of power. "Saratoga" was indeed late for the battle, but the Main Forces of Admiral Yamamoto, which the parties are taken into account without fail, were also late in the same way. Unfortunately, it is not possible to establish the exact composition of OS 11 at the beginning of June. The "method of elimination" managed to isolate the heavy cover cruiser - "San Francisco". For general reasons, a destroyer battalion is assigned to the tactical group. There is no information about auxiliary vessels and supply vessels. 7. There is also no information about destroyers (estimated at about 30), submarines (about 25) and light cruisers (three to four) located in Pearl Harbor, that is, in the operational zone. Moreover, there is no data on auxiliary vessels, of which there should be a lot in the Main Base of the Pacific Fleet. When these forces are taken into account, the total number of ships of the main classes involved from the American side in the orbit of the operation will be 104-105 pieces, about 50 submarines, and more than 100 auxiliary ships. 2. Air Force

Connect enie	Exterminate bodies	Dive ing bombardiers	Horizon flax bombardier sheepmen and scout <small>And</small>	Torpedo Hydrosam toes	flights "flying e boats"
Japan <i>skye</i> <i>impe</i> Riya Total: 615 self years	241	112	20	186	56
Deck <small>and I</small> aviation	133	112	10	114	32
percussion e OS Akagi	93 (all A6M2) 21	91 (all D3A1) 21	2 D4Y1 (divorced)	93(all B5N2) 21	

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Connect enie	Exterminate bodies	Dive ing bombardi shepherds	Horizontal flax movers and scout <small>And</small>	Torpedo Hydrosam toes	flights "flying e boats"
Kara Hiryu Soryu	30 21 21 23	26 21 2		30 21 19	
Second OS Ryujo Zuiho	40 (all A6M2) 16 24	21(all D3A1) 0 21		21(all B5N2) 21 0	
Main e forces Jose			8 D4Y1 (reconnaissance) 8		
GAV group Chitose Kamikawa					32 = 24 + 8 20 = 16 + 4 12 = 8 +4
Basic aviation : Wake Jalut T Kwaje - lane Vautier on board AB	108 36 36 36		10 10	72 36 36	24 24
Connect data State s America <small>And</small>	446	173	168	47	112

Total: 946 <i>plane</i> <i>Comrade</i>					
Deck <i>and I</i> aviation	109	133		41	20
16OC Hornet Enter prize	52F4F-4 28 24	71 SBD-3 35 36		29TBD 1 15 14	

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Connect enie	Exterminator bodies	Dive bombard movers	Horizon flax bombardier sheepmen and scout <i>And</i>	Torpedo H toes	Hydrosam flights "flying e boats"
17 OS Yorktau n	27 F4F4	37 SBD-3		12TBD1	
1OC Long Island 11	10 F4F 4	10 SBD-3			
OS Sarah <i>toga</i>	20 F4F4 15	SBD-3			
80C GAV					20 PBV
Basic aviation midway	28 21 F2A37 F4F-3	40(31) 21 SB2U-3 (12) 19 SBD-2	21 (18) 16 V17-E (13) 1 B17-D2 B26-S 2 B26-B	6TBF-1 32	(30) 31 PBV 5A (29) 1 J2F-2
Basic aviation Aleuts	109		47		
Basic aviation Pearl Harbor	200		100		60

Notes: 1. The

Saratoga Air Group consisted of only 35 aircraft at the time indicated. The breakdown by type is given for statistical reasons. 2. The Long Island air group could have up to 30 aircraft, but in reality there were only 20 of them on board. Breakdown by type according to the project. 3. The base aviation of the Aleutian Islands has the following formations: 3 squadrons of army fighters, 1 Canadian fighter squadron, 1 squadron of naval aviation fighters (5 squadrons in total), 1 Canadian reconnaissance squadron, 1 squadron of heavy army bombers (obviously B-17E), one medium bomber squadron (B-26-S), one army consolidated group. 4. Hawaiian aviation data are estimates. 5. In brackets - aircraft combat-ready at the beginning of the operation. 6. Seaplanes based on battleships and cruisers are not taken into account. 448

7. The Japanese hydrocarriers were armed with hydrofighters (float "zero") and reconnaissance aircraft. In this sense, formulas of the form $32 = 24 + 8$ should be understood. **3. The balance of forces in the area of Midway Atoll.** The most important for the analysis of the course of the battle is the balance of forces of the immediate

the vicinity of Midway Atoll: respectively, the strike force Nagumo, the squadron of heavy cruisers Kurita, "flying boats" from Julait - against OS 17 and 16, and Midway base aviation. Parties LK AV TKR KRL EM PL

A						
Japan 2 USA			6	1	14	16
0		4	7 1		15	19
Storo on	Total O	3 Exterminate ate	Piqirs boxes	"Leve ly"	torpedon axes	gav
Japan and I	303 93		91	O	93	24
USA 341	107 139	18 (Only comb	bat-ready aircraft		47	thirty

are taken into account.) To a good approximation, the needles concentrated in the Midway region can be considered almost equal. The Americans outnumbered the enemy in the number of aircraft and had a significant aviation reserve in the Hawaiian Islands. The Japanese had more ships of the main classes and strong reinforcements in the amount of the Second Kondo Fleet and Yamamoto's Main Forces. In the Aleuts, superiority in aviation was entirely on the side of the Americans, but there it was devalued by the prevailing weather conditions; in ships, the advantage remained with Japan. **3. Losses in the Battle of Midway Atoll**
LOSSES OF THE AMERICANS According to Japanese data, SHIPS 2 aircraft carriers of the Enterprise type were sunk. 1 San Francisco-class aircraft

carrier - damaged. 1 destroyer - sunk by M. Futida, M. Okumiya. 449 AIRCRAFT Shot down or destroyed during an air raid on the island.
Midway - 45 Shot down during attacks by American aircraft
carriers - 5 Shot down during combat air patrols - 90 Shot down by anti-aircraft artillery of Japanese ships - 29 Total - 179
1

Actual losses: Aircraft carrier
Yorktown - sunk. Destroyer "Hammann" - sunk. Carrier aircraft lost - 109 This figure includes losses suffered on 4.5 and 6 June, and 11 aircraft lost from the Yorktown when she sank on 7 June. US Coastal Aviation Losses: Marine Corps Aviation 28 Navy Aviation 6 Army Aviation 4 Total Coastal Aviation Losses 38 Total 147 **FACILITIES** Eastern Island: 1 hangar - burned down. 3 buildings burned down. Runway - damaged in two places, about. Sand Island: 1 seaplane hangar - burned down. Seaplane Platform - Destroyed. 2 fuel tanks burned down.
2 anti-aircraft gun platforms - destroyed. The command post of the marines and the canteen were destroyed. Thermal power plant -

damaged.
The runway was damaged but remained usable. 1 seaplane hangar - destroyed. Fuel tanks have been destroyed.
The fuel supply system is damaged. The hospital and the aircraft depot were burned down. **LOSS OF JAPANESE SHIPS**
Sunk 4 aircraft carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu), 1 cruiser (Mikuma), Heavily damaged: 1 cruiser (Mogami). Received moderate damage 2 destroyers ("Arasio". "Asasio").

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Lightly damaged: 1 tanker ("Akebono Maru" by an aircraft torpedo) 1 destroyer ("Tanikaze" by a bomb that exploded near). 1 battleship ("Haruna" by a bomb that exploded near). AIRCRAFT

Lost during Midway attack 6 Fighters
lost during combat air
patrols 12 Lost during US carrier attacks 24 Lost
with carriers 280 (approximately) Total 322 4.
Retrospective analysis of Operation MI

-1-

Analyzing the battle at Midway Atoll, it is customary to address Admiral Yamamoto with accusations of "excessive dispersal of forces", underestimation of the enemy and poorly organized intelligence. Let us consider these accusations outside the context of the predetermination of past events, which is characteristic of official and semi-official history. Of course, it was not difficult to capture Midway, having gathered the entire Combined Fleet in the central sector of the Pacific Ocean. But even in chess, the "principle of concentration of forces" should not be understood as crowding all the pieces in one corner of the board. S. Dall and S. Morrison² build their criticism on the assertion that the commander of the Japanese fleet was obliged to proceed in his plans from the possibility of having all American Task Forces near Midway Atoll. The reasoning looks **methodologically** flawless, but it definitely implies the need for the Combined Fleet to cover any landing operation, no matter how small. After all, if the advance deployment of Nimitz aircraft carriers in the vicinity of Midway was to be feared, then why not expect a similar surprise when attacking Guam, Wake, Kwajalein, the Andamant Islands, not to mention the Philippines, Indonesia or Rabaul? It is tempting for a warlord of any school to keep the fleet constantly concentrated so that he is always ready for a pitched battle, but the size of the Pacific

¹ According to the book by S. and E. Pereslegin. Pacific Premiere. M., ACT, 2001

² S. Dall. Battle path of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Yekaterinburg, 1997 S. Morrison. American Navy in World War II. Yekaterinburg, 1999
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ocean and the scope of the tasks of both the first and second stages of the war, such a strategy is completely excluded.

Yamamoto had no reason to suppose the presence of any significant enemy forces in the Midway area. Let's imagine for a moment that Nimitz would not have received exhaustive information from the cryptanalysis service. Until mid-May, all the attention of the headquarters of the US Pacific Fleet was drawn to the South Seas, the defense of Midway was considered a task of secondary importance. And now, to the island, where a battalion of marines is on duty and, in the best case, there are a dozen "wildcats", a fleet "designed" by respected historians approaches: five heavy aircraft carriers, including Zuikaku, four light aircraft carriers, including Zuiho and Ryuho, four hydro-air transports, eleven battleships, twenty heavy cruisers, about a hundred destroyers and destroyers and a lot of squadron tankers and supply ships ... its finest pattern of subsidiary,

intermediate, distracting and main blows, in favor of a completely direct offensive

"United Forces". Meanwhile, Yamamoto, who did not have an American industrial empire behind him, could not afford a strategy that, at best, would lead to a massive "exchange of figures". Given the

incommensurability of the opponents' resources, it is difficult to offer a positive plan for the weaker side. The concept of the MI operation was, apparently, incorrect - likewise, the scheme of the campaign in the South Seas, and the geometry of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the entire strategy of the Pacific War in general, were refuted (with the correct actions of the Anglo-American allies). The operations of the Combined Fleet from the first to the last day of this war resembled attempts to play a "leaky" minuscule; the capture of Midway Atoll was no exception to the general rule. In this interpretation, criticisms of Dall and other historians are perceived as a set of "useful" advice on the topic: how best to play this minuscule if

your cards were spied on by the enemy.

The "sense of danger" prompted Yamamoto to concentrate excess forces against Midway. In the Central Pacific

¹ Having discovered this armada, Nimitz certainly would not have sent his surface ships to Midway.

It would be limited to submarine operations, seaplane attacks at night and bombings from B-17s based in the Hawaiian Islands. The Combined Fleet would either have to leave - with obvious embarrassment - or attack Hawaii, relying only on force, since there would be no question of any surprise.

everything that the Combined Fleet could allocate was collected without compromising operations in other directions. The most unpleasant scenario for the Japanese side, envisaged in the simulation of the MI operation, allowed the appearance of two or three American aircraft carriers in the Midway area. The 1st and 2nd DAV of the Nagumo formation could operate against them - four aircraft carriers with slightly smaller air groups than those of the enemy ships. That is, even in this hypothetical and unlikely case, the forces of the parties would be approximately equal. Is it possible to call a strategic plan incorrectly balanced, which, under the most unfavorable set of circumstances, leads to an equal battle? Note that the command of the Combined Fleet quite accurately predicted the capabilities of the US Navy: in the "worst case scenario" realized against the Nagumo formation, Nimitz actually used three heavy aircraft carriers. Losing on the maps

various versions of the upcoming battle, Yamamoto, Kondo, Nagumo did not take into account the possibility that the entire Japanese plan was known to the American command in detail. But such an assumption would border on paranoia; to respect the enemy does not mean to attribute to him supernatural insight or fantastic knowledge. More justified is the accusation of poor organization of intelligence. The Japanese side was unable to obtain any information regarding Nimitz's plans. American aircraft carriers were "lost" by the radio interception service: at the beginning of June, analysts assumed that the Enterprise and Hornet were in the South Seas, the Yorktown was listed as "sunk or badly damaged"¹. Nothing was learned about the structure of the enemy's operational formations, about the defense of Midway, about the intensity of traffic between Pearl Harbor and San Diego, about the delivery of a large amount of cargo to Midway. In other words, the battle revealed the complete bankruptcy of Japanese strategic intelligence.

Yamamoto tried to get information about the enemy's intentions at his own - operational - level. For reconnaissance purposes, submarines and seaplanes were involved. Using Dan Interestingly, the Saratoga, which was being repaired on ¹ the West Coast, and the Wasp, operating in the south, were considered by Japanese intelligence officers to be in Pearl Harbor. In addition, it was hypothesized that the Ranger could also operate in the Hawaii region (the Americans rightly considered this ship, in principle, unsuitable for the Pacific theater of operations; the Ranger spent the entire war in the Atlantic, covering convoys). Thus, analysts "guessed" the number of aircraft carriers in the Central Pacific, but failed to correctly determine any of them. 453

cryptanalysis, the Americans thwarted "Operation K", as for the curtain of submarines, they were late in reaching the observation line and therefore could not open the deployment of Spruance and Fletcher's formations. There is no doubt that the commander of the Combined Fleet is responsible for this mistake of his subordinates. Let us note here that the MI operation required absolute precision, genuine impeccability in actions and decisions from the responsible executors. The war had been going on for half a year, people had not left the information posts and conning towers for months, and Yamamoto had to take into account the possibility of "human error". Sakiyama Sako, who destroyed his cruiser in a relatively calm environment, was deservedly considered one of the best commanders of the Japanese

*fleet ... A number of analytical works express the opinion that it was necessary to sharply increase tactical reconnaissance and, in particular, to carry out a preliminary reconnaissance of Midway. It is difficult to agree with these recommendations. The operation was calculated on surprise: meanwhile, according to **the principle of uncertainty in intelligence**, it is impossible to obtain information about the enemy without providing him with equivalent information about his intentions. (So, for example, in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, it was the reconnaissance raids of the British that prompted the Turkish command*

to strengthen the fortifications of the Dardanelles.) The Japanese side planned surprise and, in accordance with the laws of dialectics, received it with a minus sign. In this regard, the question arises of "unacceptably wide use of radio communications" or the poor provision of secrecy in the preparation of the operation. As already noted, the first information about the upcoming Japanese offensive in the central sector of the Pacific Ocean was provided by the cryptanalytic service to Nimitz in mid-May. Thus, the commander of the American fleet had no more than two weeks to develop a battle plan and translate it into concrete battle orders. With the utmost tension of all headquarters and organizational structures, such a reserve of time "back to back" was enough, but, as a rule, the leading authorities are very skeptical about the conclusions of the intelligence officers, which were unexpected for them:

logically, Rochfort should have taken several days to "persuade" Nimitz. Further, as a rule, two parties are formed at the headquarters: one of career considerations believes in the information received, the other (f

one has to maneuver between these groups, insuring against any outcome. As a result, a "weighted", but in fact a half-hearted decision is made belatedly. (For example, to reinforce the Midway garrison and send the 16th task force to the atoll on the second - "look".) 454

From this point of view, a leak of information such as that which took place before Midway could not lead to any serious consequences. After all, it took place before Pearl Harbor, and before the battle for Indonesia, and before the raid into the Indian Ocean. And only in this case the situation developed non-standard. Although the "alternative party" existed (moreover, it had support in the highest Washington headquarters), it did not have any influence on the development of operational decisions. **Admiral Nimitz ignored all her warnings and gave full support to the intelligence department.** In other words, Rochfort not only deciphered the Japanese codes, but in some mysterious way managed to convince the commander of the **absoluteness** of his analysis. Nimitz must be given his due: at the end of the battle, he declared in the presence of all staff officers that they owed their victory to the brilliant work of the naval intelligence unit led by Rochfort. In any case, Nimitz's deep conviction that cryptographers' reconstructions are flawless remains one of Midway's mysteries, perhaps the main one². It is very difficult to unambiguously evaluate the decisions taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Navy late in the evening of June 4th. Although, unlike Nagumo Yamamoto, he remained apparently calm, there is no doubt that he was shocked by the suddenness of the disaster and its scale. Old plans collapsed, there were no new ones. The only chance that came to mind was an artillery battle. Shortly before his death, Count A. Schlieffen published an

¹ article in the open press in which he criticized the changes made by G. Moltke to his strategic plan. The article analyzed in detail both the general pattern of the future "Schlieffen maneuver" and the individual subtleties of deployment and concentration. Nevertheless, the implementation of the "Schlieffen Plan" in the summer of 1914 came as a complete surprise to the Allies. Similarly, the French leadership in 1940 had an idea about the Gelb plan, the Soviet about the deployment of Barbarossa, the British about the Malay operation. In general, it is impossible to hide the preparation of an action of a strategic scale. It's just about that, so that the enemy receives information, firstly, contradictory, and secondly, delayed. As a rule, this

quite enough to disguise their intentions. ²

During the entire battle, Admiral Nimitz issued only three orders, including the fundamental directive that sent Fletcher and Spruance to Midway. All of them were based on an uncritical attitude to the findings of the intelligence department and turned out to be extremely successful and timely. (Orientation relative to the southwestern group of Japanese ships, order to stop the operation and return the fleet to Pearl Harbor.) 455

preferably at night. To do this, it was necessary to bring the operation to capture Midway to its logical end.

The opportunity to capture the atoll from the Combined Fleet remained on 5 and 6 June.¹ But to act contrary to the events that had taken place meant for the Japanese to oppose themselves to the will of Heaven. Neither Nagumo, nor Kondo, nor Yamamoto himself had any inner strength left for this. The "Aleutian project"² seemed to them more encouraging. New ships, a different sector of the Pacific Ocean ... it was about **a different** battle - not about an attempt to "outplay" the outright lost Midway. But, of course, the Japanese had no reason to assume that, having a crane in their hands, the Americans would rush to catch a tit in the sky. In retrospect, the refusal to continue Operation MI on the evening of June 4th should be regarded as a very serious mistake by the Combined Fleet Command. Of course, after the loss of Nagumo's connection, the question of the blockade of Hawaii did not arise. The Americans maintained dominance in the central Pacific, which meant that Midway, even if captured, could not be held for long enough. But for his return, Nimitz would have to pay **a real price**. ¹

It should, however, be borne in mind that the island was prepared for positional defense. Apparently, the SMDCH with the help of battleship artillery could defeat the American garrison, despite the lack of air support, but this would take time and lead to heavy losses. On June 6-7, the command of the

² Combined Fleet?, tried to improvise a new general battle - this time in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean. For this, a short-term search for American ships by six Japanese cruisers was first designated, then the operation was canceled, and the Combined Fleet was ordered to return to Kure. This was done not defiantly, but not very secretly either. Yamamoto expected that the American

the command, in the conditions of the withdrawal of the Japanese naval forces, will continue its operation in the direction to the north - in order to destroy Kakuta's mobile forces after the Nagumo formation. Spruance really chose just such a plan: on the

evening of June 7, the ships of the 16th task force turn north. However, a few hours later - Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet Nimitz ordered to stop the operation and immediately return to Pearl Harbor. Meanwhile, a rather interesting situation could have developed in the Aleut region. Simultaneously with Spruance, the aircraft carriers Zuikaku and Zuiho, which urgently left the metropolitan area,

as well as the battlecruisers Kongo and Hiei and the heavy cruisers Tone, entered the area. "Tikuma", "Haguro", "Mioko" from the Combined Fleet, which, therefore, did not return to Kure at all. 456 -2- The blunders of the chief executor of the MI operation, Vice Admiral Nagumo Chuichi, became the subject of study already during the war. But behind the abundance of "question marks" put

commentators on almost all the "moves" of the commander of an aircraft carrier formation, remained two interrelated questions remain unanswered: why did Nagumo make such decisions and how should he act in the situation that developed on the morning of June 4, 1942, north of the island? The first remark about Nagumo is the poor organization of intelligence. Indeed, it looks strange that he, having at his disposal about three hundred carrier-based aircraft with

experienced crews who have accumulated experience in night and twilight flights, used to search the enemy has only seven fuel and lubricants. There is no denying that Nagumo had a biased assessment of the situation. Although he told his staff officers that there might be a large enemy force in the Midway area, these words were more of an "evil spell" than expressing the commander's actual point of view. From aerial reconnaissance, Nagumo only expected confirmation of his confidence in the absence of American surface ships in the operational zone. In other words, the sector search was organized "just in case" and was considered by everyone - from the commander of the formation to the direct executors - as a purely formal fulfillment of statutory requirements. Let us note in this connection that Halsey did not conduct aerial reconnaissance at all during the raid on Jaluit Kwajelein (and in the Tokyo raid). Nagumo, like Yamamoto, attached great importance to the secrecy of the deployment of his unit. And that is why he did not use carrier-based aircraft for preliminary reconnaissance. The appearance of a Japanese seaplane in the vicinity of Midway did not mean anything: such a reconnaissance aircraft could fly from Kwajelein (with refueling from submarines). In the worst case, he would lead the Americans to the idea that somewhere nearby is an enemy heavy cruiser. But a "wheeled plane" with red circles on its wings, discovered by some fishing layba five hundred miles west of Wake, pointed to the obligatory presence of at least one Japanese aircraft carrier in the central Pacific. Nagumo used carrier scouts only in the deserted southern sectors; the search in the directions to the west and north-west was carried out by the fuel and lubricants of the cover ships. There were enough of them to organize single-phase observation - which the Japanese limited themselves to. This decision, fraught with late detection of the enemy, reduced to a minimum the risk of accidentally unmasking the operation. Nagumo, of course, had no idea that Spruance knew exactly what he

strength and intention.
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In military literature (and in particular, in the work of M. Futida and M. Okumiya), much attention is paid to the episode with a half-hour delay in the departure of the seaplane from the Tone. Of course, had this fuel and lubricants been launched on time, it would have passed over the American formation at about seven o'clock in the morning and, **possibly**, would have seen it. Taking into account the weak motivation of the observers, the weather conditions, the illumination, and, finally, the fact that the ships would have been met not in the search sector, but on the way back, the probability of detection is estimated at 10-15 percent. The battle at Midway Atoll was, after all, not so chaotic that its outcome was determined by such an insignificant motive as the discovery of the enemy half an hour earlier than it actually happened. Nagumo could easily "insure" the situation and restore the reconnaissance schedule. To do this, it was enough to launch a second plane from Tikuma. And there is no doubt that in the raid on Pearl Harbor, the commander of the formation would have done just that. However, by June 4, the 1st and 2nd DAVs had been in continuous operational mode for half a year. Nagumo, his staff officers and ship commanders were tired, the pilots were exhausted. The war has lost its sense of novelty for them, the danger has ceased to be a stress factor that ensures mobilization and

concentration of attention, which are the only guarantee against accidental errors. In 1944, the Americans will learn to deal with psychological fatigue by creating shifting operational commands: the unit has two account numbers and two commanding headquarters, one of which controls ships at sea, and the other is engaged in organizational and reporting activities ashore. After some time, these headquarters change places. As a result, responsible commanders constantly maintain a high level of information activity; they do not have time to "get used" to war. But such a system implies democracy with its sacramental formula "there are no irreplaceable people." The semi-feudal Japanese society did not recognize the division of responsibility among its elite. It was difficult even for a simple sailor from the Akagi to imagine that Nagumo and, for example, Ozawa commanded an aircraft carrier strike formation for half a year and, for example, Ozawa. A Japanese military leader could be removed from office or could die. Admiral Nagumo didn't bother with a minor malfunction on the Tone and a minor schedule disruption. Reconnaissance is still being carried out only for the sake of formality ... A serious mistake by the command

of an aircraft carrier formation is considered to be the use of only half of the available forces to attack Midway. The tactical justification for this decision was, obviously, the desire to save ammunition, which might not be enough for the general battle that followed the occupation of the island. In addition, the second wave, prepared for a strike on enemy ships, was considered an insurance policy in case of various surprises.

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And most importantly: serious air resistance over the atoll was not expected; from this point of view, the number of aircraft deployed to strike an empty shell looked more than sufficient.

But Nagumo, of course, was obliged to accurately set the task for the pilots of Tomonaga. First of all, this concerned the Midway airstrips: should they be destroyed in order to disable the "unsinkable aircraft carrier", or, on the contrary, should they remain intact? The second raid on the atoll was needed precisely because there was no proper target designation for the first wave. Although the division of carrier-based aviation into "assault" and "anti-ship" groups was tactically

sound, it served as a catalyst for further mistakes. The presence of two shock waves focused on different targets led to a bifurcation of the operational thought of the commander. The very structure of the air force provoked the decision to fight two different battles simultaneously. Under the circumstances, that would have been the lesser evil, but Nagumo was too experienced a commander to go for that option. As a result, the operational split resulted in a sequence of orders

and counter-orders: remove torpedoes, hang up bombs, equip torpedoes again... *at that moment she introduced herself to the commander, but all together they make an ugly impression. This is how general battles are not won!* "You should have stuck to your original plan. Or your second plan. Or third. In fact, you had to stick to one thing. Whatever it is." However,

Nagumo can also be understood. A task force of the enemy suddenly appeared on his flank, as if materialized from the void and nightmares. And - and this is typical for such situations - the degree of danger was realized stepwise, going through all the stages in an hour and a half: from "insignificant interference" to "probable catastrophe". The First Air Fleet found itself under the influence of centrifugal forces: inertia attracted it to Midway, while a sudden flank threat demanded that all efforts be concentrated against it. As far as I can tell, Nagumo fully understood the situation at about half past eight in the morning. And here they were taken

¹ On September 6, 1914, von Kluck, commander of the 1st German Army, found himself in a similar situation, forced to fight two battles: on the Marne and on the Urk River (see M. Galaktionov "Paris, September 1914"). On the whole, Kluk acted more consistently than Nagumo, but his crisis developed much more slowly: the characteristic time for making a decision was hours, not minutes. However, the inhibition of the maneuver, due to the "stepped" perception of the threat, led the 1st Army to the defeat of 459

a decision that - following Yamaguchi - is condemned by everyone. Nagumo delayed the rise of the planes until the first wave was received and the second was rearmed. Thus, regardless of his subjective opinion on this matter, he objectively assumed the obligation to repulse the attack of enemy carrier-based aircraft¹.

In the 1st and 2nd DAV, only the Kaga (and even then with a very big stretch) could claim the role of a linear aircraft carrier. The Akagi, not to mention the Hiryu and Soryu, were typical strike ships. Using attack carriers to defend a formation is certainly a crazy idea. But maybe she's crazy enough to be right. Indeed, if Nagumo had repulsed the last attack of the dive-bombers (and it really was the last - at least for the next few hours), he would have been the master of the situation. The psychological mood on the American ships dropped at that moment to a very low level. Superiority in the quantity and quality of aircraft, in the level of training of pilots was entirely on the side of the Japanese. For completeness of happiness, an air attack would have occurred at the time the American aircraft carriers received their aircraft². However, Nagumo's decision to adopt defensive tactics was, firstly, unconscious and, secondly, inconsistent. It was necessary to attend not to the hasty preparation of the aircraft for departure (they still did not have time!), But to saturate the air patrol with fighters and clean the flight and hangar decks from bombs and torpedoes. Perhaps in the air it was necessary to detain part of the "vals" of the Tomonaga group, entrusting them with the tasks of early warning and combating torpedo bombers³.

¹ Japanese historiography speaks of "five fatal minutes" for which Nagumo was late with the release of his air group. However, the situation developed in such a dramatic way only due to the poor quality of work of the headquarters of Spruance and Fletcher and the insufficient training of American pilots. Having discovered the Japanese ships at 5.30 in the morning, the Americans had every opportunity to attack them no later than 8.30. Nagumo, who received a report about the enemy aircraft carrier only at 8.20. and knowing that his connection was observed by the Catalinas from the very early morning, he should have concluded that the "preemption game" is obviously meaningless: enemy planes will appear any minute.

² And what would we then read in the sources? "The success of the battle was due to the non-standard decision of Admiral Nagumo. By abandoning the obligatory stereotype of "whatever the cost, strike first," he created an impenetrable fighter screen over his aircraft carriers. While the American admirals in uncoordinated direct attacks spent the entire color of carrier-based aviation of the 16th and 17th operational formations ... "

³ The dive bombers "Val" were able to conduct a maneuverable battle with the "Wildkets". Devastators without cover would be easy prey for them.

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-3-

If it is difficult to put the control of carrier-based aviation into the asset of Vice Admiral Nagumo (although, in my opinion, it was at a higher level than during the attack on Pearl Harbor and Colombo), then the maneuvering of the formation was beyond praise. During the entire battle, the Japanese pilots had no problems with the "place" of their aircraft carriers, in other words, Nagumo accurately maintained the general course and squadron speed in a mixture of enemy attacks. The 90-degree turn, which followed at 9.17 in the morning, was taken at the most opportune moment: the Catalinas temporarily lost contact with the Japanese ships, the carrier-based aircraft of the Hornet, Enterprise and Yorktown were in the air and were focused on the previous route of the aircraft carrier connections. This turn allowed Nagumo to evade the Hornet dive-bombers, and, if an accident had not intervened, he would have taken the Enterprise air group out of the battle, which had practically exhausted the emergency fuel supply. In another situation, such a brilliant "move" could lead to winning the battle. **-4-**

Summing up, we note that the main mistake of both Yamamoto and Nagumo was the unwillingness to listen to the language of coincidences and forebodings. The Americans could afford such inattention - their intelligence had already reached the level of technology. The Japanese side professed the strategy of a miracle, reliance on Chaos as an alternative to the general Western order. But within the framework of this strategy, the signs of Fate had to be

read and taken into account. **-5-** If you analyze the management of the operation on the American side, you have to be surprised again and again by the impeccable leadership on the part of Admiral Nimitz. He did not make a single mistake: all his decisions, actions (and inactions) were optimal. Nimitz managed to impose his reading of Rochfort's cryptographic exercises on the entire fleet and Washington strategists, organized a lightning-fast repair of the Yorktown, and contributed to a "resonant" rise in morale on the ships of the 16th and 17th operational formations. For a commander whose role was seen as purely administrative, not a bad track record! On the contrary, Spruance and Fletcher seem to have set themselves the task of making all the mistakes which can only be done by controlling an aircraft carrier formation, and in no case miss none. We started with Fletcher, the appointed team

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to do both "Task Forces", withdrew from the tasks of general management and completely focused on "his" "Yorktown" ¹. As a result, the 16th and 17th OS, being ten miles away from each other, fought - with the same enemy - two different battles and used two different tactics. Note that the task facing the American tactical command was actually very simple. Spruance and Fletcher knew in advance the strength of the enemy, and from 5.30 in the morning - his "place", course and speed. They could interact with Midway's base aircraft, and, even more importantly, use its airfields to refuel carrier-based aircraft. Rochford and Nimitz created the perfect trap, and once Nagumo fell into it, he was doomed. With any correct actions by the Americans, the question of Nagumo's mistakes would not even have arisen: his formation would have been destroyed somewhere around seven o'clock in the morning by a joint attack by planes from Midway and three aircraft carriers. But Fletcher and Spruance failed to organize interaction between the fleet and the air army stationed on Midway Atoll. They were also unable to ensure the coordinated use of at least one carrier-based aircraft: the Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise air groups searched for the enemy on their own and attacked him separately. Moreover, even the "statutory" tactical relationship between the squadrons that took off from one aircraft carrier was not provided! The rise of the aircraft was carried out with unacceptable slowness, additional reconnaissance of targets was not carried out. Instead of a unified air defense system, the admirals organized two independent air patrols, each of which solved its tasks separately. As a result, an incomplete air group from one "Hiryu" managed to break through the zone defense twice, built by three

aircraft carriers.

Each of these mistakes could (and should) lead Spruance and Fletcher to a rout. However, in the battle at Midway Atoll, the information component prevailed over the material one, and the advantage of the American side in radio intelligence turned out to be a more significant factor than the superiority of the Japanese in tactics and operational art. So perhaps S. Morrison had some reason to write: "Fletcher did well, but Spruance was great. Calm, collected, resolute, always ready to listen to advice, keeping in mind the whole picture with the formations scattered across the ocean, boldly seizing every opportunity, Raymond E. Spruance emerged from this battle one of the greatest admirals of the American Navy.

¹ It is difficult even to find an analogy for such behavior of the commander. However, on May 19, 1940, when the German guns broke through to the English Channel, and the threat of defeat loomed over France, the French commander
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-6-

The last question arising from the analysis of the ups and downs of the battle at Midway Atoll is the sacramental: "What would happen if ..." The victory of the "stars and stripes" was semi-random (this is not denied by American historiography), so the search for alternative versions history in this case is not only of interest, but methodologically fully justified. Most sources agree that the war "would have been pretty long", but its outcome would not have changed. In other words, the ultimate victory of the United States of America was predetermined. At the same time, however, no one indicates not only specific operational schemes, but also strategic plans for the "game" to win. The Battle of Midway Atoll could have been won by the Japanese in one of three main ways: 1. The American cryptanalysts failed to reveal the intention of the MI operation, and it is carried out in accordance with the original calculations of Admiral Yamamoto. 2. Yamamoto pays attention to unfavorable signs and postpones the start of the operation for 10-15 days. 3. Nagumo manages to repulse the attack of dive bombers from the Yorktown and the Enterprise. There is no significant difference between these versions: in all cases, the Americans lose Midway and a certain number of aircraft carriers. The first possibility corresponds to the "main option" of Yamamoto's strategic plan¹ and minimizes the losses of the Japanese side². The "second option" results in a complete loss of trust between Nimitz's headquarters and the cryptanalytic department. The deployment of the American fleet turns out to be pointless;

ironing cent

General Gamelin issued "Personal and Secret Instruction No. 12", which opened with the following words: "Not wanting to interfere in the leadership of the ongoing battle, which is carried out by the commander of the North-Eastern Front, and approving all decisions made by him, I believe ..." ¹

A hypothetical "pendulum" plan to establish control over two oceans - the Pacific and the Indian - with the help of one aircraft carrier connection. Provided an exit

Great Britain out of the war and the use of Midway Atoll as a strategic outpost in the implementation of the "far blockade" of the Hawaiian Islands. (For more details, see S. Pereslegin, E. Pereslegina "Pacific Premiere").

² With the correct implementation of this scheme, the Combined Fleet retains its aircraft carriers; the predicted loss of the American side will be one aircraft carrier sunk and one two damaged. 463

the Pacific Ocean, the 16th and 17th OS return to Pearl Harbor - just at the moment when the Nagumo aircraft carriers finally approach Midway. The forecast of losses is almost the same as in the main version - with the exception that the Aleutian formation, forced to act isolated from the main forces for a long time, is at significant risk¹. The last possibility maximizes American losses: it is doubtful that in this option Fletcher and Spruance will be able to save even one of their aircraft carriers. We can agree with the calculations of mathematical expectations made by Ugaki and Genda during the headquarters game: Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown should cost Admiral Nagumo one sunk and one damaged aircraft carrier. This version of events is the worst for the Americans. Decipher enemy codes, deploy the fleet in advance, "catch" the enemy in a prepared "at home" option, be the first to detect the enemy and be the first to strike, have at your disposal all conceivable tactical advantages - from greater survivability of ships to the ability to interact with your base aviation, from the presence radar to the Catalina-built long-range warning system - and still lose the battle! Such an outcome could lead to a psychological "breakdown" even of the self-confident American leadership. "Marshall was demoralized, lost hope of winning - not like in a match, but, it seems, even in one game." *In all three "alternative versions" the Americans would develop a psychological "Midway complex" (similar to the one diagnosed in the Current Reality in the Japanese), but only in the last one could it lead to the creation of a "defeat scenario"*. In all variations, the nearest "moves" of the parties are predetermined. Yamamoto establishes a temporary base at Midway, taking on the inconvenience of regular raids by B-17 heavy bombers based in the Hawaiian Islands. The Americans are evacuating the Aleutian Islands and withdrawing ships from the South Seas. From this moment on, the communication line between the American continent and Australia is strategically "shadowed", and it is no longer possible to use it in the interests of the Allies.

possible: the first strategic consequences of a decisive defeat begin to appear.

In the United States, a crisis of confidence is inevitable. Of course, he will not have macroscopic political consequences, but Roosevelt will have to remove the entire
or 1

Probably, the "exchange" would have been repeated, similar to what happened in the Coral Sea: "Ryudze" and "Zunie" - on the "Hornet" and "Yorktown" (with the damaged "Enterprise").
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almost the entire leadership of the Pacific Fleet. It should be noted here that the elation with which the American sailors went into the general battle on June 4, 1942 was artificially caused by Nimitz and needed to be reinforced by real combat achievements. Defeat and the subsequent "purge" will return the fleet to a "post-Pearl Harbor" psychological state, and this time it will not be possible to cope with the decline with harmless and safe means (like a few successful lines from the new commander and "bite and run" tactics). While the American fleet remains idle, preoccupied with internal problems, Yamamoto will complete the creation of both blockade

lines: the outer defensive perimeter (Aleutians - Midway - Marshall Islands - Eastern Solomon Islands) and its branches to the southeast (Marshall Islands - Gilbert Islands - Fiji and / or Samoa). Now the covert penetration of American ships into the western sector of the Pacific Ocean is hardly possible: Japanese seaplanes patrolling along the blockade line observe Pearl Harbor itself and all communication lines between the Hawaiian Islands and Australia. The Pacific transport network is actually disintegrating, supplying Australia with oil and military equipment is drastically difficult. Under these conditions, the American command will have no other strategy than a counter-offensive in the northern operational direction in the Aleuts-Kuriles. The Japanese side will respond to this by increasing pressure in the center: the use of submarines and cruisers on the Pearl Harbor-San Diego line will be on the agenda. This will lead to the creation by the Americans of the "Hawaiian Express" and fierce naval battles, mainly at night.

This whole option is forced, and it is not clear how the American command can evade it. The defeat of the United States is not yet discussed here, but the defeat of Great Britain can already be put on the agenda. Moreover, if the anti-Hitler coalition is not (yet) experiencing a "tendency to disintegrate", then this cannot be said about the British Empire. The further development of events entirely depends on whether the command of the Combined Fleet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan will succeed in initiating negotiations between Germany and the USSR, using the prospect of dividing up the "British inheritance" as a "bait". If not, then the allies will win sooner or later, having almost completely spent the material resources of the United States and 1

Unless, of course, one does not seriously consider the suicidal strategy of Armageddon - to collect all the ships from both oceans, pour fuel into one end and go looking for a squadron battle with the Yamato and three divisions of aircraft carriers.
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human resources of Russia. Otherwise, in the world of 1942-1943, a kind of stalemate: neither side can destroy the other.

The American continent is apparently immune to invasion. Raiding operations against the US mother country are also unrealistic: the risk of falling under a crushing blow from base aviation is too great. On the other hand, the Americans cannot cover the Panama Canal area, and some difficulties arise with the defense of Alaska. It is generally impossible to hold the Hawaiian Islands: even if the Japanese do not go for a direct assault on Pearl Harbor, maintaining the San Diego-Honolulu communication line will be prohibitively expensive. So, by the end of 1943, the United States and possibly the United Kingdom are facing the "Axis" Berlin-Tokyo¹, with the neutrality of the Soviet Union. The opposing forces are separated by oceans, with the Allies dominating the Atlantic while the Combined Fleet controls the Pacific. Such an intercontinental war obviously does not have a positive goal for either side. It can continue - with varying degrees of success - for decades. Probably, it will be quickly transferred to the "cold" stage; in any case, it will be another war². Italy by the end of 1943 will in any case come out of the war. Of course, a developed industry will allow the United States to build

¹ not only a second Pacific Fleet (Essex-class aircraft carriers,

² South Dakota and Iowa-class battleships), but, probably, a third one already from ships with nuclear power plants. It is highly doubtful, however, that Congress will allow the military to sit idle while the enemy attacks Hawaii, Panama, Alaska. Therefore, new aircraft carriers will have to be brought into battle "as soon as they are ready" - with an obvious result. In any case, the loss of Midway puts the United States in front of the real prospect of a protracted and very costly war, which, even in the event of ultimate victory, will cost the American economy dearly. Can you be sure that the country's business circles will not put pressure on the government in favor of a compromise peace on acceptable terms? APPENDIX 10

Biographical index1 Antonescu Ion

[14.6.1882, Pitesti - 1.6.1946], dictator of Romania, general. Participated in the suppression of the uprising of 1907, as well as in the intervention in Hungary (1919). In 1933 Chief of the Romanian General Staff, from 1938 Minister of Defense. In September 1940 he became the dictator of Romania, joined Germany in the war against the USSR. After the uprising on August 23, 1944, he was arrested and, as a war criminal, was executed by the People's Tribunal of Bucharest. **Aosta** (Aosta) Prince Amadeus [1898-1942], Italian general, cousin of King Emmanuel of Italy. During the 2nd World War he was an Air Force General and Viceroy of Abyssinia. He led the invasion of British Somalia, but in 1941 Aosta's troops were defeated, and he himself surrendered. Placed in a POW camp in Kenya, where he died. **Arnim** Juergen von

[1889-1971], German colonel general. In the army since 1908, since 1919 in the Reichswehr, since 1922 in the General Staff. In the Polish campaign of 1939 he commanded an infantry division. He commanded a tank division, and from December 9, 1942, commander-in-chief of the Axis forces in Tunisia. May 12, 1943 was captured by the Allies along with the remnants of the Afrika Korps.

Bagramyan Ivan Khristoforovich [2.12.1897, Elizavetpol, Azerbaijan - 21.09.1982], Marshal of the Soviet Union (11.3.1955), Hero of the Soviet Union. Since 1915 in the army, he graduated from the school of ensigns (1917). 12.1920 joined the Red Army, a participant in the Civil War. He graduated from cavalry advanced training courses for commanders (1925), advanced training courses for senior officers (1931), the Frunze Military Academy (1934) and the Academy of the General Staff (1938). Since September 1940, the head of the operational department of the army and district headquarters. At the beginning of the war, the head of the operations department of the South-Western Front, the head of the operational group of the South-Western direction and the chief of staff of the South-Western Front. From July 1942 he commanded the army, from November 1943 the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, from April 1945 the troops

front. After the war, he commanded the troops of the Baltic Military District, from 1954 the chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense, in 1956-58 the head of the Military Academy of the General Staff, ¹ R. Ismailov. In the book: Liddell Hart "The Second World War". M., St. Petersburg, ACT, Terra fantastica, 2001. 467

since 1958 Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces. Since 1968 the general inspector of the group of general inspectors. **Badoglio** (Badoglio) Pietro [September 28, 1871, Grazzano Monferrato - October 31, 1956, ibid.], Italian statesman and military figure, marshal (1926). Member of the 1st World War. In 1919-21 Chief of the General Staff. In 1924-25 he was ambassador to Brazil. From 1925 Chief of the General Staff, at the same time in 1928-33 Governor-General of Libya, in 1935-36 Commander-in-Chief of Italian troops in the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36. After the defeat of Ethiopia - Viceroy of Ethiopia (1936-37). After the first defeats of the Italian troops in the Greek campaign (1940), he retired from the post of chief of staff. Participated in the coup d'état (25/07/1943), which led to the fall of the Mussolini regime, after which he was appointed prime minister. The Badoglio government declared war on Germany on 10/13/1943. Resigned 9/7/1944. **Bayerlein** Fritz [January 14, 1899—], German lieutenant general. Chief of Staff of the African Corps (1942). Commander of the 130th Panzer Division. He was awarded the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords (20.7.1944). **Beck** (Beck) Ludwig [June 29,

1880, Biebrich - July 20, 1944, Berlin], German Colonel General. Member of the 1st World War, chief of staff of the army, then served in the Reichswehr. Since 1933 he was the head of the military administration, since 1935 the chief of the general staff of the ground forces. In August 1938 he was dismissed. One of the leaders of the unsuccessful plot against Hitler in 1944, was arrested and committed suicide. **Bock** (Wax)

Fedor [December 3, 1880, Kustrin - May 3, 1945, Lensanne, Holstein], Field Marshal of the German Army (1940). Since 1912 he was an officer of the General Staff, a participant in the 1st World War. Member of the armistice commission in 1918, then served in the Reichswehr, monarchist, one of the organizers of the "black Reichswehr". From 1925 he commanded the 3rd Army Group. In 1938 he commanded the 8th Army during the Anschluss of Austria, then the 2nd Army Group during the occupation of the Sudetenland. Commander of Army Group North in the Polish campaign of 1939, Army Group B in the French campaign of 1940, and Army Group Center in the Russian campaign of 1941. In December 1941, he was removed from command for the defeat near Moscow. From January to July 1942 he commanded Army Group South, then was at the disposal of Hitler's headquarters. Died in an air raid.

Brauchitsch Walther von [October 4, 1881, Berlin - October 18, 1948, Hamburg], General Field Marshal of the German Army (1940). 468

In the army since 1900. Member of the 1st World War in staff positions, then served in the Reichswehr. From 1932 he was an inspector general of artillery, from 1933 he commanded the 1st military district, from 1935 - the 1st army corps, from 1937 - the 4th army group. On February 4, 1938, after the dismissal of General V. Fritsch, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the ground forces. After the failure of the attack on Moscow, he was transferred to the reserve on December 19, 1941. In 1945, he surrendered to British troops and died in

a POW hospital. **Brooke**, Alanbrooke (Brooke, Alanbrooke) Alan Francis [7/23/1883, Bagneres-de-Bigorre, France - 6/17/1963, Hartley-Whitney, Hampshire], English field marshal (1944), Viscount Brookborough (1946). Member of the 1st World War. At the beginning of World War II, he led the air defense of Britain. In 1940 he commanded the 2nd Army Corps in France and in the Dunkirk area. Since July 1940 the commander of the troops of the metropolis. From December 1941 to 1946, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was a military adviser to Prime Minister Churchill at international conferences. From 1946 retired.

Bradley Omar Nelson (February 12, 1893, Clark, Missouri - April 8, 1981, New York), American army general (1950). He graduated from the US Military Academy at West Point (1915), taught tactics in military schools. During the 2nd World War, in 1943 - Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in North Africa; in the Tunisian and Sicilian operations he commanded the 2nd corps; in 1944 - the 1st American Army in the Normandy operation. From August 1944 - commander of the 12th Army Group in Europe. From 1947 to 1949 he was Chief of Staff of the US Army, and from 1949 to 1953 he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NATO Military Committee. Since August 1953 retired. **Bush** (Busch)

Ernst [07/06/1885, Bochum - 07/17/1945, Nottinghamshire], German Field Marshal General (1943). Member of the 1st World War, then served in the Reichswehr. From 1938 he commanded the 8th Army Corps, with which he participated in the Polish campaign of 1939. From October 1939 he commanded the 16th Army during the French campaign and on the Soviet-German front. Since November 1943, the commander of Army Group Center, after the defeat in Belarus in August 1944, was transferred to the reserve. From March 1945 he commanded a grouping of German troops in the North-West.

Germany. Died in captivity in

England. **Vian** Philippe Louis [1894–1968], British Admiral of the Fleet. On February 15, 1940, the destroyer Kossak under his command locked the German auxiliary cruiser Altmark with British prisoners on board from Norway. In 1941 he led a formation of destroyers attacking Bismarck. Knighted 1942.

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Vandergrift Alexander Archer [March 13, 1887, Charlottesville, Wyoming - May 8, 1973, Bethesda, Maryland], American general (March 1945). Called up as a junior lieutenant in the Marine Corps in 1909. Participated in hostilities in Nicaragua, Haiti and China. During the 2nd World War, he commanded the Marine Corps, from 1942 - Major General. From November 1943 commander of the 1st Naval Amphibious Corps on the Bougainville Islands. Retired since 1948. **Vasilevsky** Alexander Mikhailovich [30.9.1896, p. New Golchikha of the Komstomskaya province, - 12/5/1977], Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union (2/16/1943), twice Hero of the Soviet Union. He graduated from the Alekseevsky military school (1915), participated in the 1st World War, graduated from it with the rank of staff captain. Member of the Civil War in the Red Army. He graduated from the Academy of the General Staff (1937), from May 1940 deputy chief, from August 1941 chief of the Operations Directorate, deputy and first deputy chief of the General Staff. From June 1942 Chief of the General Staff and Deputy. Defense Commissar. In February 1945, he was introduced to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, conducted an operation to capture Koenigsberg and East Prussia. In June 1945 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East and led them in the Japanese campaign of 1945. deputy and deputy defense minister. Since January 1959 at the nomenklatura work in the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. **Vatutin** Nikolai Fedorovich [12/16/1901, p. Cherepukhino, Kursk region - 04/15/1944], Army General (2.1943), Hero of the Soviet Union (05/06/1965). He graduated from the Poltava Infantry School (1922), the Kyiv Higher United School (1924), the Frunze Military Academy (1929), the operational department of the same academy (1934) and the Academy of the General Staff (1937). Prior to the start of the Great Patriotic War, he was chief of staff of a division, deputy chief of staff of the Kyiv military district, chief of the operational department of the General Staff. From July 1941 to May 1942 he was chief of staff of the Northwestern Front, in May-July 1942 he was deputy chief of the General Staff and authorized headquarters on the Bryansk Front. Then he commanded the troops of the fronts: Voronezh (July-October 1942, March-October 1943), South-Western (October 1942-March 1943), 10th Ukrainian (October 1943-March 1944). Died after a severe wound. Buried in Kyiv. **Weichs** Maximilian von [12.11.1881, Dassau, -27.9.1954], German General Field

Marshal (1943). Varmis 1900, served in the cavalry, participant in the 1st World War, then served 470

in the Reichswehr. From 1933 he commanded a cavalry (from 1935 tank) division, from 1937 - the 13th Army Corps. From October 1939 - commander of the 2nd Army, participated in the French and Balkan campaigns and in the war against the USSR. From July 1942 commander of Army Group B, from August 1943 - Army Group F and the German troops of the southeast (Balkans). He widely used anti-aircraft artillery in ground battles, for which he received the nickname "anti-aircraft general". Since March 1945 in reserve rates. In 1945-48 he was in an American prison for war crimes. **Victor**

Emmanuel III (Vittorio Emanuele) [11/11/1869-12/28/1947], the last king of Italy (1900-46). He supported the establishment of Mussolini's dictatorship (1922). In 1943, under the threat of mass unrest, he removed him from power. On June 5, 1944, he transferred the royal functions to his son Umyerto, as the royal governor, and on March 9, 1946, he abdicated and left the country. **Witzig** Rudolf [8/14/1916, Rohlinghausen, Westphalia, -?], German paratrooper, colonel (10/18/1965). In the army since 1935, promoted to lieutenant 20/4/1937, platoon commander. Since 1938 in the parachute troops of the army (then transferred to the Luftwaffe). For the capture of Fort Eben-Emael (10.5.1940) in the French campaign of 1940 he was awarded a knight's cross. In 1942 with a regiment of paratroopers in Tunisia, 24.3.1942 - major. In 1944 he commanded a battalion, then a regiment of paratroopers. Surrendered on May 8, 1945. After the war he served in the Bundeswehr. Retired September 30, 1974. **Voronov** Nikolai Nikolaevich [5.5.1899, St. Petersburg - 28.2.1968, Moscow]. Chief Marshal of Artillery (1944), Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Red Army since 1918, participated in the Civil War. Graduated from the Frunze Military Academy (1930). Since 1934, the head of the 1st Leningrad Artillery School. Participated in the war in Spain 1936-37. In 1937–41 he was chief of artillery in the Red Army, deputy chief of the Main Artillery Directorate, and head of the air defense directorate. From July 1941 to March 1943 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Chief of Artillery of the Red Army, from March 1943 to March 1950 Comma

From 1950 to 1953 he was president of the Academy of Artillery Sciences, from 1953 to 1958 he was head of the Military Artillery Command Academy, from 1958 he worked as a nomenklatura in the USSR

Ministry of Defense. **Halifax** Edward Frederick Lindley Wood (born April 16, 1881, Powderham, Dorsetshire - December 23, 1959, York), English statesman, Baron Irwin (1925). Member of Parliament since 1910 from the Conservative Party. In 1922–24 and 1932–35 he was Minister of Education, in 1924–25 he was Minister of Agriculture. From 1926 to 1931 he was Viceroy of India. In 1935–37 - Lord Privy Seal, in 1935 - 471

38 - Leader of the House of Lords and Deputy Prime Minister. In 1938–40 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1941–46 Ambassador to the USA. From 1947 to 1953 he was chairman of the advisory board of the BBC Broadcasting

Company. **Halder** (Haider) Franz [June 20, 1884, Würzburg, - 1971], German Colonel General (1940). In the army since 1902, graduated from the Bavarian Military Academy (1914), participant in the 1st World War. From 1936 in the General Staff of the Ground Forces, from October 1937, from February 1938 - the first Chief Quartermaster. From September 1938 to September 1942 Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. He supervised the work of the headquarters in the Polish campaign of 1939, the French campaign of 1940, the Balkan campaign of 1941, as well as in the campaigns against the USSR in 1941 and 1942. Due to the failure of the German strategy, he was dismissed in the fall of 1942, and in January 1945 he was dismissed. In 1945–46, an American prisoner, he participated in the writing of military-historical works. Author of the pamphlet Hitler as a Commander (1949), as well as the three-volume War Diary (1962–

64), containing important data on the history of World War II. **Gamelin** Maurice Gustave [September 20, 1872, Paris - April 18, 1958, Paris], French general. He graduated from the military school of Saint-Cyr (1893) and the staff college (1899). During World War I, he was Joffre's secretary and commanded a brigade and a division. In 1925–28 he was commander of French troops in Syria and deputy high commissar; he crushed an uprising in Syria (1925–27). In 1931–35 and 1938–39 - Chief of the General Staff, in 1935–40 Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Military Council. Since September 3, 1939 - Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in France. On May 19, 1940, he was replaced by General M. Weigan. In September 1940 he was arrested and convicted at the Riom trial of the perpetrators of the defeat (1942). The process was undertaken by the government of A. Pétain in order to justify itself. In 1943 he was

taken to Germany by the Nazis, and was in a concentration camp until the end of the war.

Goebbels Josef Paul [October 29, 1897, Reidt - May 1, 1945, Berlin], one of the leaders of the Nazi Party. He joined it in 1922. In 1927–33 he was the publisher of the newspaper Angriff. In 1928 he headed the work of conducting propaganda. From 1933 - Imperial Minister of Public Education and Propaganda. In 1944, he was the imperial commissioner for total military mobilization. After the entry of Soviet troops into Berlin, **Gepner** Erich [1886, - 8.4.1944], a German general, committed suicide. He commanded the 16th Panzer Corps during the invasion of Poland. Dismissed for differences with Hitler (1941). Participated in a conspiracy of officers (1944), after the failure of the conspiracy, he was arrested and shot. 472

Goering (Goring) Hermann [12.1.1893, Rohenheim, Bavaria, -15.10.1946, Nuremberg], German Reich Marshal of Aviation (1940), one of the Nazi criminals. Participated in the 1st World War, was a pilot. Since 1922, a member of the NSDAP (fascist party), the head of the SA (assault detachments). As Hitler's political plenipotentiary (since 1930) and chairman of the Reichstag (since August 1932), he played an active role in Hitler's rise to power in 1933, after which he became imperial aviation minister and head of the Prussian government. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force from 1935, head of the Goering concern (since 1937). One of the organizers of the Nazi terror in the countries occupied by Germany. At the Nuremberg trials of 1946, with the help of clever demagoguery, he managed to divert a significant part of the charges from himself, was sentenced to death, and committed suicide before the execution. **Himmler**

Heinrich [October 7, 1900, Munich - May 23, 1945, Lüneburg], one of the leaders of the Nazi Party. Participated in the coup in November 1923. Since 1929 - the head of the SS. From 1933 he served as chief of the political police in Munich, Bavaria and then throughout Germany (since 1936 chief of the Gestapo). Since 1943 - Imperial Minister of the Interior, since 1944 commander of the reserve army. One of the organizers of terror, the system of concentration camps, the mass extermination of the local population in the occupied territories. After the surrender of Germany in 1945, he tried to escape, but was arrested. Committed suicide. **Adolf Hitler** (April 20, 1889, Braunau, Austria - April 30, 1945, Berlin), leader of the German National Socialist Party (fascist), head of the Nazi state (1933–45), chief war criminal. Adolf's father Alois Schicklgruber changed his surname to Hitler in 1876 (Hitler sometimes used the old surname as a pseudonym). Since 1913, Hitler lived in Munich, during the 1st World War he was a corporal in

German army. In 1919, one of the organizers, and in 1920 the head (Führer) of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany. On November 8-9, 1923, together with General E. Ludendorff, he attempted a fascist coup in Munich, which ended in failure (Hitler went to prison). In the future, using National Socialist demagoguery and revanchist sentiments, he created a massive support among the population. On January 30, 1933, President P. Hindenburg appointed him Chancellor of the Reich. After the death of Hindenburg, Hitler concentrated all legislative and executive power in his hands, uniting the posts of Reich Chancellor and President (August 1934). Subsequently, the Hitler government turned Germany into a base for world expansion. Fascist Germany took part in the war against the Spanish Republic (1936-39). carried out the Anschluss (accession) of Austria 473

(1938), occupied Czechoslovakia (1938-39), and, having put together a bloc of allies, unleashed World War II (1939-45). In 1945, when Soviet troops entered Berlin, Hitler committed suicide.

Govorov Leonid

Alexandrovich [February 22, 1897, Butyrki, now the Kirov Region, - March 19, 1955, Moscow], Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944), Hero of the Soviet Union. In the army since 1916, graduated from the Konstantinovsky Artillery School (1917). In October 1918 he was mobilized with the rank of second lieutenant in the Kolchak army. In January 1920 he joined the Red Army. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy (1933) and the General Staff Academy (1938). Participated in the Soviet-Finnish war as chief of staff of artillery of the 7th army, then deputy inspector general of artillery. Since 22/7/1941 the chief of artillery of the Western direction, then the Reserve Front. From October 18, 1941 he commanded the 5th Army, from April 25, 1942 he commanded the Leningrad Group of Forces, and from June 1942 to May 1945 the troops of the Leningrad Front (in February-March 1945, he simultaneously commanded the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front). After the war, commander of the Leningrad Military District, chief inspector of the ground forces, since 1948 commander of the air

defense forces and deputy minister of war. **Golikov** Filipp Ivanovich [July 30, 1900, Borisovo, now the Kurgan Region,—?], Marshal of the Soviet Union (1961). In the Red Army from 1918, graduated from the Frunze Military Academy (1933). In 1939 he commanded the 6th Army, which participated in the annexation of western Ukraine to the USSR. From July 1940 Deputy Chief of the General Staff. From October 1941 he commanded the 10th Army, from February 1942 - the 4th Shock Army, from April 1942 - the Bryansk Front, and from July 1942 - the Voronezh Front. In August-October 1942, commander of the 1st Guards Army and deputy commander of the South-Eastern and North-Western fronts. From October 1942 he commanded the Voronezh Front. From April 1943 - head of the main personnel department and from October 1944 - at the same time temporarily authorized by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for repatriation. In 1950-56 - in command positions. In 1956-58 he was the head of the Military Academy of Armored Forces. In 1958-62 he was the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Since May 1962 - at nomenclature work in the Ministry of Defense. **Gaulle** Charles de [11/22/1890, Lille, -11/9/1970, Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises], French military and statesman, brigadier general (1940). He studied at the military school of Saint Cyr and later at the Higher Military School in Paris. Member of the 1st World War. Until 1937 he was mainly engaged in teaching and staff activities. From the first days of the 2nd World War, the command 474

did in the rank of colonel tank units of the 5th French army, and in May 1940, during the fighting on the river. Somme, led the 4th Armored Division. July 5 became Deputy Minister of National Defense. After the German troops entered Paris (June 14) and the Pétain government came to power (June 16), Gaulle left for Great Britain, from where he led the Free French movement. In June 1944, chairman of the Provisional Government of the French Republic. December 10, 1944 signed in Moscow the Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and France. In January 1946 he resigned as head of state. Since 1947, he led the party "Unification of the French people" created by him. Having announced in 1953 the dissolution of this party, he temporarily retired from political activity. In May 1958, during the Algerian crisis, the majority of the parliament supported the return of Gaulle to power. On June 1, 1958, the National Assembly approved the composition of the government headed by him. In September, a new constitution was prepared, and on December 21, Gaulle became president of the French Republic. On December 18, 1965, he was re-elected for a new 7-year term, but after losing the referendum on April 27, 1969 (on the reorganization of the Senate and the reform of the territorial administrative structure of France), he resigned as president. **Gormley**

(Ghornley) Robert Lee [1883, - 1953], American vice admiral. Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (1940). From May 12, 1942 to October 18, 1942, Commander of the South Pacific. After which he was part of the headquarters of Admiral King. 12/15/1944 assigned to the United Navy in Europe. After the war, an observer for the disarmament of the German Navy. Resigned 1947.

Gort John Standish Syurte Prendergast Werker, Viscount [1886-1946], British general. Commander of the British Expeditionary Force in France (1939-40). Commanded the evacuation of his forces from Dunkirk. **Hoth** Hermann [April 12, 1895, Neuruppin - January 25, 1971, Goslar], German general. Member of the 1st World War (in the cavalry). He commanded a tank corps in the Polish 1939 and French campaigns of 1940, the 3rd Panzer Group in the 1941 campaign against Russia, the 4th Panzer Army in the 1942 campaign, and the new 4th Panzer Army in the Battle of Kursk 1943. Removed from his post for defeat. In April 1945 he was appointed commander of the defensive area in the Ore Mountains, was taken prisoner by the Americans. Sentenced to 15 years by the Nuremberg Tribunal, released in 1954. After the war, he wrote the book Tank Operations. **Graziani** Rodolfo [born August 11, 1882, in Filettino - January 11, 1955, in Rome], Italian marshal (1937). In 1930-34 - Vice-Governor of Key 475

Renaiki, in 1935 governor of Italian Somalia. For participation in the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1936-37 (commander of the Southern Army), he received the rank of marshal and the title of Marquis Negelli. In 1936-37 Viceroy of Ethiopia. In 1939-40 he was Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces. From June 1940 - Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Forces in North Africa. After the defeat at Mersa, Matruh was fired. During the German occupation of Italy (1943-45), B. Mussolini, Minister of War of the puppet "Italian Social Republic", led the fight against the partisans. In 1950 he was sentenced to 19 years in prison, but amnestied the same year. From 1952 he was honorary president of the neo-fascist party Italian Social Movement. **Guderian** Heinz Wilhelm [June 17, 1888, Kulm, now Chelmno, Poland - May 15, 1954, Schwangau, Bavaria], German Colonel General (1940), military theorist. He graduated from the military school (1907) and the military academy (1914). During the 1st World War in staff positions, after the war - in the Reichswehr, since 1922 in the automotive troops. In 1935-38 he was commander of a tank division and an army corps. In 1938-39 he commanded mobile troops. At the beginning of World War II he commanded a tank corps (1939-40), from June 1940 - the 2nd tank group, from October 1941 - the 2nd tank army. In December 1941, for the defeat near Moscow, he was removed from his post and expelled to the reserve. Since March 1943 inspector general of tank troops. From July 1844 to March 1845 - Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. Captured by the Americans and soon released. In the 50s, he advocated the restoration of pre-war borders and the military power of Germany as a bulwark against communism. Author of the books "Attention - tanks!" (1937) and "Armored Forces and Their Interaction with Other Arms" (1937), as well as the memoir "Tanks - Forward" (1957). **Darlan** (Darlan) Jean Louis Xavier [7.8.1881, Nerak, - 24.12.1942, Alfir], French naval commander, admiral of the fleet (1939). In the Navy since 1902, a participant in the 1st World War. From December 1936 Chief of the Naval General Staff. From August 1939 Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. After the defeat of France during the French campaign in June 1940 Minister of Marine in the government of Petain. Since February 1941 - Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the Vichy government, Minister of Defense, Foreign and Internal Affairs. From April 1942 - Commander-in-Chief of the Vichy Armed Forces. After the landing of the Anglo-American troops in North Africa in November 1942, he ordered the French troops to stop resisting the Allies, and then to join the French armed forces in the fight against the Axis powers. 12/14/1942 declared himself High Commissioner of France in North Africa and formed the Council of State. Killed by the French

nationalist. 476

Dowding Hugh Caswell Tremenhir, Baron Bentley (1943) [1882, - 1970], British Air Chief Marshal (1936). Member of the 1st World War in aviation, commanded the corps of the British Air Force in France. Since 1939, the head of the British Fighter Command, led him during the Battle of Britain. Due to disagreements with Churchill and other political leaders removed in November 1940. Retired since 1942. **Dempsey** (Dempsey) Miles, sir [1896, - 1969], English lieutenant general. In 1939-40 he commanded an infantry brigade in France, and from June 1941 a tank division. In 1943 he commanded the 13th Corps in Sicily and Italy. During the landing of the Allies in Normandy (1944) and the subsequent offensive of the Allies, he commanded the 2nd British Army. Then the commander-in-chief of the allied forces in Southeast Asia, he held this post until the end of the war. **Doenitz** (Donitz) Karl [16.9.1891, Grünau, near Berlin, -24.12.1980], German Grand Admiral (1943). In 1936-43 he commanded the submarine fleet, from 1/30/1943 commander-in-chief of the Navy. On May 1, 1945, according to Hitler's will, he succeeded him as Reich Chancellor and Supreme Commander, and on May 2-5 formed a new "imperial government" in Mürwik Flensburg. On May 23, he was arrested by British troops and in October 1946 was sentenced by the Nuremberg Tribunal to 10 years in prison as a war criminal. Released in 1956, he was active in politics in Germany.

Dietl Eduard [1890–1944], German general. He joined the NSDAP in 1920. In 1939 he commanded the 3rd mountain division, with which he participated in the Polish and Norwegian campaigns. During the 1941 campaign in the USSR, he headed the mountain corps. Then he commanded all German troops in Lapland. Died in a plane crash. **Dietrich** Joseph ("Sepp") [May 28, 1882, the village of Havangen, Swabia, - April 21, 1966, Ludeburg], German Colonel General of the SS Obergruppenführer (8.1944). Member of the 1st World War, ended the war in tank troops. After the war, the "green" police. He took part in the "Beer Putsch" on November 9, 1923, joined the NSDAP and the SS. From 1930 he was a member of the Reichstag, and at the end of 1931 he received the rank of SS Gruppenführer. He organized the life standard "Adolf Hitler", with which he participated in the Anschluss of Austria (1938), the campaign against the Sudetenland (1938), the Polish (1939) and French (1940) campaigns, as well as the 1941 campaigns in Yugoslavia, Greece and the USSR. On July 27, 1943, he commanded the 1st SS Panzer Corps, and at the end of September 1944, the 6th Panzer Army, which later became the 6th SS Panzer Army. Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and Diamonds (1944). Surrendered to the Americans on May 8, 1945. Sentenced to 25 years imprisonment, 477

however, he was already released on 10/22/1946. However, for participation in the "purge" of 1934 (destruction of the SA), he was again imprisoned on August 7, 1958 for a year and a half, but in January

1959 he was released for health reasons. **Doolittle** James Harold ("Jimmy") (12/14/1896, Alameda, California - 9/27/1993, Pebble Beach, California), American aviator and lieutenant general (1944). He graduated from Youth College in Los Angeles (1916) and the University of California School of Mines (1917). In the army since 1917, he became a pilot and instructor. After the war, he remained in the Air Force, in 1920 he was promoted to lieutenant, while studying at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Retired since 1930, however, and after that he took part in aircraft competitions, in 1932 he set a speed record. With the beginning of the 2nd World War, he returned to the Air Force. April 28, 1942 led a raid on Tokyo. For this raid, Doolittle was promoted to brigadier general, and soon to major general. In 1944-45 he commanded the 8th Air Army. **Zhukov** Georgy

Konstantinovich [December 1, 1896, vil. Strelkovka, Kaluga region, - 18.6.1974, Moscow], Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1.18.1943), four times Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic. Member of the CPSU since 1919. Since 1915 in the army, participant in the 1st World War, junior non-commissioned officer in the cavalry. Member of the Civil War 1918-20, platoon and squadron commander. He graduated from cavalry courses (1920), advanced training courses for cavalry commanders (1925) and senior officers (1930). He commanded a cavalry regiment, brigade, division, corps, was an assistant inspector of the Red Army cavalry and deputy commander of the Belarusian Special Military District. In 1939 he defeated the Japanese troops on the river. Khalkhin Gol (Mongolia). From June 1940 he commanded the troops of the Kyiv Special Military District. From the end of January 1940 to July 30, 1941, Chief of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Member of the 2nd World War, the defense of Moscow (winter 1941), the defense of Stalingrad (autumn 1942), the breaking of the blockade of Leningrad (1943), the Battle of Kursk (1943), the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine (March-May 1944), the Vistula- Oder operation and the capture of Berlin (November 1944-May 1945). May 8, 1945 accepted the surrender of Germany. After the war, he was commander-in-chief of a group of Soviet troops in Germany and chief of the Soviet administration (June 1945-March 1946), commander-in-chief of the ground forces and deputy minister of the armed forces (March-June 1946). From 1946 to 1953 he commanded the troops of the Odessa and Ural military districts. From March 1953 - 1st Deputy Minister, and from February 1955 to October 1957 - Minister of Defense of the USSR. Retired since March 1958. **Eremenko** Andrei Ivanovich [October 14, 1892, the village of Markovka, - 19.11. 1970, Moscow], Marshal of the Soviet Union (1955), Hero of the Soviet 478

th Union. In the army since 1913, participated in the 1st World War as a private. In the Red Army since 1918, a participant in the Civil War. Graduated from the Frunze Military Academy (1935). Participated in the annexation of Western Ukraine (1939) as a commander of a cavalry corps. From August to October 1941 he commanded the Bryansk Front, then the 4th Shock Army (December 1941-February 1942), the South-Eastern, Stalingrad and Southern Fronts (August 1942-February 1943), the Kalinin Front (April-October 1943), 1- m Baltic Front (October-November 1943), Separate Primorye Army (February-April 1944), 2nd Baltic Front (April 1944-February 1945) and 4th Ukrainian (March-May 1945). After the war, commander of the Carpathian, West Siberian and North Caucasian military districts (1945-58). Since 1958, Inspector General of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. **Jodl** Alfred [May 10, 1890, Würzburg - October 16, 1946, Nuremberg], German Colonel General (1944). Member of the 1st World War, then served in staff positions in the Reichswehr, was the head of the country's defense department. From August 1939 to May 1945 - Chief of Staff of the OKW. On May 7, 1945, on behalf of Doenitz, he signed the general surrender of Germany. Was

brought to trial as a war criminal, October 1, 1946 sentenced to death by the international military tribunal in Nuremberg and hanged. Hugo **Cavaliere**, Count [October 20, 1880, Cassade Monferrato - October 12, 1943, Rome], Italian marshal (1942). Member of the 1st World War, in 1917 he received the rank of brigadier general. He headed the Italian delegation at the negotiations in Versailles. Retired in 1920, after Mussolini came to power (1922), he took the post of freelance secretary of the military ministry. He returned to the army in 1937 and was appointed commander-in-chief of the Italian forces in East Africa. Then chairman of the coordinating committee of the Italo-German pact in Berlin. In 1940 he replaced Badoglio as chief of staff. Left from 4.2.1943. Shot himself. **Canaris** Friedrich Wilhelm [January 1, 1887, Aplerbeck, near Dortmund - April 9, 1945, Flossenbürg camp], German admiral (1940). In the Navy since 1905. During World War I he served on the Dresden cruiser, after the sinking of which he was (1915) interned in Chile. In 1916 he was sent by German intelligence to Spain. After the November Revolution of 1918 in Germany, he was adjutant to the Minister of War G. Noske. Member of the "Kapp Putsch" (1920). Then he served in the Navy. Since 1935, the head of military intelligence and counterintelligence ("Abwehr") at the Ministry of War, and since 1938 at the supreme command of the armed forces. Created a wide spy network. In February 1944 he was dismissed. Took part

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tie in the conspiracy of the generals against Hitler (1944), was arrested and hanged. **Cunningham** Sir Alan Gordon [May 1, 1887, Dublin - January 30, 1983, Royal Tunbridge Wells, Kent], British general (1945). In the army since 1906. From November 1940 he took command of the British troops in Kenya. In February 1941, he undertook a raid against Italian Somalia and captured the ports of Kisimayo and Mogadishu, pushing the Italians into the mountains, and on April 6, 1941 entered the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. May 20, 1941, together with General Platt, moving from the north, accepted the surrender of Italian troops at Amba Alagi. In August 1941 he took command of the 8th Army in Egypt. Failures in the November offensive led Cunningham to leave command and return to England. Knighted in 1941. After the war, chief commissar in Palestine (1945-48). **Quisling** Vidkun [7/18/1887, Furesdal village, Telemark, - 10/24/1945, Oslo], leader of the Norwegian fascists. Received a military education, major in the Norwegian army. In April-December 1918 the military attaché was in Petrograd, and from October 1920 to May 1921 in Helsinki. In 1931-33 he was minister of war. In May 1933 he organized the National Association party. He contributed to the occupation of Norway during the Norwegian campaign of 1940. On February 1, 1942, he became prime minister of the puppet government of Norway. After the liberation of Norway, he was shot by sentence

Norwegian court.

Wilhelm **Keitel** (September 22, 1882, Helmscherode - October 16, 1946, Nuremberg), German Field Marshal General (1940). Warmiis 1901, participant in the 1st World War, later served in the Reichswehr. In 1935-38 he was the head of the military-political department of the military ministry. From February 4, 1938 to May 8, 1945, he was commander-in-chief of the OKW. After the assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944, he was a member of the "officers' court". 8/5/1945 signed the act of unconditional surrender of Germany. At the Nuremberg military tribunal sentenced to death as a war criminal and

hanged.

Kesselring (Kesselring) Albert [20.11.1885, Markstedt - 16.7.1960, Bad Nauheim], German Field Marshal (1940). In 1936-37 - Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. From February 1938 he commanded the 1st air fleet, participated in the Polish campaign of 1939. From 1940 he commanded the 2nd air fleet during the French campaign, the Battle of England, and also in the summer campaign of 1941 against the USSR. From December 1941 - Commander-in-Chief of the German Forces of the Southwest (Mediterranean), from March to May 1945 - Commander-in-Chief of the German Forces of the West. In October 1947, as a war criminal, he was sentenced by a British military tribune.

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scrap to the death penalty, which was commuted to life imprisonment. Released in October 1952. He was an honorary member of revanchist societies in Germany. **Kimmel** (Kimmel) Husband Edward [1882, Henderson, Kentucky - 14.5.1968], American admiral. Commander of the American Pacific Fleet from February to December 1941. Removed from command after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Ernst Joseph King (11/23/1878, Lorain, Ohio - 6/25/1956, Portsmouth, New Hampshire), Admiral of the US Navy (1944). He graduated from the naval school (1901), military college (1933). In World War I, he commanded a destroyer, a destroyer division, and was assistant chief of staff of the Atlantic Fleet. After the war, he commanded a submarine division, a submarine base, the Lexington aircraft carrier, and was head of the aeronautics bureau. In 1936-41 he commanded reconnaissance and then base aviation of the US Navy, was a member of the General Council of the Naval Ministry. From February 1941 he commanded the Atlantic Fleet. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the US Navy. 03/26/1942 - 12/15/1945, as directed

President of the United States, combined this position with the position of Chief of Naval Operations. He was a member of the American Chiefs of Staff and the Anglo-American Joint Staff. By his decision, the command of anti-submarine forces was created: it received the name "10th Fleet", which was also commanded by King. Retired from November 1945. **Kinkeid** Thomas Kassin [April 3, 1888, Hanover, New Shempshire - November 17, 1972, Bethesda, Maryland], American Rear Admiral. Graduated from the Naval Academy (1908). He was commander of the cruiser Indianapolis, after which he was sent as a naval attaché to Rome and Belgrade. At the beginning of 1941 he commanded a formation of cruisers in the Pacific Ocean, replaced Admiral Fletcher as commander of an aircraft carrier formation (1942). Commander of the 7th Fleet, North Pacific Forces (1943). After the war in staff positions. **Kleist** (Kleist) Paul Ludwig (Ewald) von [8/8/1881, Braunfels-on-Lahn, - 10/15/1954, a concentration camp in the USSR], German field marshal general (1943). In the army since 1900, graduated from the Academy of the General Staff (1913), participant in the 1st World War. Then he served in the Reichswehr in the cavalry. During the 2nd World War, he successively commanded a tank division, a group, an army, and from November 22, 1942, Army Group A. In 1944 he was dismissed for defeat and disagreement with Hitler's position. At the end of the war he was taken prisoner by the British and in 1946, as a war criminal, he was transferred to Yugoslavia, and then to the USSR. He spent the rest of his life in a concentration camp.

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Kluge Hans Günther [September 30, 1882, Posen, now Poznan - August 19, 1944, near Metz], German Field Marshal (1940). In the service since 1901. He graduated from the Military Academy (1912). Member of the 1st World War in staff positions, after the war - in the Reichswehr. From 1933 to 1939 he was chief of the communications troops, commander of a military district, and commander of an army corps. Participated in the Anschluss of Austria and the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Since 1939 he commanded the 4th field army, which took part in the Polish campaign of 1939, the French campaign of 1940 and the 1941 campaign in the USSR. In the battle of Moscow, the 4th Army was defeated. On December 19, 1941, he commanded the Army Group Center, treated prisoners of war and the population of the occupied Soviet territory with barbaric cruelty. From November 1943 he was in the headquarters reserve, from July to August 1944 he was commander of Army Group D. He was associated with the participants in the conspiracy against Hitler, but at the decisive moment did not support them. Committed suicide. **Koga** Mineichi [9.1885–4.1944], Japanese admiral. He graduated from the naval school (1906), the naval academy (1917). He was an officer at the headquarters of the squadron, naval attaché at the Japanese embassy in France, commander of the Aoba cruiser, then the battleship Ise, a training squadron, deputy chief of the naval general staff, commander of the Yokosuka naval region. From April 1943 Commander-in-Chief of

the Japanese Combined Fleet. Died in a plane crash. **Kondo** Nobutake [1856–1953], Japanese Vice Admiral He commanded a Japanese unit in the operation to oust the British fleet from the Indian Ocean (April 1942), then a landing unit intended to capture the Aleutian Islands. In battle 11/15/1942 at about. The Guadalcanal compound under his command was

defeated. **Konev** Ivan Stepanovich [December 28, 1897, the village of Lodeyno, Kirov Region, - May 21, 1973, Moscow], Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union (February 20, 1944), twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Czechoslovakia and Hero of the MPR. Member of the CPSU since 1918.

Drafted into the army in 1916, participant in World War I and the Civil War of 1918–20. In 1921 he participated in the liquidation of the Kronstadt rebellion. They will finish courses for senior command personnel at the Military Academy (1926). He commanded a regiment (until 1930), then a division (until 1932). Graduated from the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze (1934). In

1934-40 commander of a rifle division, corps, commander of the 2nd Separate Red Banner

Far Eastern Army. In 1940-41 he commanded the troops of the Trans-Baikal and North Caucasian military districts. In 1941 he commanded the 19th Army, then he was the commander of the fronts of the Western (9.41-10.10.4

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8.43), Northwestern (3.43-6.43), Steppe (7.43-4.44), 1st Ukrainian (5.44-5.45). In 1945–46 he was Commander of the Central Group of Forces and High Commissioner for Austria. From 1946 to 1950 he was Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In 1950-51 he was the chief inspector of the Soviet Army, in 1951-55 he was the commander of the Carpathian military district, in 1955-56 he was the 1st deputy minister of defense and at the same time commander in chief of the Ground Forces. From May 1955 to June 1960 he simultaneously served as Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact. 1961-62 - Commander-in-Chief of a group of Soviet troops in Germany, from April 1962 - General Inspector of the group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. **Konoë** Fumimaro,

Prince [10/12/1891, Kyoto - 12/16/1945, Tokyo], Japanese statesman. In 1933-37 he was chairman of the House of Peers. From June 1937 to January 1939 and from July 1940 to October 1941 - Prime Minister. After the dissolution of political parties (1940) was

organizer and first president of the Throne Relief Association. In September 1940, the Konoe government signed the Berlin Pact with Germany and Italy. After the surrender of Japan (1945) he committed suicide. **Cruwell** Ludwig [1892–

1953], German general. Member of the 1st World War, then served in the Reichswehr. Promoted to major general in December 1939, commanded a tank division. In 1941 he was appointed commander of the African Corps. In 1942 he was shot down and captured by the British during a reconnaissance flight. **Kuchler** (Kuchler) Georg von

[May 30, 1881, Germersheim, - 1969], German Field Marshal General (June 30, 1942). In the army since 1900. Promoted to lieutenant in 1910, in 1910-13 he studied at the Academy of the General Staff. Participated in the 1st World War, then in the Reichswehr. In 1934 he was promoted to major general. Since 1937 commander of the 1st military district. During the Polish campaign of 1939 he commanded the 3rd Army, in the French campaign of 1940 and the 1941 campaign in Russia - the 18th Army. From 17.1.1942 commander of the Army Group "North". January 31, 1944 retired. Sentenced by the Nuremberg Tribunal to 25 years in prison. Released in February 1955. **Leeb** Wilhelm

Josef Franz [September 5, 1876, Landsberg am Lech - April 29, 1956, Hohenschwangau], German Field Marshal General (1940). In the army since 1895, graduated from the Bavarian Military Academy (1903). Member of the 1st World War, from 1919 in the Reichswehr. In 1930–33 he was commander of the troops of the military district, in 1933–38 he was commander of the 2nd Army Group (in Kassel). When changing the command objectionable to Hitler in February 1938, he was dismissed, but in July 1938 he was appointed

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commander of the 12th Army, which in the fall of 1938 occupied the Sudetenland. In 1939-40 he was commander of Army Group C during the French campaign. At the beginning of the campaign against the USSR in 1941, he commanded Army Group North. For the failure of the attack on Leningrad and sharp disagreements with Hitler (he offered to retreat from Leningrad), he was dismissed on January 16, 1942.

List (List) Wilhelm [May 14, 1880, Oberkirchberg, Württemberg, - June 18, 1971], German General Field Marshal (1940). In the army since 1898. He graduated from the Military Academy (1912), participated in the 1st World War, then served in the Reichswehr. In 1938 he commanded an army group during the occupation of the Sudetenland. In the Polish campaign of 1939 he commanded the 14th Army, in the French campaign of 1940, the Balkan campaign of 1941 he commanded the 12th Army, then commanded the occupying forces in the Balkans. From June to September 1942 - commander of Army Group A, advancing on the Caucasus. Dismissed for disagreement with Hitler. In 1948 he was sentenced by a military tribunal in Nuremberg to life imprisonment for war crimes in Yugoslavia and Greece. In 1952 he was released by the American

authorities. **Luttwitz** (Luttwitz) Diepold Georg Heinrich Vor, Baron [12/6/1896, Krumpach, East Prussia - 10/9/1969, Neuburg], German general of tank troops (11/9/1944). Member of the 1st World War, lieutenant, from 1919 in the Reichswehr. He graduated from staff courses (1929). Head of the German equestrian team (1936). 8/7/1942 commander of the 20th rifle brigade. 10/10/1942 acting commander of the 20th Panzer Division. 12/1/1942 promoted to Major General. From 4/5/1943 - as part of a special headquarters for the preparation of new armored vehicles. In reserve from 25/9/1943 to 1/1/1944. On 1/2/1944 he commanded the 2nd Panzer Division, and on 2/8/1944 and the 352nd Infantry Division. On September 3, 1943 - commander of the 67th tank corps. Surrendered to the Americans. Released in 1946.

Lutjens Ponter [May 25, 1889, Wiesbaden - May 27, 1941, in the North Atlantic], German Admiral (September 1, 1940). In the Navy since 1907. Member of the 1st World War. In 1929-31 he commanded the 1st Flotilla of torpedo boats. In 1932-34 he was the head of the personnel department of the corps of naval officers. In 1935 he commanded the cruiser Karlsruhe. After Chief of Staff of the Naval Region of the North Sea. On May 16, 1936, he was the head of the Kriegsmarine personnel department. From 1938 he was commander of the reconnaissance forces, in 1939 he was promoted to rear admiral. On June 18, 1940, he was appointed commander of the fleet. On May 18, 1941, he went on a raid on the

Bismarck. Lost with this ship in the Atlantic. **McArthur** Douglas (January 26, 1880, Lilt Rock, Arkansas - April 5, 1964, Washington), American army general (1944). In 1903 484

Graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point. Member of the 1st World War. From 1930 to 1935 he was Chief of Staff of the American Army; in 1932 he massacred participants in a campaign of unemployed war veterans in Washington. From 1935 to 1937 he was military adviser in the Philippines, and from 1936 to 1937 he was field marshal of the Philippine Army. In 1941 he was appointed commander-in-chief of American forces in the Far East. From 1942 to 1951 he was Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the Southwestern Pacific. From 1945 to 1951 he was commander of the occupying forces in Japan. From July 1950 to April 1951, he led the operations of the US and Allied forces in the war against Korea. In April 1951, as a result of the failures of the American troops, he was removed from all command posts by President G. Truman. In 1952 he began his activity in big business.

Malinovsky Rodion Yakovlevich [11/23/1898, Odessa - 3/31/1967, Moscow], Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944), twice Hero of the Soviet Union, People's Hero of Yugoslavia. In the army since 1914, in February 1916 he was sent to France as part of the Russian Expeditionary Force. Upon his return in 1919, he joined the Red Army and participated in the Civil War as part of the 27th Infantry Division. Graduated from the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze (1930). In 1937-38 he participated in the Spanish Civil War. At the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1941-45, he commanded a corps, an army, and a front. From June 1945 he commanded the troops of the Trans-Baikal District, which delivered the main blow in Manchuria. After the war - commander of the troops of the Trans-Baikal District (1945-47), commander-in-chief of the troops of the Far East (1947-53); Commander of the Far Eastern Military District (1953-56), 1st Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief (1956-57). From October 1957 to March 1967 Minister of Defense of the USSR.

Manteuffel Hasso-Eckart von [January 14, 1897, Potsdam - September 24, 1978, Tyrol], German general of tank troops (1944). In the army since 1916, a participant in the 1st World War, then in the Reichswehr. In 1940-41 commander of a tank division in Rommel's troops operating in North Africa. In 1941-44, commanding the 7th Panzer Division and the SS Division "Grossdeutschland", he took part in the fighting near Moscow, Kiev, Zhitomir, and Iasi. He was one of the most devoted generals to Hitler, distinguished by cruelty, carried out the tactics of "scorched earth". In September 1944 he was appointed commander of the 5th Panzer Army, which operated in the direction of the main attack in the Arden operation. Since March 1945, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army. Seeing the imminent collapse of Germany, he decided to break through to the west, and on April 30, with the remnants of his army, he surrendered to the Americans. After the end of the war he was in captivity. Returning from captivity, he settled in Germany. In 1953 he was elected to the Reichstag. 485

Manstein Erich von Lewinski (11/24/1887, Berlin - 6/10/1973, Munich), German Field Marshal General (1942). In the army since 1906, graduated from the Military Academy (1914). Member of the 1st World War, after which he served in the Reichswehr. From 1935 to 1938 he was Chief of the Operations Directorate and 1st Chief Quartermaster of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. In 1939 - February 1940, the chief of staff of Army Group South, and then Army Group A, during the French campaign of 1940 commanded the 38th Corps. In 1941, the commander of the 56th tank corps, participated in the attack on Leningrad. From September 1941 to July 1942 he commanded the 11th Army during the capture of the Crimea and during the battles for Sevastopol, and from August 1942 he led the fighting near Leningrad. From November 1942 to February 1943, he commanded the Don Army Group, led the unsuccessful operation to deblockade the group surrounded by Stalingrad. In February 1943 - March 1944 he commanded Army Group South. Removed from office for failures and enrolled in the reserve. In 1950, as a war criminal, he was sentenced by a British military tribunal to 18 years in prison, and released in 1953. Author of the memoirs *Lost Victories* (1955) and *From a Soldier's Life. 1887-1939* (1958), in which he tries to justify the German generals and troops by blaming the "amateur" Hitler for the defeat of Germany. **Marshall** George Catlett

(December 31, 1880, Uniontown, Pennsylvania - October 16, 1959, Washington), General of the US Army (1944). In 1901 he graduated from the Virginia Military College and from 1902 served as an officer in the US Army in the Philippines. In 1917-18 he participated in World War I as chief of the operations department of the 1st American Army and chief of staff of the 8th American Corps in France. In 1919-24 he was adjutant of General D. Pershing. In 1924-27 he served in the 15th US Infantry Regiment stationed in China. In 1927-32 he was deputy head of the infantry school at Fort Benning (USA). In 1939 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the US Army, and remained in this post throughout World War II. From 1945 to 1947 he was President Truman's personal representative in China under the government of Chiang Kai-shek. From 1947 to 1949 he was US Secretary of State, and from 1950-51 he was Secretary of Defense. After 1952 he retired from active political life. **Maslennikov** Ivan Ivanovich [born

September 16, 1900, the village of Chalykla, now the Sartatov region, - April 16, 1954, Moscow], Soviet army general (1944), Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Red Army since 1918, a participant in the Civil War. He graduated from the Frunze Military Academy (1935) and the Higher Academic Courses (1948). In World War II, he commanded the 29th and 39th armies of the Western and Kalinin Fronts (1941-42), the Northern Group of Forces and the North Caucasian Front (1942-43), was the deputy commander of the Volkhov, South-Western, 3rd Ukrainian and Leningradsky 486

Fronts, commanded the 42nd Army (1943-44), the 3rd Baltic Front (1944), was Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East (1945). After the war, he commanded the troops of the Baku and Transcaucasian military districts (1945-47), from June 1948 - in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Meretskov Kirill Afanasyevich [June 7, 1897, the village of Nazarevo, now the Moscow Region, —

12/30/1968, Moscow], Marshal of the Soviet Union (10/26/1944), Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Red Army since 1918, a participant in the Civil War. Graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army. In 1936–37 he took part in the Spanish Civil War, and during the Finnish campaign of 1939–40 he commanded the 7th Army. From August 1940 Chief of the General Staff, from January 1941 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. In June–November 1941 he commanded the 7th, 4th and 33rd armies. From December 1941 to February 1944 he commanded the Volkhov Front, in February–November 1944 - the Karelian Front, from April 1945 - the Primorsky Group of Forces. In August 1945, commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front. After the war, the commander of the Primorsky, Moscow, White Sea and Northern military districts. In 1955–64 - assistant to the Minister of Defense of the USSR for higher educational institutions. From April 1965 Inspector General of the Ministry of Defense. **Mitscher** Mark Andre [January 26, 1887, Hillsborough, Wisconsin - December 3, 1947, Norfolk, Wyoming], American admiral (1946). He graduated from the Naval Academy in Annapolis (1910). In 1916 he became the 33rd US pilot. At the beginning of World War II, he commanded the aircraft carrier Hornet, which under his command took part in the Battle of Midway (June 1942). In 1943, he commanded TF 58, the operational formation of US ships in the Pacific, led operations to capture the Truk and Caroline Islands, participated in the battles in the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf, as well as in operations to capture Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Until his dismissal in 1947, he was Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. **Model** (Model) Walter [January 24, 1891, Genthin, East Prussia - April 21, 1945, near Duisburg], German Field Marshal General (1944). In the army since 1909, participated in the 1st World War. From November 1940 he commanded the 3rd Panzer Division, with which he participated in the 1941 campaign against the USSR. From October 1941 commander of the 41st Tank Corps, from January 1942 to January 1943 (intermittently) commander of the 9th Army on the Eastern Front. In February–March 1944 he commanded Army Group North, in April–June 1944 - Army Group Northern Ukraine, in June–August 1944 - Army Group Center. He was considered a "master of retreat", carried out the tactics of "scorched earth", and was distinguished by particular cruelty. In August–September 1944, the commander of the troops of the West, and from September 1944 - a group of

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 miy "B" (in France). In April 1945, Model's troops were defeated during the Ruhr operation of 1945 and capitulated on April 18, after which Model shot himself. **Montgomery** of Alamein Bernard Low [11/17/1887, London - 3/24/1976, Alton, Hampshire], British field marshal (1944), Viscount (1946). He graduated from the military academy at Sandhurst (1908). Member of the 1st World War. In the 1940 campaign, commanding the 3rd Infantry Division, he took part in battles in Belgium and France. Since August 1942, he was commander of the 8th British Army in North Africa, which in the battles near El Alamein (October–November 1942) defeated the Italo-German troops, and then acted in Sicily and Italy. In 1944 he was commander of the Allied Army Group, which landed in Normandy in June 1944; from August 1944 he was commander of the 21st Army Group, which operated in Belgium, the Netherlands and Northern Germany. In 1945 - Commander-in-Chief of the British occupation forces in Germany. From 1946 to 1948 he was Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and from 1948 to 1951 he was Chairman of the Committee of Commanders-in-Chief of the Defense Council of the Western Union. From 1951 to 1958 he was First Deputy Supreme Commander of the NATO Armed Forces in Europe. Cavalier of all the highest orders of Great Britain and many foreign orders, including the Soviet Order of Victory. **Morshead** Leslie James [September 18, 1889, Ballarat, Victoria - September 26, 1959, Sydney], Australian major general (1941) and businessman. A teacher by education. Member of the 1st World War, graduated from it with the rank of lieutenant colonel. During the interwar period, he was engaged in business. With the outbreak of World War II, he was appointed commander of the 18th Australian Brigade (1939). Commanded the 9th Australian Division in North Africa (1941). In 1942 he led the Allied operations in Borneo and New Guinea. After the war he continued his business. **Mussolini** Benito [7/29/1883, Forlì - 4/28/1945, near Dongo], head of the Italian fascist party and the fascist government of Italy in 1922–43 and the puppet government of the Republic of Salò in 1943–45. Was a teacher. He began his political career in the ranks of the socialist movement. He advanced as a journalist and speaker. From 1912 to 1914 he was editor of the organ of the Italian Socialist Party, the newspaper *Avanti!* ("L'Avanti!"). For campaigning in favor of Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Entente in November 1914, he was expelled from the party. Then he founded the newspaper "Popolo d'Italia" ("Popolo d'Italia") (later a fascist officialdom). In March 1919, he founded an organization from former participants in the war, called the fascist (fascist di combattimento). Relying on the fascist detachments, Mussolini led anti-democratic movement. 488

masking it with social and national demagoguery. In October 1922, he carried out a coup d'état ("March on Rome"). In the conditions of an acute political crisis that followed the murder in 1924 by the Nazis of the socialist G. Matteotti, Mussolini succeeded in

to stay in power, using the passivity of the anti-fascist opposition and terror. In 1926 he began to liquidate constitutional freedoms and establish an open dictatorship. In 1929 he signed the Lateran Agreement with the Vatican. Militarized the economy. After the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Germany (1933), he concluded a political and military alliance with Germany (formalized by a number of agreements). In 1936 he authorized the capture of Ethiopia, in 1939 annexed Albania. Dragged Italy into the 2nd World War in 1940, declaring war on France. The defeat of the Nazi coalition led to the fall of Mussolini's dictatorship (July 25, 1943). In 1943–45 he headed the puppet government of the Italian territory occupied by the Germans. He was captured by partisans near the Italian-Swiss border and executed by the verdict of a military tribunal of the National Liberation Committee of Northern Italy. **Nagumo**

Chuichi [1887, Yamagata, - 07/06/1944], Japanese Vice Admiral. He graduated from the naval school (1908). In 1917 he commanded a destroyer. In 1935 - a battleship. He commanded a "special purpose detachment" intended to attack Pearl Harbor (1941), then an aircraft carrier formation in the operation to capture the Dutch East Indies and in an attack on Ceylon. Committed suicide while defending Saipan. **Nimitz**

Chester William [February 24, 1885, Fredericksburg, Texas - February 20, 1966, San Francisco], American Admiral of the Navy (1944). He graduated from the Naval Academy (1905), served in command and staff positions (from 1918 chief of staff of the submarine forces of the US Atlantic Fleet). During World War II, from late December 1941 to November 1945, he commanded the US Pacific Fleet. On September 2, 1945, on behalf of the United States, he signed the act of surrender of Japan. 12/15/1945 - 12/15/1947 - Head of Marine Operations. Since 1947 - retired, was an adviser

to the Naval Ministry. Ozawa Jisaburo [October 2, 1886, Miyazaki - 1964], Japanese admiral. Graduated from the Naval Academy (1906), captain of a torpedo boat. Since 1926 at the headquarters of the United Fleet. Then he commanded a cruiser, and in 1935 a battleship. In 1941 he became head of the Academy of the Naval General Staff, and from December 1941 - commander of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Malayan Operational Unit. In April 1943, Ozawa commanded the 3rd Carrier Fleet in the Battle of the Solomon Islands, and in June 1943, the 1st Fleet off Saipan. In 1944 he led the Combined Fleet in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

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Auchinleck Claude John Eyre [6/21/1884, Aldershot, Hampshire - 3/23/1983, Marrakech, Morocco], British field marshal (1946). He graduated from the military school in Sandhurst (1903), served in India, during the 1st World War in Egypt and Mesopotamia, until 1940 - again in India. In May-June 1940 he commanded the Anglo-French troops in northern Norway, then the troops of the military district in southern England. In July 1941 - August 1942 he commanded British troops in the Middle East. For retreat in 1942 he was removed from his post. In 1943 he was appointed commander-in-chief of British troops in India (until 1947), and from 1943–45 he directed military operations against Japanese

troops in Burma. **O'Connor** (O'Connor) Richard Nugen, sir (1941) [8/21/1889, Srinagar, Kashmir India - 6/17/1981, London], British general (1945). In the army since 1908, he graduated from the military college in Sandhurst (1909). Member of the 1st World War (major). He graduated from Staff College (1920). From June 1940 he commanded the forces of the Western Desert in Africa, defeated the Italians at Sidi Baruch, then commanded the 8th British Army in North Africa (1941). He was captured by the Germans in April 1941, but in September 1943 he managed to escape from captivity. During the Normandy landings (1944) he

commanded the 8th Corps. Retired since 1948. **Patton** (Patton) George Smith, Jr. [11/11/1885, San Gabriel, California - 12/21/1945, Heidelberg], American general (1945). He graduated from the military academy at West Point (1909), the army military college (1932). In 1916, as an adjutant to General J. Pershing, he participated in the intervention against Mexico. In November 1917, being part of an American expeditionary force, he was engaged in the formation of the first American tank formation (1st armored brigade), with which he participated in the Saint-Miél and Meuse-Argonne operations of the 1st World War. Then he served in Hawaii and the United States, was the commander of an armored brigade (1940), an armored division (1942). During the Allied invasion of North Africa, he led the task force that captured French Morocco. Commanding the 7th American Army, he took part in the battles for the island of Sicily. On the eve of the Allied landing in Normandy, he was appointed commander of the 3rd Army. After the capitulation of Germany, he served as the military governor of Bavaria, then commanded the 15th Army, and subsequently led a group engaged in summarizing the experience of the war. Died

in a car accident. **Paulus** (Paulus) Friedrich [23.09.1890, Breitenau, Hesse, -1.2.1957, Dresden], German General Field Marshal (1943). In the army since 1910. Member of the 1st World War, then in the Reichswehr. In 1935-39 he was Chief of Staff of the Tank Forces. In the Polish campaign 1939 - 490

Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, in the French campaign of 1940 Chief of Staff of the 6th Army. From September to January 1942 - 1st Oberk Wartrmeister of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. From January 1942 he commanded the 6th Army on the Eastern Front and exercised overall leadership of the offensive against Stalingrad. After the encirclement of his troops at Stalingrad, he proposed a plan to break out of the encirclement, which was rejected by Hitler. January 31, 1943 surrendered to the Soviet troops with part of his army. While in Soviet captivity, he joined the anti-fascist Union of German officers, and then the National Committee of Free Germany. From 1953 he lived in the GDR. **Pound** Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers, Sir (1933) [8/29/1877 - 10/21/1943], British admiral of the fleet. First Sea Lord - from 1939 to 1943. Organized a system to counter German submarines.

Percival (Percival) Arthur [1887, - 1966], English lieutenant general. From June 1941 he commanded the troops defending Singapore and Malaya. He was defeated and surrendered Singapore to the Japanese on February 15, 1942. He was captured, released after the end of the war. **Peten** (Petain) Henri Philippe [April 24, 1856, Cauchy-a-la-Tour, Pas-de-Calais, - July 23, 1951, Port-Jouenville, Ile-d-Yeux, Vendée], French military and political figure, Marshal (November 1918). He graduated from the military school of Saint-Cyr (1878). In World War I, with the rank of general, he commanded an infantry brigade, then an army corps, in June 1915 - April 1916 the 2nd French army. In May 1916 the commander of the Center group, in April 1917 the chief of the General Staff, in May 1917 the commander-in-chief of the French army. From 1920 to 1931 he was deputy chairman of the Supreme Military Council and from 1922 inspector general of the army. May 17, 1940 became Deputy Prime Minister, and from June 16 - Prime Minister. June 22, 1940 signed the Compiègne armistice with Nazi Germany. In July 1940-August 1944 - head of state. In April 1945 he was arrested. In August 1945 he was sentenced to death (replaced by life

imprisonment). **Ramsay** Bertram Nome, sir (1942) [1883-1.1945], British admiral. He commanded the Dynamo operation to evacuate the expeditionary corps. Then he participated in the landing in North Africa. In 1943 he became commander of the Normandy invasion fleet. He commanded the sea phase of the operation to clean up the estuary of the Scheldt River (1944). Died in a plane crash. **Raeder** Erich [24.4.1876, Wandsbek, near Hamburg, -6.11.1960, Kiel], German Grand Admiral (1939). In the Navy since 1894. During World War I, from 1917 he commanded a

cruiser. Since 1928 491

Chief of the Main Naval Staff, in 1935-43 - Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Since January 1946 retired. In 1946 he was convicted by the Nuremberg Tribunal to life imprisonment, and released in 1955.

Reinhard Hans-Georg, German general. He commanded a corps in the French campaign of 1940, the 3rd Panzer Group in the Battle of Moscow (1941), and the 3rd Panzer Army in Poland (1944).

Reichenau (Reichenau) Walter [October 8, 1884, Karlsruhe, - January 17, 1942, Poltava], German general field marshal (1940). Member of the 1st World War, then served in the Reichswehr. From 1930 he was chief of staff of the military district, in 1933-35 he was head of a department in the Ministry of the Reichswehr, he actively participated in the creation of the Wehrmacht. One of the most fanatical Nazis among the generals. During the Polish campaign of 1939 he commanded the 10th Army, from October 1939 - the 6th Army, at the head of which he took part in the French campaign of 1940 and the campaign against the USSR in 1941. From December 1941 - commander of Army Group South on the Soviet-German front. In December 1941 he issued an order for the destruction

of Soviet prisoners of war and citizens. Died of a heart attack. **Ribbentrop** (Ribbentrop) Joachim [April 30, 1893, Wesel - October 16, 1946, Nuremberg], German statesman. Was a champagne salesman. In 1930 he joined the Nazi Party and soon became one of Hitler's close associates. From 1936 to 1938 he was ambassador to London. In February 1938-45 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. Executed by the

verdict of the international military tribunal in Nuremberg. **Richthofen** Wolfram von [October 10, 1895, Barzdorf, Silesia - July 12, 1945, Bad Ischl, Upper Austria], German Field Marshal General (February 16, 1943). In military service since 1913, during the 1st World War, the pilot, after it in the reserve. He graduated from the Higher Technical School (1923) and entered the Reichswehr. Participated in the intervention in Spain (1936-39) as chief of staff and commander of the Condor Aviation Legion. In 1939-42 he commanded the 8th Aviation Corps. From 07/04/1942 to 09/03/43 commander of the 4th air fleet. From 26/6/1943 to 27/10/1944 he commanded the 2nd air fleet in Italy (for some time he commanded two fleets at the same

time), then retired due to illness. **Rokossovsky** Konstantin Konstantinovich [December 21, 1896, Velikie Luki, - August 3, 1968, Moscow], Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944), Marshal of Poland (1949), twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the army since 1914. Member of the 1st World War.

10.1917 joined the Red Army. Member of the Civil War. He graduated from the cavalry advanced training courses for comman

advanced training courses for senior officers at the Academy named after M. V. Frunze

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(1929). Participated in battles on the CER. During the war he commanded the 9th Mechanized Corps (until 11/07/1941), the 16th Army (August 1941 - July 1942), Bryansk (July - September 1942), Donskoy (September 1942 - February 1943), Central (February - October 1943).), Belorussian (October 1943 - February 1944), 1st Belorussian (February - November 1944) and 2nd Belorussian (from November 1944 until the end of the war) fronts. 24/6/1945 commanded the Victory Parade in Moscow. From 1945 to 1949 he was Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Group of Forces. In 1949 he left for Poland and was appointed Minister of Defense and Deputy. pre-council of the NDP. In 1956 he returned to the USSR and was Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR (November 1956-July 1957), Chief Inspector - Deputy. Minister of Defense of the USSR (July-October 1957), Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District (1957-58), Deputy Minister and Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense (January 1958-April 1962), Inspector General of the group of General Inspectors

of the Ministry of Defense (since April 1962). Awarded with the Order of Victory. **Rommel** Erwin [11/15/1891, Heidenheim, Baden-Wurtemberg - 10/14/1944, Herlingem], near the city of Ulm, German Field Marshal General (1942). But military service since 1910. Member of the 1st World War. From 1919 - in the Reichswehr, then in the Wehrmacht. In the 30s he would have been a teacher and head of the Military Academy. From September 1939 - military commandant of Hitler's headquarters, from February 1940 - commander of the 7th Panzer Division during the French campaign. From February 1941 to March 1943 he commanded the German Expeditionary Force in North Africa. In July-November 1943 - Commander of Army Group B in Northern Italy. In December 1943 he served as a military inspector of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in Denmark. From December 1943 - commander of Army Group "B" in France. On July 17, he left this post due to a serious wound. BsCh is associated with the right wing of the anti-Hitler conspirators and, after the revelation of the verdict, committed suicide on Hitler's orders. **Rotmistrov** Pavel Alekseevich [July 6, 1901, the village of Skovorovo, now the Kalinin Region, -?], Soviet military leader, Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces (1962), Hero of the Soviet Union, professor (1958). In the Red Army from 1919, graduated from the Frunze Military Academy (1931). From June to September 1941 chief of staff of the 3rd mechanized corps, then commander of the 8th (1941-42) and 3rd guards (January-April 1942) tank brigades, 7th (April-December 1942) and 3rd Guards (December 1942 - February 1943) tank corps, commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army (February 1943 - August 1944). From August 1944 until the end of the war - deputy commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army, after the war - to 493

commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the group of Soviet troops of the Far East (1945-48). In 1948-58 - head of the department of armored and mechanized troops and deputy head of the department of strategy and operational art (1958-64), assistant to the Minister of Defense for higher military educational institutions (1964-68). Since June 1968 - Inspector General of the group of inspectors general of the Ministry of Defense. **Roosevelt** Franklin Delano (January 30, 1882, Hyde Park, New York - April 12, 1945, Warm Springs, Georgia), American statesman, President of the United States (1933-45). Lawyer by education. Studied at Groton, Harvard and Columbia Universities. In 1905 he married a distant relative, Eleanor Roosevelt, niece of Theodore Roosevelt. In 1910 he was elected to the New York State Senate from the Democratic Party. From 1913 to 1920 he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the government of T. V. Wilson and advocated strengthening the naval power of the United States. In 1920, the candidate for the presidency of the Democratic Party. After losing the election, he returned to private practice. In 1928 he was elected governor of New York. In 1932, he was elected President of the United States, made a number of reforms that went down in history as the "New Deal", one of the features of which was the strengthening of the military power of the United States, and above all the Navy. Roosevelt's popularity was so great that in 1940 he was elected to a third term, and in 1944 to a fourth (the first in US history). In December 1941, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (before Japan formally declared a state of war), the United States entered World War II. Represented the United States at the Tehran (1943) and Crimean (1945) conferences.

Rundstedt

(Rundstedt) Carl Rudolf Gerd von [12/12/1875, Aschersleben, Halle district - 24/2/1953, Hannover], German field marshal general (1940). In military service since 1892. He graduated from the Military Academy (1907). Member of the 1st World War, was the chief of staff of the corps. Since 1919, in the Reichswehr, he held the posts of chief of staff of an army group, division commander, commander of a military district and an army group. Retired in 1938-39. During the Polish campaign of 1939 he commanded Army Group South, during the French Campaign of 1940 - Army Group A. In June-November he commanded Army Group South on the Soviet-German front. For the defeat near Rostov-on-Don on November 30, 1941, he was removed from command and

sent to reserve. From March 1942 to early July 1944 and from September 1944 to March 1945 - Commander-in-Chief of the German Forces of the West. He was the chairman of the tribunal that tried the participants in the anti-Hitler conspiracy of 1944. One of the organizers of the attempt to defeat the Anglo-American troops in the Ardennes operation of 1944-45. Since March 10, 1945 - retired. Until 1949 he was in British captivity.

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Rydz-Smigly (Rydz-Shmigł) Edwald [March 11, 1886, Brezhany - December 2, 1941, Warsaw], Marshal of Poland (1936). In 1908 he joined the Union of Active Struggle created by Piłsudski. In 1910 he was drafted into the army and enrolled in the school of reserve officers, in 1911 he received the rank of cornet. In 1913 he headed the underground paramilitaries of the Union of Active Struggle in the Lvov District. In party circles, he used the pseudonym "Smigly". Participated in World War I (started with the rank of major in the Austrian army, finished as a brigadier general). In the Polish Republic (1918) he became Minister of Military Affairs. After the proclamation of an independent Polish state (11/11/1918) he was appointed commander of the Warsaw General District, and from February 1919 - the Kovel Task Force, which acted against the Bolshevik West Ukrainian People's Republic. Then he led the 1st division during the capture of Vilno (Vilnius), the 3rd Polish Army in Ukraine, the South-Eastern Front. He commanded the right flank of the Polish army during the battle for Warsaw. After the end of the war with the USSR, he received the post of an army inspector in Vilna, and after the Piłsudski coup (1926) - an army inspector in Warsaw. After the death of Piłsudski, he was appointed Inspector General of the Armed Forces (1935) - Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in the campaign of 1939. On September 18, 1939, he fled to Romania with the government, interned by the Romanian authorities. 11/13/1939 - "President of Poland" (immigrant government in Paris) removed Rydz-Smigly from the post of commander in chief. Fled from Romania in December 1940 to Hungary. 30.10.41 returned to Poland. Died from an attack of angina pectoris. **Simovich** Dusan [November 9, 1882, Kragujevac - August 26, 1962, Belgrade], statesman and military leader of Yugoslavia. In 1900 he graduated from a military school, in 1905 from a military academy in Belgrade. Member of the Balkan wars and the 1st World War. Brigadier General since 1925. On the eve of the 2nd World War - Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, and then - Commander of the Air Force. After the coup d'état on March 27, 1941, he was prime minister. With the start of the Yugoslav campaign, Simović's government emigrated. In 1941-42 he was the prime minister of the government in exile. After the liberation of Yugoslavia (1945) he returned to his homeland. Spaatz Karl (28/6/1891, Boyertown - 14/7/1975, Washington), American general. He graduated from the military academy at West Point (1914). Member of the 1st World War, was a pilot. Since 1940 in England to determine the military power of Germany, and in July 1942 he was appointed to command the 8th Air Army in Britain. In January 1944 he became Commander-in-Chief of the US Strategic Air Force. On his instructions, daytime strategic bombing of German territory was carried out. In July 1945 he was transferred to the Pacific Ocean, and despite the fact that he objected to the use of atom 495

weapons against Japanese cities, nevertheless ordered strategic bombing, including atomic strikes. From September 1947 Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Retired 1948. **Spruance** Raymond Ames

[3/7/1886, Baltimore, Maryland - 13/12/1969, Monterey, California], American rear admiral. Graduated from the Naval Academy (1906). At the beginning of World War II, he commanded a formation of cruisers. In 1942 he became chief of staff of the Pacific Fleet. Since November 1943, commander of the 5th Fleet, commanded the forces of the Pacific Center. After the war, he became president of the Naval War College and US ambassador to the Philippines. **Stalin** (Dzhughashvili) Iosif Vissarionovich [December 21, 1879,

Gori, Georgia - March 5, 1953, Moscow], leader of the USSR. Member of the CPSU since 1898, repeatedly tried for terrorist activities. After the February Revolution of 1917 in St. Petersburg, he participated in the preparation and conduct of the October Revolution. From 1917 to 1922 he was People's Commissar for Nationalities. In April 1922 he was elected general secretary of the CPSU, Stalin's further activities were aimed at strengthening his own power. In 1927 he graduated from the NEP, began to carry out industrialization and collectivization. On August 8, 1941, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR. As head of the Soviet delegation, he took part in the Tehran (1943), Crimean (1945) and Potsdam conferences (1945) of the leaders of the three powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. In domestic politics, he adhered to harsh repressive measures, which went down in history as the "Cult of Personality". **Turner** Richmond Kelly (May 27, 1885, Portland,

Oregon - Feb. 12, 1961, Monterey, California), US Admiral of the Navy (1945). He graduated from the Naval Academy (1908), the School of Naval Aviation (1927). He commanded a squadron of naval bombers, the cruiser "Jackson". From the mid-30s on staff work. Since March 1942 at the headquarters of Admiral King,

commanded an amphibious force in the invasion of Goodalcanal, the Solomon Islands. Then (1943) he led the 5th landing force during the invasion of the Gilbert Islands (Tarawa), the Marshall Islands, the Mariana Islands (Saipan), Iwo Jima and Okinawa (1945). Retired after the war. **Tippleskirch** Kurt von [October 9, 1891, Charlottenburg

- 1957], German infantry general (1942). In military service since 1910, a participant in the 1st World War, then in the Reichswehr. In 1938-42 he was the head of a department, the 4th quartermaster (chief of the intelligence department) of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. From January 1942 on the Eastern Front he commanded a division, from September 1942 - with

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Vetnik under the command of the 8th Italian Army, from December 1943 corps commander, in June-July 1944 he commanded the 4th Army, from November 1944 - the 1st Army in Lorraine, then the 14th in Italy, the 21st in Mecklenburg and from April 1945 - the Vistula Army Group, with which he surrendered to the British. He was declared a war criminal at the Nuremberg trials. However, he managed to escape trial. After the war, he wrote the monograph "History of the Second World War." **Tojo** Hideki [12/30/1884, Tokyo - 12/23/1948, Tokyo], Japanese general. Since 1915, he has held leading positions in the Japanese army. He headed the so-called. The "Control Group" ("Toseiha"), which included generals and officers who advocated the fascistization of Japan and the militarization of its economy. In 1937-38 he was Chief of Staff of the Japanese Kwantung Army. In 1938-39 - Deputy Minister of War. In 1940-41 he was minister of war. From October 1941 to July 1944 - Prime Minister and Minister of War at the same time. Executed by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East as one of the main Japanese war criminals. **Truman** Harry S. [May 8, 1884, Lamar, Missouri - December 26, 1972, Kansas City, Missouri], US statesman. Participated in the 1st World War. From 1934 to 1944 he was a senator. From January 1945 he was Vice President of the United States from the Democratic Party, from April 1945 (after the death of President F. D. Roosevelt) until January 1953 he was President of the United States. In August 1945 he ordered the atomic bombing of Japan. **Udet** Ernst [April 26, 1896, Frankfurt am Main - November 15, 1941], German Colonel General (July 19, 1940). Member of the 1st World War, in aviation, Fenrich (officially shot down 62 enemy aircraft). After the war, he worked as a mechanic, circus touring pilot, charter pilot, stunt performer in Hollywood. On June 1, 1935 - in the Luftwaffe with the rank of colonel. On February 10, 1936, he was an inspector of fighter and bomber aviation, and on July 9, 1936, he was the head of the technical department. Committed suicide. **Wavell** Archibald Percival [May 5, 1883, Colchester - May 24, 1950, London], British Field Marshal (1943), Earl (1947). He graduated from Winchester College, Sandhurst Military Academy (1901) and Staff College (1910). Member of the First World War, in 1916-17 he was a military attaché at the headquarters of the Russian Caucasian army. From July 1939 he headed the command of the British armed forces in the Middle East. At the beginning of World War II, the troops led by Wavell initially defeated the Italian troops in Cyrenaica (December 1940-February 1941) and East Africa (January-May 1941), but then

have suffered
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defeat in Greece, but the island of Crete and Libya, after which Wavell was appointed commander of the troops in India. In January-March 1942 - Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armed Forces in Southeast Asia, from March 1942 - Allied Forces in India and Burma. From June 1943 to February 1947 Viceroy of India. **Wainwright** Jonathan Mayhew (August 23, 1883, Walla Walla, Washington - September 2, 1953), American general. Took command of the Philippine garrison in March 1942 from General MacArthur. In Japanese captivity (from 6/5/1942 to 8/1945). Awarded with the Medal of Honor. **Falkenhorst** (Jastsewbski) Nikolaus von [January 17, 1886, Breslau, Silesia - June 18, 1968, Holzminden], German Colonel General (July 19, 1940). In the army since 1903. Member of the 1st World War, in the Great Staff, was responsible for operations in Finland, remained there until 1920. After that, in the Reichswehr. In 1933-35 he was military attache in Prague, Belgrade and Bucharest, from 1935 he was chief of staff of Army Group 3 in Dresden, promoted to major general. In 1936 - commander of the 32nd Infantry Division, since 1939 - commander of the 21st Corps. Appointed commander of the invasion forces in Norway (1940), led this invasion. From 25/07/1940 - commander of ground forces in Norway. 12/18/1944 removed from his post. Sentenced by the Nuremberg Tribunal to death, commuted to 20 years in prison. July 23, 1953 - released. **Fletcher** Frank Jack [April 29, 1885. Marshalltown, Iowa - 4/25/1973, Bethesda, Maryland], American admiral. At the beginning of World War II, he commanded a formation of cruisers, then aircraft carriers. In the Battle of Midway Atoll, he commanded the entire American fleet. From 1942 he commanded the landing troops. Retired since 1947. **Fromm** (Fromm) Friedrich [1888, - 19.3.1945], German general. During the 2nd World War

reserve commander. Member of the July conspiracy against Hitler (1944). After the plot failed, he tried to hide his involvement, but was arrested and executed by the Gestapo. **Haile Selassie I** [July 23, 1892, Ydzhersa-Goro, Harer Province - August 27, 1975, Addis Ababa], Emperor of Ethiopia (1930-74) (before the coronation of Jafari Makonnen). In 1916 he was declared regent under the Empress Zauditu, after whose death he was crowned emperor (11/2/1930). He introduced centralized administration of the country, abolished slavery and the slave trade, and proclaimed a constitution (1931). In 1923 he achieved the admission of Ethiopia to the League of Nations. During the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36 he emigrated abroad. 5.5.41 returned to Hell 498

dis Ababa. One of the organizers of the Organization of African Unity. He was deposed as a result of the coup 12.9.74. Hirohito

[April 29, 1901, Tokyo - January 7, 1989], Emperor of Japan (1926), colonel in the army and admiral of the navy (1926). From 1921, due to his father's illness, he was Prince Regent. During the 2nd World War, he was formally the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, headed the headquarters. With the entry into force of the 1947 constitution, Hirohito was declared the "Symbol of the State." He was interested in marine biology, on which he published several books. **Halsey** William Frederick Jr. ("Bill") (October 30, 1882, Elizabeth, New Jersey - August 16, 1959, Fishers Island, New York), American admiral of the fleet (12.1945). He graduated from the Naval Academy in Annapolis (1904). Participated in the 1st World War, commanded a destroyer. In 1935 he became a naval pilot. In 1940 he was promoted to vice admiral and commanded the aircraft carrier Enterprise. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (12/12/1941), Halsey's squadron remained the last combat-ready American group in the Pacific. In June 1944 he became commander of the 3rd Fleet, with which he took part in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Retired in 1947, went into business. From 1951-57 he was president of ITL (International Telecommunications Laboratories). **Homma** Masaharu [November 27, 1887, Sado - April 3, 1946, Los Bacos, Luzon], Japanese general. He graduated from the Military Academy (1907) and the Army Military College (1915). During the 1st World War, an observer with the British forces in France. In 1925 a Japanese resident in India, since 1930 a military attache in London. Since 1939, the commander of the Japanese troops in Tientsin, (China). In December 1941, Lieutenant General Homma led the invasion of the Philippines. He surrendered to the Americans on September 14, 1945, and in December 1945 he was convicted as a war criminal. Shot. **Hube** (Hube) Hans Valentin [1890, Naumburg, - 21.4.1944, near Bergtsgaden], German Colonel General (20.4.1944). In the army since 1909, a participant in the 1st World War, then in the Reichswehr. He participated in the French campaign with the 16th division, then in the 1941 campaign against the USSR. On September 15, 1942, he replaced Wietersheim as commander of the 14th Panzer Corps. Participated with him in the Battle of Stalingrad, in 1943 restored him and commanded him in the battle in Sicily. Then he commanded the 10th Army and the 1st Tank Army. Died in a plane crash. **Zeitzler** (Zeitzler) Kurt [1895-1963], German general. In 1941 - Chief of Staff of the Army Group "West", from 24.09.1942 Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces. Filmed for defeats in the East in 1944.

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Chernyakhovsky Ivan Danilovich [June 29, 1906, Uman - February 18, 1945, Melzak], Soviet army general (1944), twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Red Army since 1924. He graduated from the Kyiv Artillery School (1928), the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army (1936). At the beginning of the war he commanded the 28th Panzer Division, then the 241st Rifle Division, the 18th Tank Corps (since June 1942), and the 60th Army (since July 1942). From April 15, 1944 he commanded the troops of the Western, and from April 24, 1944 - the 3rd Belorussian Front. Killed during the East Prussian operation. **Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill** (November 30, 1874, Blenheim, near Woodstock, Oxfordshire - January 24, 1965, London), statesman, political and military leader of Great Britain, one of the leaders of the Conservative Party. He was educated at Harrow Privileged School and Sandhurst Military School. From 1895 he served as an officer in the army, participated in the colonial wars and the suppression of the national uprising in India, Sudan and other British colonies. At the same time, he worked for newspapers. During the Boer War 1899-1902 war correspondent in South Africa. In 1900 he was elected to Parliament from the Conservative Party. In 1904, for careerist reasons, he joined the Liberal Party. Numerous speeches critical of the government contributed to the growth of his popularity. In 1906 he was again elected to the House of Commons (from the Liberal Party), in the same year he was appointed Deputy Minister of the Colonies. In 1908-10 - Minister of Trade, in 1910-1911 Minister of the Interior, in 1911-15 - First Lord of the Admiralty. During the 1st World War, he participated in the defense and evacuation of Antwerp, was one of the organizers of the Dardanel operation of 1915-16, the failure of which led to his resignation. From 1917 Churchill was Minister of War Supplies, from 1919-21 he was Minister of War and Minister of Aviation. In 1921-22 he was Minister of the Colonies, actively engaged in strengthening the British colonial troops, building bases, especially in the Middle East, for the first time used military aviation to

suppression of the national liberation movement in the colonies. In the 1920s he returned to the Conservative Party, from which he was a member of parliament from 1924 until the end of his life. In 1924-29 he was Minister of Finance. In 1930-39 he was engaged in journalism. In the 1930s he actively opposed the foreign policy of S. Baldwin and N. Chamberlain, aimed at appeasing the fascist aggressors. With the entry of Great Britain into the Second World War in September 1939 he was appointed Minister of the Navy, and in May 1940 - Prime Minister. Participated in the Tehran (1943), Crimean (1945) and Potsdam (1945) conferences. After the victory of the Labor Party in the 1945 elections, the government resigned, and Churchill led the Conservative opposition in Parliament. March 5, 1946 in Fulton gave a speech calling for

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creation of a military-political alliance between Great Britain and the United States. From 1951 to 1955, Churchill was again prime minister, pursuing a policy of strengthening NATO's military organization, remilitarizing West Germany, and creating military blocs. In 1955 he resigned and retired from political activity. Churchill is also known as a publicist and author of a number of books in the historical memoir genre: The Second World War, A history of the English-speaking peoples, The world crisis. **Schlieffen** Alfred von [February 28, 1833, Berlin - January 4, 1913, Berlin], German military leader, Field Marshal (1911). He graduated from the officers' school (1853) and the Military Academy (1861). As an officer of the General Staff, he participated in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. From 1884 he was chief of a section of the German General Staff, and from 1891 to 1905 he was Chief of the General Staff. From 1906 - retired. The author of the German war plan ("Schlieffen plan"). He outlined his views on the conduct of war and battle in charters, instructions and other official documents, as well as in a number of theoretical works: Cannes, Modern War, etc. Being a follower of K. Clausewitz and X. Moltke the elder, he defended the idea of a fleeting war encirclement of the enemy's armies by strategically enveloping and defeating him in a large general battle.

Speer (Speer) Albert [March 19, 1905, Mannheim, Baden - September 1, 1981, London], German architect and minister. He received a license as an architect in 1927, joined the NSDAP (January 1931). From 1933 to 1945 Hitler's personal architect. From 1942 to 1945 - Minister of War Industry and Armaments. Found guilty by the Nuremberg Tribunal, sentenced to 20 years in prison, which he spent in Spandau prison in West Berlin. After his release, he began his writing career. Among him. Erinnerungen (1969; Inside the Third Reich), Spandauer Tagebucher (1975; Diaries of a Prisoner of Spandau), and Der Sklavenstaat (1981; Infiltrator). **Sperrle** (Sperrle) Hugo [2.2.1885, Ludwigsburg, Württemberg - 2.4.1953, Munich], German Field Marshal (19.7.1940). In the army since 1903, a participant in the 1st World War, then in the Reichswehr. From 10/1/1933 to 1/4/1934 he was commander of the 8th Infantry Regiment, then commanded the 1st Air Division. From 03/09/1935 - commander of the 2nd aviation district, then the 5th aviation district. On October 31, 1936, he commanded the Condor Legion in Spain. On February 1, 1938, he was appointed commander of the 3rd Luftwaffe Group, renamed the 3rd Air Fleet at the start of the war. From 24.8.44 - in reserve. 1/5/1945 taken prisoner by the British, convicted at the Nuremberg Tribunal, 27/10/1948 charges were dropped from him. 501

Student (Student) Kurt [1890, - 1.7.1978, Lemgo], German Colonel General (13.7.44). Since 1933 in the Ministry of Aviation. On April 1, 1938, he was appointed commander of the 3rd Parachute Division. With the outbreak of World War II, he was appointed commander of the 7th Air Division, with which he participated in the Polish campaign of 1939, the French campaign of 1940. Wounded in the head, from 14.5.40 to 1.1.41 on treatment. He commanded the 11th Airborne Corps during the landing on Crete (1941), then in Europe (until 1944). From 01/03/1944 - commander of the 1st landing army, from 11/07/1944 commanded army group "N". Convicted by military tribunal 3.1946. President of the

German Association of Paratroopers since July 1952. **Stumpf** (StumpfT) Hans-Jürgen, German Colonel General (19.7.40). Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe from 1.6.37 to 31.1.39, then until 11.1.40 chief of the Lufwaffe (Air Force infantry). From 12.1.40 to 10.5.40 he commanded the 1st air fleet, from 10.5.40 to 11.6.43 - the 5th air fleet. Then until 5.1.44 in reserve. Then he commanded the air group "Center", the air fleet "Reich", and from 8.5.45 to

23.5.45 - chief of staff of the Luftwaffe. **Eisenhower** Dwight David [October 14, 1890, Denison, Texas - March 28, 1969, Washington], US statesman and military figure, Army General (1944). He graduated from the Military Academy at West Point (1915). Since 1920 he served in the American troops in the United States and abroad, in the War Department, the army headquarters. From June 1942 he commanded US troops in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Since 1943 - Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Western Europe, led the landing of Anglo-American troops in Normandy (1944). He was awarded orders from many countries, including the Order of Victory (1945). After the defeat of Germany, the commander of the US occupation forces in Germany. November 1945-February 1948 - Chief of Staff of the US Army. In 1950-52 -

Supreme Commander of NATO Forces in Europe. From 1948-52 he was rector of Columbia University in New York. From 1953 to 1961 he was President of the United States from the Republican parties.

Yamamoto Isiroku [April 4, 1884, Nagaoka, Niigata Prefecture - April 18, 1943, Solomon Islands], Japanese admiral. He graduated from the Naval Academy (1904) and the Naval Staff College (1916). Participated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. In 1936-39 he was Deputy Minister of the Navy. From 1939 he commanded the United Fleet. In 1941-43 he directed naval operations beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor. During the Battle of the Solomon Islands, Yamamoto's plane was shot down by American aircraft, which received information about his departure. 502

Yamashita Tomoyuki ("Tiger of Malaya") [November 8, 1885, Koshi, Japan - February 23, 1946, Manila, Philippines], Japanese general. He graduated from the Army Academy (1905) and the Army Military College (1916), then in staff positions. In 1941–42 he commanded the 25th Japanese Army, which captured Malaya and Singapore. Until 1944, he trained Japanese troops in Manchuria, and after the fall of the Tojo cabinet in 1944, he was appointed to command the defense of the Philippines. His troops surrendered after the general surrender signed in Tokyo in August 1945. He was brought to trial and, although he denied any involvement in the crimes attributed to his soldiers, was convicted and presumably hanged.

APPENDIX 11

THE HIGHEST COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN LAND ARMY¹ 1.

Army Groups 1.

Command of the **Army** Group "Center" ("C"). In peacetime it was called the command of the 2nd Army Group. Formed in August 1939. Operated in the West. In November 1940 it was redeployed to the territory of Germany. April 22, 1941 - transferred to East Prussia and received the name "headquarters of the East Prussia section" for the purpose of camouflage. 06/21/1941 - renamed the command of the Army Group "North" ("Nord"). Worked in the East. On January 25, 1945, it

was renamed the command of the Army Group "Kurland" ("Kuhland"). **Commanders:**
Aug. 1939-Jan.

1942 Colonel General Wilhelm Rigger von Leeb Jan. 1942-Jan. 1944

Colonel General Georg von Küchler Jan. - Feb. 1944 Colonel

General Walter Model March-June 1944 Colonel General

Georg von Lindemann July 1944 Colonel General Johannes

Friesner July 1944-Jan. 1945 Field Marshal

Ferdinand Schörner Jan. 1945 Colonel General Lothar von

Rendulich Jan. 1945 and. O. Infantry General Karl

Gilpert Jan.-March 1945 Colonel-General

Heinrich von Vietinghoff March. 1945 and. O. Infantry

General Karl Gilpert March-April, 1945 Colonel-

General Lothar von Rendulich **2. Command of the**

Army Group "South" ("Sud"). Formed in August 1939. Operated in Poland.

10/3/1939 - renamed the command "East" ("Ost"). Carried out leadership of troops on the

German-Soviet demarcation line. 10/20/1939 - renamed

the command of Army Group "A". Worked in the West. 10/25/1940 - renamed the command

of army group "A" (command of the West). April 22, 1941 - relocated to the German-Soviet border and for the purpose of camouflage was called the "headquarters of the Silesia section."

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06/21/1941 - renamed the command of Army Group "South" ("Sud"). Worked in the East.

07/09/1942 - renamed the command of Army Group "B" ("C"). February

14, 1943 - placed at the disposal of the main command of the ground forces.

8/19/1943 - relocated to Northern Italy, taking command of the German ground forces in Northern

Italy. 11/18/1943 - transferred to the imperial

territory of Germany. January 2, 1944 - subordinated to the command

of Army Group "D" (command of the West), for use in the West. **Commanders:**

Aug. 1939-Nov. 1941 Colonel General Gerd von Rundstedt
1941 - Jan. 1942 Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau
Jan.-July 1942 Field Marshal Fedor von Bock July 1942-July
1943 Colonel General Baron Maximilian von Weichs July 1943-
Jan. 1944 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel Jan.-Aug. 1944 Field Marshal
Günther von Kluge Aug. 1944-Apr. 1945 Field Marshal
Walter Model **3. Command of the Army Group**

"North" ("Nord"). In peacetime it was called the command of the 1st Army Group. Formed in August
1939. Used in Poland. On October 5, 1939, it was renamed the command of Army
Group B. Worked in the West. In September 1940, he was transferred to Poland, led the
troops on the German-Soviet demarcation line, 21/6/1941 - renamed the command
of the Army Group
"Center" ("Mitte"). Worked in the East. January 25, 1945 - renamed the command of the Army
Group

"North" ("Nord"). 8/4/1945 - disbanded. **Commanders:** Aug. 1939-dec. 1941
Colonel-General Fedor von
Bock Dec. 1941-

Nov. 1943 Field Marshal Günther von Kluge Nov.
1943-July 1944 Field Marshal Ernst Busch July-Aug. 1944 Field
Marshal Walter Model Aug. 1944-Jan. 1945 Colonel
General Georg Hans Reinhardt Jan.-March 1945
Colonel General Lothar von Rendulich March-April. 1945
Colonel General Walter Weiss **4. Command of**

Army Group "D" ("D"), Formed 10/26/1940.

Worked in the West. 04/15/1941 - renamed the command of Army Group "D" (command of the
West). 505

11/17/1944 - adopted the name of the High Command of the West. March 25, 1945 - renamed
the Main Command of the South. Operated in the West, in the strip of the
city of Harz. From 22.4.1945 - operated throughout
Germany.

Commanders: June 1940-March 1941 Field Marshal Gerd von
Rundstedt March 1941-March 1942 Field Marshal Erwin
von Witzleben March 1942-July 1944 Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt July-Aug. 1944 Field
Marshal Günther von Kluge Aug.-Sept.

1944 Field Marshal Walter Model Sept. 1944-March
1945 Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt March-May 1945 Field
Marshal Albert Kesselring **5. Command of Army Group A.**

Formed 9/7/1942. Worked in the East. April 5, 1944 - renamed the command of the Army
Group "Southern Ukraine". September 25, 1944 - renamed the command of
Army Group "South" ("Sud"). April 22, 1945 - subordinated to the High
Command of the South. In May 1945 - renamed the
command of Army Group "Austria" ("Osterreich"). **Commanders:** July-Sept. 1942 Field
Marshal Wilhelm

List Sept.-Nov. 1942 Adolf Hitler Nov. 1942-Apr. 1944
Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist
Apr. July 1944 Colonel General Ferdinand Schörner July-Dec.
1944 Colonel General Johann Frisner Dec. 1944-
March 1945 General of the Infantry Otto Wehler
March-May 1945 Colonel-General Lothar von

Rendulich **6. Command of Army Group**

"Don" ("Don"). 11/21/1942 formed on the basis of the headquarters of the 11th Army. Worked
in the East. February 13, 1943 -
renamed the command of Army Group "South" ("Sud"). 5/4/1944 - renamed
the command of the army group "Northern Ukraine". September 25, 1944 -
renamed the command of Army Group "A". January 25, 1945 -
renamed the command of the Army Group "Center" ("Mitte"). **Commanders:**
Nov. 1942-

March 1944 Colonel General Erich von Manstein March-July
1944 Field Marshal Walter Model July 1944-Jan. 1945
Colonel General Josef Harpe Jan-May 1945 Field
Marshal Ferdinand Schörner

7. Command of Army Group "E" (Command of the South-East). Formed 12/28/1942 on the basis of the headquarters of the 12th Army. Worked in the South East. 08/20/1943 - renamed the command of Army Group "E" and subordinated to the newly created command of Army Group "F" (Command of the South-East). March 28, 1945 - renamed the command of Army Group "E" (command of the South-East). April 22, 1945 - passed into the subordination of the High Command of the South.

Commanders: Dec. 1942-May 1945 Colonel-General

Alexander Löhr **8. Command of the Army Group "Africa" ("Afrika").** Formed at the end of Feb. 1943 on the basis of part of the German headquarters of the German-Italian tank army and part of the headquarters of the 5th tank army. Under command of the South. Worked in Tunisia. May 13, 1943 -

destroyed in Tunisia. **Commanders:** February-March

1943 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel March-May

1943 Colonel General Jurgen von Arnim **9. Command of Army Group F (F) (Southeast Command).** Formed 20/8/1943. Worked

in the South East. March 29, 1945 - disbanded.

Commander: July 1943-March 1945 Field Marshal Baron Maximilian von

Weichs **10. Command of the South-West** (command of Army Group C). It was formed on 11/15/1943 as a result of the expansion of the former headquarters of the command of the South (headquarters

of the command of the Air Force). Worked in Italy.

April 22, 1945

subordinated to the High Command of the South. **Commanders:**

Nov. 1943-Oct. 1944 Field Marshal Albert Kesselring Oct.

1944-Jan. 1945 Colonel General Heinrich von Vietinghoff Jan-

March 1945 Field Marshal Albert Kesselring March 1945

Acting gene. Panzer Troops Joachim Lemelsen March-

May 1945 Colonel General Heinrich von Vietinghoff **11. Command of Army Group**

"G" ("G"). Formed 27/4/1944 and subordinated to the

command of Army Group "D" (command of the West). May 13, 1944 - renamed the command of the army group "G". September 15, 1944 - renamed the

command of Army Group G. **Commanders:** May-Sept. 1944 Colonel General Johann Blaskowitz

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sept.-dec. 1944 General of Tank Forces Herman Balk

Jan.-April. 1945 Colonel General of the SS Troops Paul

Hausser April - May 1945 Infantry General Friedrich

Schulz **12. Command of Army Group "X" ("H").** It was formed on November 9, 1944 on the

basis of the operational group "Serbia" and subordinated to the command of Army Group

"D" (command of the West). April 22, 1945 - renamed the command of the North-West

and subordinated to the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht. Operated in the North-West, including the

territory of Holland. **Commanders:** Nov. 1944-Jan.

1945 Colonel-General Kurt Student Jan-May 1945

Colonel-General Johann Blaskowitz **13. Command of Army Group**

"Upper Rhine" ("Oberrein"). Formed 12/7/1944 by the Reichsfuehrer SS. Worked in the West.

January 29, 1945 - renamed the command of the Army Group "Vistula" ("Vistula,

Weichsel"). Worked in the East. 4/4/1945 - reinforced by personnel from the disbanded command

of army group "F" (command of the South-West) and subsequently functioned as a

military administrative body. **Commanders:** Dec. 1944-

March 1945 Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler Jan. 1945

Colonel-General of the SS troops

Paul Hausser March-April. 1945 Colonel General Gotthart Heinrici

apr. 1945 General of the Infantry Kurt von

Tippelskirch Apr.-May 1945 Colonel General

Kurt

Student **2. Armies 1st Army.** Formed in Aug. 1939 on the basis of the headquarters of the 12th AK.

From Aug. 1939 - subordinate to Army Group "C" in the West, from February. 1941 - Army Group

"D" in the West, from April. 1944 - Army Group G in the West. **Commanders:**

Aug. 1939-Oct. 194 (1 Colonel General Erwin von Witzleben Oct.

1940-May 1944 Colonel General Johann

Blaskowitz Sept.-Dec. 1944 General of the Infantry Otto von

Knobelsdorf Dec. 1944-May 1945 General of the Infantry Kurt von der Chevalleri March-May 1945 General of the Infantry He

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2nd army. Formed on September 5, 1939 as a result of the renaming of the 8th Army. April 27, 1945 - renamed the army "East Prussia". From Oct. 1939 - subordinate to Army Group B in the West, from May 1940 - Army Group C in the West, from November. 1940 - Army Group "C" in Germany, from April. 1941 - directly subordinate to the OKH in the Balkans, from May 1941 - directly subordinate to the OKH in Germany, from July 1941 - Army Group Center in the East, from February. 1942 - Army Group South in the East, from July 1942 - Army Group B in the East, from March 1943 - Army Group Center in the East, from February. 1945 - Army Group "Vistula" in the East, since March 1945 - Army Group "North" in the East.

Commanders: Sept. 1939-July 1942 Colonel

General Baron

Maximilian von Weichs July 1942-Jan. 1943

General of the Infantry

Hans von Salmuth Feb. 1943-March 1945 General of the

Infantry Walter Weiss March-May 1945 General of the

Panzer Troops Dietrich von Saucken **3rd**

Army. Formed in

Aug. 1939 based on the headquarters of the 1st AK. 10/05/1939 renamed the command of the border section "North"; in Oct. 1939 - in the 16th army. From Aug. 1939 -

subordinate to Army Group North in Poland; from Oct. 1939 - Army Group South in Poland.

Commander:

Aug-Oct 1939 General of Artillery

Georg von Küchler

4th Army. Formed in Aug. 1939 on the basis of the command of the 6th Army Group. In March 1945 destroyed in the

East. From Aug. 1939 - subordinate to Army Group North in Poland, from October. 1939 - Army Group "B" in the West, from Oct. 1940 - Army Group "B" in Poland, from June 1941 - Army Group "Center"

in the East, from January. 1945 - Army Group North in the East. **Commanders:**

Aug. 1939-dec. 1941 General of Artillery

Günther von Kluge Dec. 1941-Jan. 1942 Colonel General Ludwig Kübler

Jan. 1942-June 1944 General of the Infantry Gotthard Heinrici

June-July 1944 General of the Infantry Hans von

Salmuth July 1944 General of the Infantry Kurt von

Tippepskirch July 1944-Jan. 1945 General of the Infantry

Friedrich Hossbach Jan.-March 1945

General of the Infantry Friedrich Wilhelm Müller May

1945 General of the

Panzer Troops Dietrich von Saucken 509

5th army. Formed in Aug. 1939 based on the 6th AK. 13.9. 1 was reformed into the command of the border section "Center". Nov. 1940 reorganized into the 18th Army. From Aug. 1939 subordinate to Army Group C in the West, from Oct. Army Group South in Poland.

Commander:

Sept.-Oct. 1939 General of the Infantry Kurt

Liebmann **6th Army.** Formed 10/5/1939 by renaming the 10th Army. 2/2/1943 destroyed in Stalingrad.

It was re-formed on 03/05/1943 on the basis of the Hollidt Task Force. From Oct. 1939 -

subordinate to Army Group B in the West, from July 1940 - Army Group A in the West, from Aug. 1940

- Group "B" in the West, from Sept. 1940 - Army Group "C" in the West, from Nov. 1940 - Army Group

C in the West, from May 1941 - Group A (from 21.6.1941 - Army Group South) in the East, from

July 1942 - Army Group B in the East, from November. 1942 - Army Group "Don" in the East. Since

March 1943, under the command of the Army Group "South" in the East. From Oct. 1943 - Army

Group "A" in the East; from Jan. 1944 - groups "South" in the East; from Feb. 1944 - Army Group

"A" in the East; from Apr. 1944 - Army Group "Southern Ukraine" in the East. 1944 - Army Group "South"

in the East. **Commanders:**

Oct. 1939-Nov.

1941 Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau

Jan. 1942-Feb. 1943

Panzer General Friedrich Paulus March 1943-

April. 1944 Colonel

General Carl Hollidt Apr.-June 1944 Artillery General

Max de Angelis June-Dec. 1944 gene.

artillery

Maximilian Fretger-Pico Dec.

1944-May 1945 General of Tank Forces Herman

Balk **7th**

Army. Formed in August 1939 on the basis of the 5th AK.

From August 1939 - under the command of Army Group C in the West, from July 1940 - Army Group B in the West, from October. 1940 - Army Group "D" in the West, from Jan. 1945 - Army Group G in the West.

Commanders: Aug. 1939-June 1944 General

of Artillery Friedrich Dolmann June-Aug. 1944 Colonel-General of

the SS Troops Paul Hausser Aug-Dec. 1944 General of the Infantry
Erich Brandenburger 510

March 1945 General of Infantry Hans Gustav

Felber March-May 1945 General

of Infantry Hans von

Obstfelzer **8th Army.** Initially formed on March 11, 1938 from the 7th and 13th AK, carried out the Anschluss of Austria, after the capture of Austria in March 1938 it was disbanded. Formed in Aug. 1939 based on the 3rd Army Group. On September 5, 1939, it was renamed the 2nd Army. It was re-formed on 16/8/1943 (or 30/9/1942) on the basis of the Kampf task force. From Aug. 1939 - subordinate to Army Group South in Poland. From Aug. 1943 - subordinate to the Army Group "South" in the East, from April; 1944 - Army Group "Southern Ukraine" in the East, from Oct. 1944 - Army Group "South" in the

East. **Commanders:** March 1938 Colonel-

General Fedor von Bock Aug.-Sept. 1939 General of

the Infantry Johann Blaskowitz Sept. 1942-Aug.

1943 Panzer General Werner Kampf Aug. 1943-dec. 1944 General

of the Infantry Otto Wehler Dec. 1944-May 1945 General
of Mountain Rifle

Troops Hans von Kreising **9th Army.** Formed on the basis of the corps command

"Vostok" in May 1940. 26.3.1943 - renamed the fortress headquarters 11. 18.4.1943 - into the group

"Vostok", 5.7.1943 - into the 9th army. From May 1940 - under the command of Army Group "A" in the West, from June 1940 - Army Group "B" in the West, from July 1940 - Army Group "A" in the West, from May 1941 - Army Group "B" in the East, from June 1941 - Army Group Center in the East, from Dec.

1944 - Army Group "A" in the East, from Feb. 1945 - Army Group "Vistula" in the

East. **Commanders:** May-July 1940 Colonel General

Johann Blaskowitz July 1940-Jan. 1942 Colonel General

Adolf Strauss Jan. 1942-Nov. 1943 Colonel General

Walter Model Nov. 1943-May 1944 Colonel General

Josef Harpe May-June 1944 Infantry General

Hans Jordan June-Aug. 1944 General of

Tank Forces N. Forman end of 1944-Jan. 1945 gene. tank

troops Smilo von Lutwitz Jan.-May 1945 Infantry General Theodor

Busse **10th Army.** Formed in August 1939 on the basis of the 4th Army Group. 10/5/1939 renamed the 6th Army. Re-formed in Aug. 1943.

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From Aug. 1939 - subordinate to Army Group South in Poland. From Aug. 1943 - Subordinate

to the Command of the South (Air Force Headquarters) in Italy, from Nov. 1943 - command of the

South-East (army group "C") in Italy. **Commanders:** Aug.-Oct. 1939 General

of Artillery Walther von Reichenau Aug. 1943-Oct. 1944 General of the

Infantry Heinrich von Vietinghoff Feb.-May 1945 General

of the Panzer

Troops Tragot Herr **11th Army.** Formed in October 1940. On November 21, 1942, the Directorate of the Army Group "Don" was formed on the basis of the army headquarters. Re-formed in Feb. 1945 on the basis of the headquarters of the Army Group "Upper Rhine". February 22, 1945 - the headquarters was transferred to the reserve

army. In Apr. 1945 re-incorporated into the active army. From Oct. 1940 - subordinate to Army Group

C in Germany, from May 1945 - OKH in Romania, from June 1941 - Army Group South in the East,

from July 1942 - Army Group A in the East, from Sept. 1942 - Army Group North in the East. From

Feb. 1945 subordinate to the Vistula Army Group in the East, from 22.2.1945 - commander of

the reserve army; from Apr. 1945

- Commander-in-

Chief in the West. **Commanders:** Oct. 1940-Sept. 1941

Colonel

General Eugene Ritter von Schobert Sept. 1941-Nov. 1942 Field Marshal General

Erich von Manstein

February-March 1945 SS General

Felix Martin Steiner March-

May 1945 General of Artillery Walter Lucht **12th**

Army. Formed 10/5/1939 by renaming the 14th Army. 5.1.-28.1.1941 the army headquarters was called the headquarters of the commander of the armed forces in the South-East (headquarters of the 12th army). 12/28/1942 - reorganized into the command of Army Group "E" (command of the South-East). Re-formed in Apr. 1945 from parts of the headquarters of the army group "North" and the headquarters of the chief of supply and supply of army group "F". From Oct. 1939 - subordinate to Army Group "D" in the West, from October. 1940 - Army Group "B" on the Soviet-German demarcation line, from January. 1941 - OKH in Romania, from 1.3.1941 - in Bulgaria, from April. 1941 - OKH in Yugoslavia and Greece, from June 1941 - OKH in the South-East. From Apr. 1945 subordinate to the Army Group Commander-in-Chief in the West; from the end of Apr. 1945 - Army Group "Vistula". 512

Commanders:

Oct. 1939-Oct. 1941 Field Marshal Wilhelm

List Oct. 1941-Aug. 1942 gene. pioneer troops Walter Kuntze Aug.-Dec. 1942

Colonel-General Alexander Löhr April-May 1945

General of Tank Troops Walter Wenk **14th Army.**

Formed in August 1939 on the basis of the 5th Army Group. 10/5/1939 renamed the 12th Army. It was re-formed in November 1943 on the basis of the command of the South. From Aug. 1939 - subordinate to Army Group South in Poland. From November 1943 - subordinate to Army Group C in Italy. **Commanders:** Aug.-Oct. 1939 Colonel General Wilhelm List Nov. 1943-July 1944 Colonel General Ebergard von

Mackensen July-Oct. 1944 Panzer General Joachim Lemelsen Oct.

1944-Feb. 1945 General of Artillery Heinz Ziegler Feb.-May 1945 General of Panzer Troops Joachim Lemelsen

15th Army. Formed in Jan. 1941 on the basis of the 6th Army.

From Jan. 1941 - subordinate to Army Group "D" in the West, from March 1941 - Army Group "A" in the West, from April. 1941 - Army Group "D" in the West.

Commanders:

Jan. 1941-Jan. 1943 Colonel General Kurt Gaase

Feb. 1942-Aug. 1943 General of the Infantry Heinrich von Vietinghoff-

Scheel Aug. 1943-Aug. 1944 Colonel General Hans von

Salmuth Aug. 1944-May 1945 Infantry General Gustav

von Zangen **16th Army.** Formed 10/25/1939 by renaming the 3rd Army. From

Oct. 1939 - subordinate to Army Group A in the West, from May 1941 - Army Group C in East Prussia, from June 1941 - Army Group North in the East, from January. 1945 - Army Group "Courland" in the East. **Commanders:** Oct.

1939-Oct. 1943

Field Marshal Ernst Busch Oct. 1943-July 1944 General of

Artillery Christian Hanse 3.9.1944-April. 1945 Infantry General

Karl Gilpert April-May 1945 Gen. mountain infantry troops Friedrich Volkamer

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17th Army. Formed in December 1940/12/7/1944, its units were destroyed in the Crimea, and the headquarters was evacuated and new units were given to it. From Jan. 1941 - subordinate to Army Group "B" on the Soviet-German demarcation line, since May 1941 - Army Group "A" in the same place; from June 1941 - Army Group "South" in the East, from July 1942 - Army Group "A" in the East, from April. 1944 - Army Group "South Ukraine" in the East, from August 1944 - Army Group "Northern Ukraine" in the East, from October 1944 - Army Group "A" in the East, from February 1945 - Army Group "Center" in the East; **Commanders:** Feb.-Oct. 1941 Infantry General Karl von Stülpnagel Oct.1941-Jan. 1942 Colonel General Herman Goth June! 942-June 1943 Colonel General Richard Ruoff

July 1943-May 1944 General of Engineers Erwin Jeneke May-July 1944 General of Infantry Karl Almendinger July 1944-Jan. 1945 General of the Infantry Friedrich Schulze April-May 1945 General of the Infantry Wilhelm Hasse
18th Army. Formed in November 1939 on the basis of the 5th Army. From November 1939 - under the command of Army Group B in the West, from July 1940 - OKH on the Soviet German demarcation line, from May 1941 - Army Group C in East Prussia, from June 1941 - Army Group North in the East, from Jan. 1945 - Army Group "Courland" in the East.

Commanders:

Nov. 1939-Jan. 1942 General of Artillery Georg von K  chler

Jan. 1942-March 1944 Cavalry General Georg von Lindemann

March-Sept. 1944 General of the Infantry Herbert

Loch Sept. 1944-May 1945 Infantry General Ehrenfried

Bege **19th Army.** Formed in August 1943 on the basis of the reorganization of the headquarters of the 83rd AK (army group "Felber"). From August 1943 - under the command of Army Group D (West Command), from May 1944 - Army Group G in the West, from December 1944 - Army Group Upper Rhine in the West, from January 1945 - Army Group G in the

West. **Commanders:** Aug. 1943-June 1944 General of the Infantry Georg von Sodenstern July-Dec. 1944

General of the Infantry Friedrich Wiese Dec. 1944-

March 1945 General of the Infantry

Siegfried Raschp March 1945 General of the Infantry Hans von Obstfelzer March-May 1945 General of the Infantry Erich Brande
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20th mountain army. Formed 20/6/1942 on the basis of the army "Lapland".

From June 1942 - subordinate to the Design Bureau in Finland and Northern Norway, from the end of 1944 - in Norway.

Commanders: June 1942-June 1944 Colonel General

Edward Dietl June 1944-Jan. 1945 Colonel General Lothar von

Rendulich Jan-May 1945 mountain rifle troops

Franz B  hme

21st Army. Formed at the end of April 1945 from the remnants of the 4th Army. Since April 1945 - subordinate to the Army Group "Vistula" in the East.

Commanders: Apr. 1945-May 1945 Colonel General

Nikolaus von Falkenhorst **24th Army.** Formed at the end of 1944. From the end of April. 1945 - subordinate to Army Group G

in the West. **25th Army.** Formed 4/1/1945 on the basis of the reorganized 88th AK (commander's headquarters in

the Netherlands). From January 1945 - under the command of Army Group "X" in the West, from 22.4.1945 - command of

the North West. **Commanders:** Jan-March 1945 General

of the Infantry G  nther Blumentrit March-Apr.

1945 Cavalry General Philipp Kleffel Apr.-

May 1945 Aviation

General Friedrich Christiansen **1st Parachute Army (Air Force Headquarters).** Formed in July 1944 on the basis of the reorgan
th Aviation Corps.

Since July 1944 - subordinate to Army Group X in the West. **Commanders:** May-

Nov. 1944 Colonel General Kurt Student Nov. 1944-

May 1945 General of the Parachute Troops Alfred

Schlemm Apr. 1945 Colonel General Kurt Student **Army**

"Norway". Formed in December 1940 on the basis of the 21st group (headquarters of the 21st AK). 12/18/1944 disbanded, troops transferred to the command of the 20th Mountain

Army. Since December 1940 - subordinate to the OKH in Norway; from 31.10. '944 -20th Mountain Army in Norway.

Commander: Dec. 1940-dec. 1944 Colonel General

Nikolaus von Falkenhorst

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Army Lapland. Formed on 14.1.1942 in Finland as a result of the division of the army

"Norway". On June 22, 1942, it was renamed the 20th Mountain Army.

Commander: Nov. 1941-June 1942 Colonel-General

Edward Dietl **3. Tank**

Armies 1st Tank Army. Formed on 11/16/1940 on the basis of the 22nd AK. Until 10/05/1941 it was called the 1st

Panzer Group. From November 1940 - under the command of Army Group C in Germany, from January 1941 - in Romania, from April 1941 - in Yugoslavia, from May 1941 - 2nd Army in Germany, from June 1941 - Army Group South in the East, from July 1942 - Army Group "A" in the East, from February 1943 - Army Group "Don" in the East, from March 1943 - Army Group "South" in the East, from April 1944 - Army Group "South Ukraine" in the East, October 1944 - Army Group A in the East, from February 1945 - Army

Group Center in the East. **Commanders:** Nov. 1940-Nov.

1942 Colonel General Ewald von Kleist Nov. 1942-Oct. 1943

Cavalry General Ebergard von Mackensen Oct. 1943-

Apr. 1944 General Colonel Hans Valentin Hube April-May

1944 tank troops Carl von der Chevalier May-Aug.

1944 Panzer General Ergard Raus Aug. 1944-March

1945 Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici March-anp. 1945

General of the Panzer Troops Walter Nehring **2nd Panzer Army.** Formed 11/16/1940 on the basis of the 19th AK.

Until 10/05/1941 it was called the 2nd Panzer Group. From November 1940 - under the command of Army Group B on the Soviet-German demarcation line, from June 1941 - Army Group Center in the East, from September 1943 - Army Group F in the South East (command in the South East), from

December 1944 - Army Group "South" in the East

Commanders: Nov. 1940-Jan. 1942 Colonel General

Heinz Guderian Jan. 1942-July 1943 Colonel General Rudolf

Schmidt July 1943-June 1944 Colonel General Logar

von Rendulich June-July 1944 Panzer General Franz Boehme July 1944-May 1945 Artillery General Max de Angelis

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3rd Panzer Army. Formed 11/16/1940 on the basis of the 15th AK. Until 12/31/1941 it was called the 3rd Panzer

Group. From November 1940 - under the command of Army Group C in Germany, from June 1941 - Army Group Center in the East, from September 1944 - Army Group North in the East, from October 1944 - Army Group Center in the East, from January 1945 - Army Group North in the East, from February 1945 - Army Group Vistula in the

East. **Commanders:** Nov. 1940-Oct. 1941

Colonel-General Herman Goth oct. 1941-

Aug. 1944 Panzer

General Georg Hans Reinhardt Aug. 1944-March

1945 Colonel-General Erhard Raus March-May

1945 Panzer

Troops Hasso von Manteuffel **4th Panzer Army.** Formed on February 15, 1941 on the basis of the 16th AK. Until

12/31/1941 it was called the 4th Panzer Group. From February 1941 - subordinate to the 18th Army in East Prussia, from May 1941 - Army Group C in East Prussia, from June 1941 - Army Group North in the East, from October 1942 - Army Group Center in the East, from May 1942 - OKH, from June 1942 - Army Group South in the East, from July 1942 - Army Group A in the East, from February 1943 - Army Group Don in the East, from March 1943 - Army Group "South" in the East, from April 1944 - Army Group "Northern Ukraine" in the East, from October 1944 - Army Group "A" in the East, from February 1945 -

Army Group "Center" in the East. **Commanders:**

Feb. 1941-Jan. 1942 Colonel General

Erich Hoepner Jan. 1942 Colonel General

Richard Ruoff Feb. 1942-dec. 1943 Colonel

General Hermann Goth Dec. 1943-May 1944

Colonel General Erhard Raus May-June

1944 Colonel General Josef Harpe July-Aug. 1944 Panzer General

Walter Nehring Aug.-Sept. 1944 Panzer

General Herman Balk Sept. 1944-May 1945 Panzer General Franz Hubert Graeser

5th Panzer Army. Formed 12/8/1942 on the basis of the reorganization of the 90th AK. 13/4/1943 destroyed in Tunisia. Newly formed on 27/7/1944 on the basis of the reorganization of the West tank group.
From December 1942 - subordinate to the command "South" (Air Force headquarters) in Tunisia, from the end of February 1943 - Army Group "Africa" in Tunisia. Since July 1944, under the command of Army Group B in the West, since October 1944 - Army Group G in the West, since November 1944 - Army Group B in the West. April 12, 1945 - capitulated.

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Commanders:

Dec. 1942-Apr. 1943 Colonel General Jurgen von Arnim apr.
1943 Panzer General Gustav von Waerst July-
Aug. 1944 Panzer General Heinz Eberbach Sept.
1944-March 1945 gene. tank troops Hasso von Manteuffel
March-April. 1945 Colonel General Josef Harpe **6th SS Panzer Army.**
Formed on September 6, 1944 by the command of the SS troops. From sept. 1944
- subordinate to Army Group "B" in the West, since February 1945 - Army Group "South" in the East.

Commander:

Sept. May 1944 1945 Colonel-General of the SS troops Josef Dietrich
Panzer Army "Africa". Formed 15/8/1941 as Panzer Group Africa. January 22, 1942 - renamed Panzer Army Africa. 11/1/1942 - reorganized into the German-Italian tank army. At the end of February 1943 it was divided into the 1st Italian Panzer Army and Army Group Africa. Since August 1942 - subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the Italian Armed Forces in North Africa. **Commander:** Aug. 1941-sept. 1942 Colonel General Erwin Rommel Sept.- Oct. 1942 Panzer General Georg Stumme Oct. 1942-Feb. 1943 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel
Tank Group West. 27/7/1944 transformed into the 5th Panzer Army. **Commanders:** Oct. 1943-June 1944 gene. tank troops Leo Baron Geyer von Schweppenburg June-July 1944 Colonel General of the SS troops Josef Dietrich July 1944 General of the tank troops Heinrich Eberbach

APPENDIX 12

Higher formations of the Red Army on June 22, 1941 1.

Northern Front (formed on the basis of the LVO)

(15 s. Commander General Popov M. M. 1st M. K. - Major General Chernyavsky M. L. (since 06.07 as part of the North-Western Front) 7th varnish. 2nd Air Defense Corps - Colonel Danilov S. P. 2nd Air Defense Corps - Major General Protsvetkin M. M. **7th Army of the LVO** Commander - Lieutenant General Gorelenko F. D. Member of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar Zelenkov M. N. Chief of Staff - Major General Krutikov A. N. **14th Army of the LVO** Commander - Lieutenant General Frolov V. A. Member of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar Kryukov A. I. Chief of Staff - Colonel Svirsky L. S. 42- y s. K. Major General Panin R. I. (From 6.07 as part of the North-Western Front) **23rd Army of the LVO** Commander - Lieutenant General Pshennikov P. S. Member of the Military Council - Brigadier Commissar Sosnovikov V. V. Chief of Staff - Colonel Gorodetsky N. V. 19th p. K. - Lieutenant General Gerasimov M. N. 50th p. K. - Major General Shcherbakov V.I. 10th M.K. - Major General Lazarev I.G. ., 4 t.d., 2 p.m., 5 a.d.) Commander - Colonel-General Kuznetsov F.I. Website of the Red Army: <http://www.rkka.ru/i22.htm> Also used materials of volume 4 of the History of the Second World War in 12 volumes and the book "Secrecy removed: losses of the armed forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts) under the general editorship of G. Krivosheev, M., 1993.

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Member of the Military Council - Corps Commissar Dibrova P. A. Chief of Staff - Lieutenant General Klenov P. S. Commander of the Air Force - Major General Ionov A. P. Chief of Staff of the Air Force

- Major General Sinyakov S. P.

65th p. K. Major General Komissarov K. V. 5th c. Major General Bezugly I.S. **8th**

Army of the Baltic OVO

Commander - Major General Sobennikov P.P. Member of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar Shabalov S.I. Chief of Staff - Major General Larionov G.A. 10th p. K.

- Major General Nikolaev I. F. 11th p. K. -

Major General Shumilov M. S. 12th M. K. -

Major General Shestopalov N. M. **11th Army**

of the Baltic OVO Commander -

Lieutenant General Morozov V. I. Member of the

Military Council - Brigadier Commissar Zuev I. V. Chief of

Staff - Major General Shlemin I. G. 16th p. K. - Major General Ivanov M. M. 29th p. K. - Major General

Samokhin A. G. 3rd M. K. - Major General Kurkin A. V. **27th Army of**

the Baltic OVO Commander - Major

General Berzarin N. E. Member of the Military

Council - Divisional Commissar Batrakov P.K. Chief of Staff -

Colonel Boloznev 3. V. 22nd p. K. - Major General Dukhanov M. P. 24th p. K. - Major General

Kachanov **K.M.** e.) Commander

- General of the Army Pavlov D. G. Member of the Military

Council - Corps Commissar Fominykh A.

Ya. Chief of Staff - Major General Klimovskikh V. E. Commander of the Air Force - Major

General Kopets I. I. Chief of Staff of the Air Force - Colonel Khudyakov S. A. 2nd p. K. - Major

General Ermakov A.N. (since June 26, as part of the 13th Army) 21st S. K. - Major

General Borisov V. B. 44th p. to. - Divisional Commander

Yushkevich

V. A. (since 26.06. as part of the 13th

Army) K. - Major General Povetkin S. I. 17th M. K. - Major

General

Petrov M. P. 520

20th m. to. - Major General Nikitin A. G. 4th

c. d. to. - Major General Zhidov (Zhadov) A.S. **3rd**

Army of the Western OVO

Commander - Lieutenant General Kuznetsov V.I.

Member of the Military Council - Arm. com. 12 r Biryukov

N. I. Chief of Staff - Major General Kondratyev A. K. 4th p. K. - Major General Yegorov E. A. 11th M.

K. - Major General TV Mostovenko D. K. 4th

Army of the Western OVO

Commander - Major General Korobkov A. A. Member of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar

Shlykov M.S. Chief of Staff - Colonel Sandalov L.M. 28th p. K. -

Major General Popov V. S. 14th M. K. -

Major General Oborin S. I. **10th Army of**

the Western OVO

Commander - Major General Golubev K. D.

Member of the Military Council - Brigadier Commissar Dubrovsky

D. G Chief of Staff - Major General Lyamin P. I.

1st s. K. - Major General Rubtsov F. D.

5th p. K. - Major General Garnov A. V.

6th M. K. - Major General Khatskilevich M. G.

13th M. K. - Major General Akhlyustin P. N.

6th Kav. K. - Major General Nikitin I.S. **13th**

Army of the Western OVO

Commander - Lieutenant General Filatov P.M., Member of the Military Council - Brigadier Commissar

Furt P.S. Chief of Staff - Brigade Commander Petrushevsky

A.V. **4. South-Western Front (formed on the basis of**

KOVO) (32nd rifle division, 16th division,

8th division, 2nd cavalry division, 10th division) Commander Colonel General Kirponos M. P.

Member of the Military Council Corps Commissar Vashugin N. N. Chief of Staff Lieutenant General

Purkaev M. A. Commander of the Air Force Lieutenant General Ptukhin E. S.

Chief of Staff of the Air Force Major General Laskin N. A. 31st p. K. - Major General Lopatin A. I.

36th p. K. - Major General Sysoev P. V. 55th p. K. - Major General Koroteev K. A. 49th p. K. - Major General Kornilov I. A.

19th M.C. - Major General TV Feklenko N.V. 24th M.C. - Major General Chistyakov V.I. 1st c. D.K.
- Major General Usenko M.A. 5th

Army of the

KOVO Commander - Major General Potapov

M.I. Member of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar

Nikishev M.S. Chief of Staff - Major General Pisarevsky D.S. 15th p. K. - Colonel Fedyuninsky I. I.

27th p. K. - Major General Artemenko P. D. 9th M. K. - Major General Rokossovsky K. K. 22nd M.

K. - Major General Kondrusev S. M.

6th Army KOVO

Commander - Lieutenant General Muzychenko I.N.

Member of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar Popov

N.K. Chief of Staff - Brigade Commander Ivanov N.P. K. - Major General Alekseev I. I. 37th p. K. -

Brigade Commander Zybin S. P. 4th M. K. - Major General Vlasov A. A. 15th M. K. - Major General

Karpezo I. I. 5th Kav. K. - Major General

Kamkov F. V. **12th**

Army KOVO Commander Major General

Ponedelin P. G. Member of the Military Council Brigadier

Commissar Kulikov I. P. Chief of Staff Major General Arushanyan B. I. 13th SC 12 Major General

Kirillov N.K. 17th SC 12th Major General Galanin I.V. I. Member of the

Military Council -

Brigadier Commissar Kolesnikov D. E. Chief of Staff

- Colonel Varennikov I. S. 8th p. K. - Major General Snegov M.

G. 8th M. K. - Lieutenant General Ryabyshev D. I. **5. Southern Front (formed on the basis of the OdVO)** (13 s. m. d., 3 kav. d., 3

a. d.) In the operational subordination of the

South-Western Front Commander -

Tyulenev I. V. 7th p. K. - OdVO Major General

Dobroserdov K. L. 9th p. K. - OdVO Lieutenant General Batov P. I. 3rd c. D.C. - OdVO Major

General Glazunov V.A.

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9th Army of the

OdVO Commander - Cherevichenko Ya. T. 14th p. K. - Major General Egorov D. G. 35th p. K. - brigade

commander Dashichev I. F. 48th p. K. - Major General Malinovskiy R. Ya. 2nd M. K. - Lieutenant

General Novoselsky Yu. V. 2nd Cavalry. K. - Major General Belov P. A. 18th M. K. - Major General

Volokh P. V.

6. Reserves of

the RGC 20th p. K. - Major General Eremin S. I. 45th p. K. - Divisional Commander Magon E.

Ya. 67th p. K. - Brigade Commander Zhmachenko F. F. 21st M. K. - Major General Lelyushenko

D. D. 1st dbak. - Major General Izotov V.I. 2nd dbak. - Colonel Smirnov K. I. 3rd dbak. -

Colonel Skripko N. S. 4th dbak.

- Colonel Sudets V.A. 5th dbak. **16th Army of the ZabVO** (from 21.06 transferred to the **KOVO**,

from 28.06 it is considered to be part of **the Army Group of the**

Reserve, from 2.07 it is part of **the Western**

Front) Commander - Lieutenant General Lukin M. F. Member

of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar Lobachev A. A. Chief of Staff - Colonel Shalin M.A.

32nd p. K. - Major General Kolomiets T. K. 5th M. K. - Major General

Alekseenko

I. P. (since 02.07. as part of the 20th **Army**) As part of **the Southern Front**,

the 19th Army (since June 28, as part of **the Army Group of the Reserve** under the command

of S. M. Budyonny) The Directorate was formed on the basis of the North Caucasus Military

District Commander - General Konev I. S. 25th p. K. - Major General Chestokhvalov S. M. 34th p.

K. - Lieutenant General

Khmelnitsky R. P. 26th M. **K. - Major** General Kirichenko N. Ya. on the basis of OrVO

Commander - General Kurochkin P. A.

61st p. K. - Major General Bakunin F. A. 69th p. K. - Major General Mogilevchik E. A. 523

7th Mechanized Corps - **Major General** V.

I. Vinogradov base PriVO 63rd p. K. - commander Petrovsky L. G. 66th p. **K. - Major** General

Sudakov F.P.

The department was formed on the basis of the Ural Military District Commander - General Ershakov F. A. 51st p. K. - Major General Markov A. M. 62nd p. K. - **Major** General Karmanov I.P. K. - Major General Andreev D. I. 53rd p. K. - Major General Seleznev **D.M.** K. - Major General Kuleshov **A. D.** 7. Far Eastern Front **1st Red Banner Army of the Far Eastern Fleet**
Commander
- Lieutenant General Vasiliev V. P. Member of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar Romanenko A. A. Chief of Staff - Major General Shelakhov G A. 26th p. K. - 1st A Far Eastern Fleet, Major
General Dubkov M. G. 59th p. K. - 1st A Far Eastern Fleet, Major
General Morozov A. M. 30th M. K. - 1st A Far Eastern Fleet, Lieutenant General Golubovsky **V. S. F.** Member of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar Shebalin N.I. Chief of Staff - Major General Korytnikov P.K.
15th Army of the Far Eastern Fleet
Commander - Major General Cheremisov L.G. Chief of Staff - Major General Yu. L. Gorodinsky

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18th p. K. - Major General Zaitsev V. A. **25th Army** of the Far Eastern Fleet Commander - Lieutenant General Parusinov F. A. Member of the Military Council - Brigadier
Commissar Lebedev N. G. Chief of Staff - Lieutenant General Ivanov V. D. 39- y s. K. - Major General Gorodinsky Yu. L. **8. Transcaucasian Military District** 3rd s. K. - Lieutenant General Chernyak S. I. 23rd p. K. - Major General Baronov K. F. 40th p. K. - Major General Khadeev A. A. 28th m. K. - Major General Novikov V. V. 8th and. A. K. - 3rd Air Defense Corps 3rd Air Defense Corps - Major General Gudymenko P. E. **9. Oryol Military District** 30th p. K. - Lieutenant General Selivanov I. V. 33rd p. K. - Major General Khalyuzin F. A. 23rd M. K. - Major General Myasnikov M. A. **10. Moscow Military District** 41st p. K. - Major General Kosobutsky I.S. (from 6.07 as part of **the North-Western Front**) 6th and. A. K. - 1st Air Defense Corps, Colonel Klimov ID. 1st Air Defense Corps, Major General art. Zhuravlev A. D. **11. Central Asian military district** 58th p. K. - Major General Grigorovich M. F. 27th M. K. - Major General Petrov I. E. 4th Cavalry. K. - Lieutenant General Shapkin T. T. **12. Kharkov Military District** of the 2nd century. D. K. - Major General Kharitonov F. M. **13. Transbaikal Military District** 12th p. K. - Major General Fomenko S.S. **17th Army** Commander - Lieutenant General Romanenko P.L. Member of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar Novikov S.M. Chief of Staff -

APPENDIX 13 1

Higher formations of the Soviet army in 1941-1942.

Organizational events. Commissioning of additional forces 1941 Frontier battle in the North

(Strategic defensive operation in the Arctic and Karelia) Duration: from 29.06. by 10.10.

Organizational changes: from August 23, **the Northern Front** is divided into: **the Leningrad Front** (commander Popov M.M.) as part of the 23rd, 8th, 42nd armies;

Karelian Front (commander Frolov V.A.) as part of the 7th, 14th armies; from 25.09. The 7th Army was given the status of a separate one. In total, an additional 10 divisions and 5 brigades were introduced. **Border battle in the Baltics (Baltic strategic defensive operation)** Duration: from 22.06 to 09.07. In total, additionally introduced: 14 divisions, 1 brigade. **Border battle in Belarus (Belarusian strategic defensive operation).** Duration: from 22.06. to 09.07.

Organizational changes: from 28.06. the Army Group of the Reserve was created as part of the 16th (until 2.07), 19th (until 2.07), 20th (until 2.07), 21st (until 2.07), 22nd (until 2.07), 24th Army; from 2.07 the 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd armies were transferred to the Western Front. In total, an additional 45 divisions were introduced. **Border battle in Western Ukraine (Lvov-Cherno-Vitskaya strategic defensive operation)** Duration: from 22.06 to 6.07. Organizational changes: from June 25, the management **of the Southern Front was introduced**; from 25.06, the command **of**

the 18th army was introduced. In total, an additional 12 divisions and 6 brigades were introduced.
¹ The site of the "RKKA": <http://www.rkKa.ru/i22.htm> Also used materials from volume 4 "History of the Second World War in 12 volumes" and the book "Secrecy removed: losses of the armed forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts) under the general editorship of G. Krivosheev. M., 1993. 526

Leningrad strategic defensive operation Duration: from 10.7 to 30.9. Organizational changes: from August 23, part of the troops **of the Northern Front** was allocated to **the Leningrad Front**; 5 army directorates were introduced (from 14.07 - the 34th army, from 31.08 - the 54th, 55th, 42nd armies, made up of garrisons of the URs and militias, from 1.09 the 52nd separate army takes part in hostilities). In total, an additional 20 divisions were introduced. **Battle of Smolensk** Duration: from 10.7 to 10.9. Organizational changes: from 14.07. **The front of the Reserve Armies** was created as part of the 24th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd (until 18.07) armies. from 18.07. **the front of the Mozhaisk Line of Defense** under the command of P.A. Artemyev was created as part of the 32nd Army, the 33rd Army, which is in the process of being formed; from July 24, the 13th and 21st armies **of the Western Front** were assigned to **the Central Front** under the command of F. I. Kuznetsov; from 30.07. **the front of the Reserve Armies** and **the front of the Mozhaisk Defense Line** were abolished, their troops were transferred to **the Reserve Front** under the command of G.K. Zhukov; on August 16, **the Bryansk Front** was created as part of the 50th, 3rd, 13th armies). A total of 9 army directorates were introduced (24th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 43rd, 49th, 50th armies). A total of 59 additional divisions and 2 brigades were introduced. **Kiev defensive operation** Duration: from 7.07 to 26.09. Organizational changes: from August 5, the 37th (from the KIUR) and 38th armies were created, from the end of August the 40th army was created from the 37th and 26th armies under the command of K. Podlas. In total, an additional 28 divisions and 4 brigades were introduced. **Defense of Odessa** Duration: 5.08 - 16.10. Organizational changes: on the basis of the Odessa defensive region, a Separate Primorsky Army was created. **Donbass-Rostov defensive operation** Duration: from 29.9 to 16.11. Organizational changes: management of the 56th separate army was introduced. A total of 8 additional divisions were introduced. 527
Crimean defensive operation Duration: from 18.10 to 16.11. Organizational changes: management of the 51st separate army was introduced.
Moscow defensive operation

Duration: from 30.09 to 05.12.

Organizational changes: **the**

Reserve Front was abolished from

12.10; management **of the Kalinin Front** was introduced

from 20.10; **the Bryansk Front** was

abolished from 10.11; controls of the 1st shock, 5th, 10th,

16th armies were introduced. In total, an additional 34

divisions and 40 brigades were introduced.

Sevastopol defensive operation Duration: 10/30/1941 - 07/04/1942

Organizational changes: a separate Primorsky Army was renamed into the Sevastopol

Defensive Region. **Tikhvin defensive**

operation Duration: from 10.11 to 30.12. Organizational changes:

from 17.12, the departments **of the Volkhov Front**, the 4th and 52nd separate

armies were introduced;

administration of the 59th army was introduced. In total,

an additional 16 divisions and 2 brigades

were introduced. **Rostov**

offensive operation Duration;

from 17.11 to 02.12. Organizational changes: from November

23, the 56th separate army was

transferred to **the Southern Front**. In total,

5 additional brigades were introduced. **Moscow offensive operation** Duration: from December

5, 1941 to January 7, 1942. Organizational changes: the administration of **the**

Bryansk Front was introduced (since December 24),

the

administrations of the 39th and 61st armies. In

total, an additional 22 divisions, 40 brigades were introduced. **1942 Rzhev-Vyazemskaya offensive**

operation Duration: from January 10 to April 20. Organizational changes:

Commands of the 3rd and 4th shock armies were introduced. In

total, an additional 29 divisions and

33 brigades were introduced.

Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad defensive

operation Duration: June 28 - July 24. Organizational changes: management of **the Voronezh Front** was introduced; 528

introduced 3 army controls. In

total, an additional 4 tank corps, 20 divisions were introduced.

Stalingrad defensive operation Duration: from

July 17 to November 18. Organizational

changes: **South-Eastern Front**

30.9. renamed the **Stalingrad Front**; **Stalingrad Front** 30.9. renamed the **Don**

Front; 5 army directorates, 2 tank armies directorates were introduced.

In total, an additional 56 divisions and 33 brigades were

introduced. **North Caucasian defensive operation**

Duration: from July 25 to December 31, 1942.

Organizational changes: 28.07. **The southern front**

was renamed into **the North**

Caucasian; 01.09. **The North Caucasian Front** was renamed

the **Black Sea Group of Forces**; administrations of the 44th and 46th armies were

introduced. A total of 31 additional

divisions and 27 brigades were introduced. **Stalingrad**

Offensive Operation Duration: November 19,

1942 to February 2, 1943 In total, an additional 5 t. to., 3. m.

to., 6 brigades were introduced.

1943 North Caucasian offensive operation Duration: from January 1 to February

4, 1943. Organizational changes: 5 shock army

introduced. In total, an additional 5 divisions and 6

brigades were introduced. The literature

also mentions the following

formations: the 53rd Army

as part of **the North-Western Front** at the beginning

of 1942 (Demyansk operation from 7.01 to 20.05);

57th Army as part of the **Southern Front** in May 1942 (Kharkov battle); 2nd Shock Army as part of the **Volkhov Front** in the first half of 1942.




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


Схема 2

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Группа альтернативных Реальностей,
"выгодных" для СССР ("зеленые Реальности")




Схема 3

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Альтернативные Реальности,
связанные с битвой под Москвой




Схема 4

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Схема 5

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


Схема 6




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